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Abstract in English 
In cities, timely emergency response (ER) presupposes timely citywide accessibility enabled by the 
road transport system’s uninterrupted functioning. However, in this era of increasing frequency and 
intensity of extreme weather events and hydrometeorological hazards, delays or blockages challenge 
timely accessibility. Therefore, the thesis aims to contribute to saving lives by reducing losses in 
critical infrastructure (CI) functioning for adaptive emergency response (ER) provision towards the 
population’s and the emergency responders’ safety. For this purpose, the urban ER system is 
presented as a complex adaptive system of systems (SoS) that, under the stressor of floods, can adapt 
and transform so to retain its critical functionality considering safety and security aspects.  
For a deepened understanding of flood risks, their cascading impacts and interrelation with the 
resilience of a complex adaptive SoS, the thesis introduces an operational resilience framework that 
adopts an interdependent resiliencies concept and combines a top-down and a bottom-up spatial 
scaling approach. The SoS resilience concept, as applied to an urban ER system, introduces an 
operational framework for the urban emergency response resilience (ERR) that follows the 4R model 
(4Resilience characteristics: robustness, resourcefulness, redundancy, rapidity of response) in an 
interdependent form. The usefulness and intent of adopting the urban ERR concept from European 
stakeholders and researchers and emergency response and civil protection officials are analysed with 
semi-structured interviews. The CAS theory applied to the urban ER system enables its division to 
the agent, system and network level and identifies the hierarchy between its constituent systems. The 
road transport system is higher in the hierarchy due to its pivotal role in the urban ER system’s 
behaviour and, therefore, is the ‘zero-point’ for further flood risk assessments. The graph theory and 
the complex network theory assist with graphical representations and compartmentalisation of the 
urban ER system to its systems, networks, and components and digitisation using geographic 
information systems (GIS) for ERR assessments. 
The ERR to regular and extreme scenarios of riverine floods and flash floods is assessed with a multi-
criteria risk-based time-dependent accessibility indicator (RITAI) for Cologne’s fire brigade system 
in Germany. The RITAI utilises applied geoinformatics with geographic information systems (GIS) 
to identify first-, second and third-order flood risks in various scales and levels of this urban ER 
system, with a top-down and an eight-step GIS-based spatial upscaling approach. Safety and security 
aspects are considered with the RITAI’s benchmarking according to the fire trucks’ safe driving 
capacity through flooded waters, the flood depths and the road types. After defining analyses’ units 
on a road network level, a developed semi-automated GIS-Toolkit integrates flood depth and flood-
impacted road type-dependent speeds in the road network database for each of the selected flood 
scenarios. The resulting flood-risk informative road networks are utilised for large-scale road network 
resilience capacities, assessed with changes in transport characteristics. Later and after the definition 
of city units, citywide connectivity and accessibility assessments are conducted with network 
analyses. For a pattern identification of the fire brigade system’s ERR to floods, the RITAI is assessed 
and visualised in each city unit, after classification according to Cologne's fire brigades' official ER 
time thresholds - eight minutes. Geovisualisation and fuzzification techniques are utilised for 
simplification and aggregation of the information. Flood-impact statistical curves are also generated 
for aggregation of information and preparedness of response to escalating or compound flood events. 
The data utilised were retrieved from open sources and fire brigade and flood management local 
officials in raster, vector, Excel files and official reports and were visualised in maps. The data 
undertook cleaning and transformation for interoperability purposes and further handling. The 
RITAI’s general application and handling of data can be time-consuming, with the processing costs 
depending highly on the selected units of analyses and the computer’s memory capacity. 
The results, i.e., large-scale road network exposure, redundancy and resourcefulness, citywide 
accessibility route plans and spatial hexagonal urban ER system connectivity and ERR matrixes, are 
visualised in maps. They indicate that the citywide ER efficiency in cities depends highly on large-
scale geolocated flood extent and flood depth information and the road type and the rescue vehicles’ 
capacity for safe drivability through flooded waters. It is identified that the regular and extreme flash 
floods scenarios follow a similar geographical locality of occurrence. However, the extreme flash 




to floods and the geolocation of flood intensities. Moreover, in cities, the local enhancement of the 
road network’s resilience (absorption, adaptation and transformation) capacities, considering the 
emergency responders’ safety, enhances the fire brigade system’s ERR to floods. The local extension 
of CI functioning is achieved by enhancing resourcefulness (transformation capacity) with an 
extension of the road transport system’s endogenous redundancy (adaptation capacity). This 
extension further extends its exogenous redundancy of alternative accessibility route paths, enhancing 
the fire brigade system’s response capacity. Additionally, statistical analyses of the road transport 
system’s resilience capacities in case of escalating floods revealed that its resilience capacity for ER 
provision is highly decreased. Finally, ERR assessments indicate that the ER provision will 
potentially be highly incapacitated in case of an extreme riverine flood scenario and highly delayed 
with an extreme flash flood scenario.  It is also identified that east Cologne needs further attention in 
the preparedness phase for timely ER under flooded conditions. Nevertheless, the results depend on 
the correctness of data used, their resolution and unit of analyses, which can cause biases in the 
calculation processes. Biases in interpreting the results are reduced by simplifying the system’s 
connectivity and ERR information in hexagonal spatial matrixes.  
With the concept of ERR and its operationalisation approach, current silo-thinking disaster risk 
management (DRM) approaches are enriched with CAS, resilience, security and spatial thinking, 
enabling holistic and collaborative risk mitigation strategies. For this purpose, an identified lacking 
connection between the application fields of emergency rescue systems, civil protection and critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP) is now established with the suggested urban ER system. Additionally, 
the enhancement of the ERR and the communities’ resilience through timely ER provision is achieved 
with enhanced geospatial preparedness for adaptive management. Applied geoinformatics and GIS 
provide the means for identifying, assessing, visualising and timely exchanging a range of systemic 
and cascading first-, second-and third-order flood impacts for adaptive management. Adaptation is 
attained with approaches that consider safety and security aspects and enable accurate assessments 
of, for example, operational costs associated with the transfer of heavy rescue equipment, emergency 
humanitarian logistics, community and CI resilience. The concept’s flexible and interdisciplinary 
character is valuable for further applications to various SoS and scenario- and place-based multi-
criteria risk analyses and interdependency analyses valuable for training purposes in different 
countries, urban districts, and counties where floods are not typical. The thesis also discusses in detail 


















In Städten setzt eine rechtzeitige Notfallreaktion eine rechtzeitige stadtweite Erreichbarkeit voraus, 
die durch ein ununterbrochenes Funktionieren des Straßentransportsystems ermöglicht wird. In dieser 
Ära, in der extreme Wetterereignisse (EWE) und hydrometeorologische Gefahren immer häufiger 
und intensiver auftreten, wird die rechtzeitige Zugänglichkeit jedoch durch Verzögerungen oder 
Blockaden in Frage gestellt. So gefährden beispielsweise Verzögerungen oder Blockaden, die beim 
Fahren unter suboptimalen Überschwemmungsbedingungen auftreten können, die Sicherheit der 
Einsatzkräfte und damit der Bevölkerung. Daher zielt die Arbeit darauf ab, einen Beitrag zu den 
übergeordneten Zielen der Rettung von Menschenleben zu leisten, indem Verluste in der 
Funktionsfähigkeit kritischer Infrastrukturen (KRITIS) reduziert werden, um eine adaptive 
Notfallreaktion zur Sicherheit der Bevölkerung und der Einsatzkräfte zu ermöglichen.  
Zu diesem Zweck wird das städtische Notfallsystem als ein komplexes adaptives System von 
Systemen (SoS) vorgestellt, das sich unter dem Stressor von Überschwemmungen so anpassen und 
transformieren kann, dass seine kritische Funktionalität unter Berücksichtigung von 
Sicherheitsaspekten erhalten bleibt. Für ein vertieftes Verständnis der Hochwasserrisiken, ihrer 
kaskadierenden Auswirkungen und der Wechselbeziehung mit der Resilienz eines komplexen 
adaptiven SoS wird in der Arbeit ein operationelles Resilienz-Framework vorgestellt, das ein Konzept 
Interdependente Resilienzen anwendet und einen Top-Down- und einen Bottom-Up-Ansatz zur 
räumlichen Skalierung kombiniert. Die Ansätze ermöglichen Rückkopplungsschleifen von großen zu 
kleinen Skalen in Bezug auf die Resilienz-Kapazitäten seiner konstituierenden Systeme, die nach 
einem gefährlichen Ereignis offengelegt werden und die Resilienz Kapazität des komplexen 
adaptiven SoS unter Berücksichtigung seiner Umgebung definieren. Das SoS-Resilienzkonzept, wie 
es auf das städtische Notfallsystem angewendet wird, führt die Resilienz der städtischen 
Notfallreaktion ein. Das Notfallreaktionsresilienz-Rahmenwerk folgt dem 4R-Modell (4Resilienz-
Eigenschaften: Robustheit, Einfallsreichtum, Redundanz, Schnelligkeit der Reaktion) in einer 
voneinander abhängigen Form. Der Nutzen und die Absicht der Übernahme des städtischen 
Notfallreaktions-Resilienz Konzept von europäischen Interessenvertretern, Notfallreaktionsbeamten 
und Wissenschaftlern werden mit halbstrukturierten Interviews mit Experten aus den 
Forschungsbereichen analysiert. Die auf das städtische Notfallreaktionssysystem angewandte KAS-
Theorie ermöglicht dessen Aufteilung auf die Agenten-, System- und Netzwerkebene sowie die 
Identifizierung der Hierarchie zwischen den einzelnen Systemen. Das Straßenverkehrssystem ist 
aufgrund seiner zentralen Rolle im Verhalten des städtischen Notfallreaktionssystems in der 
Hierarchie höher angesiedelt und stellt daher den "Nullpunkt" für weitere 
Hochwasserrisikobewertungen dar. Darüber hinaus helfen die Graphentheorie und die Theorie 
komplexer Netzwerke bei der graphischen Darstellung und der Zerlegung ihrer Systeme und 
Netzwerke in ihre Komponenten, was ihre Digitalisierung mit geographischen Informationssystemen 
(GIS) und Netzwerkanalysen für die Bewertung der Resilienz der Notfallreaktion ermöglicht wird. 
Die Notfallreaktionsresilienz zu regulären und extremen Szenarien von Flusshochwasser und 
Sturzfluten wird mit einem multikriteriellen risikobasierten zeitabhängigen Erreichbarkeitsindikator 
(RITAI) für das Feuerwehrsystem von Köln (in) Deutschland, bewertet. Der RITAI nutzt angewandte 
Geoinformatik mit geografischen Informationssystemen (GIS) für die Identifizierung von 
Hochwasserrisiken erster, zweiter und dritter Ordnung in verschiedenen Maßstäben und Ebenen des 
städtischen Notfallreaktionssystems, mit einem Top-Down- und einem achtstufigen GIS-basierten 
räumlichen Upscaling-Ansatz. Sicherheitsaspekte werden beim Benchmarking der RITAI 
berücksichtigt, und zwar in Abhängigkeit von der sicheren Fahrkapazität der Löschfahrzeuge durch 




auf der Ebene des Straßennetzes integriert ein entwickeltes halbautomatisches GIS-Toolkit für jedes 
der ausgewählten Hochwasserszenarien die von der Überschwemmungstiefe und dem Straßentyp 
abhängigen Geschwindigkeiten in die Straßennetzdatenbank. Die sich daraus ergebenden 
informativen Straßennetze mit Hochwasserrisiko werden für großräumige Resilienzkapazitäten des 
Straßennetzes genutzt, die unter Berücksichtigung der Veränderungen seiner Transporteigenschaften 
bewertet werden. Nach der Definition von Stadteinheiten werden stadtweite Konnektivitäts- und 
Erreichbarkeitsbewertungen mit Netzanalysen durchgeführt. Zur Vereinfachung der Informationen 
werden Geovisualisierungs- und Fuzzifizierungstechniken eingesetzt. Zur Aggregierung der 
Informationen und zur Vorbereitung der Reaktion auf eskalierende oder zusammengesetzte 
Hochwasserereignisse werden auch statistische Hochwasserauswirkungskurven erstellt. Die 
verwendeten Daten wurden aus offenen Quellen, von Feuerwehr- und 
Hochwassermanagementbeamten vor Ort in Form von Raster-, Vektor- und Excel-Dateien sowie 
offiziellen Berichten abgerufen und in Karten visualisiert. Die Daten übernahmen die Bereinigung 
und Transformation für Interoperabilitätszwecke und die weitere Bearbeitung. Die allgemeine 
Anwendung der RITAI und die Handhabung der Daten kann zeitaufwendig sein, wobei die 
Verarbeitungskosten stark von den ausgewählten Analyseeinheiten und der Speicherkapazität des 
verwendeten Computers abhängen. 
Die Ergebnisse, d.h. die großräumige Belastung des Straßennetzes, die Redundanz, der 
Einfallsreichtum und die stadtweite Erreichbarkeit von Routenplänen sowie die räumliche 
sechseckige Anbindung an das städtische Notfallreaktion-System und Notfallreaktionsresilienz-
Matrizen werden in Karten visualisiert. Sie zeigen, dass die stadtweite Notfallreaktions-Effizienz in 
Städten stark von der großräumigen geolokalisierten Hochwasserausdehnung, der Information über 
die Hochwassertiefe, dem Straßentyp und der Kapazität der Rettungsfahrzeuge für eine sichere 
Befahrbarkeit durch überschwemmte Gewässer abhängt. Ferner wird festgestellt, dass die regulären 
und extremen Sturzfluten einem ähnlichen geografischen Ort des Auftretens folgen. Ihre 
Auswirkungen auf die stadtweite Notfallversorgung sind jedoch unterschiedlich, wobei das extreme 
Sturzflut-Szenario einen höheren Rückgang der Notfallrisikokosten verursacht, was auf die 
Abhängigkeit vom Straßentyp, der Überschwemmungen ausgesetzt ist, und der Geolokalisierung der 
Überschwemmungsintensitäten hinweist. Darüber hinaus erhöht in Städten die lokale Verbesserung 
der Widerstandsfähigkeit des Straßennetzes (Absorptions-, Anpassungs- und 
Transformationskapazitäten) unter Berücksichtigung der Sicherheit der Notfallhelfer die 
volkswirtschaftliche Rentabilität des Feuerwehrsystems bei Überschwemmungen. Diese lokale 
Ausdehnung der Funktionsfähigkeit der KRITIS wird durch die Verbesserung der Einfallsreichtum 
(Transformationskapazität) nach der Ausdehnung der endogenen Redundanz des 
Straßentransportsystems (Anpassungskapazität) erreicht, was deren nahezu analoge Beziehung 
offenbart. Die Erweiterung der endogenen Redundanz des Straßennetzes führt zu einer Erweiterung 
der exogenen Redundanz alternativer Erreichbarkeitswege, die folglich die Reaktionsfähigkeit des 
Feuerwehrsystems verbessern. Darüber hinaus haben statistische Analysen der 
Belastbarkeitskapazitäten des Straßennetzes im Falle eskalierender Überschwemmungen gezeigt, 
dass die Belastbarkeit des Straßentransportsystems für die Notfallversorgung stark vermindert ist. 
Bewertungen der Notfallreaktionsresilienz deuten darauf hin, dass die Notfallversorgung im Falle 
eines extremen Flusshochwasser-Szenarios stark beeinträchtigt und bei einem extremen Sturzflut-
Szenario stark verzögert sein wird.  Schließlich wird auch festgestellt, dass Osten Köln in der 
Vorbereitungsphase für die rechtzeitige Bereitstellung von Notfallprodukten unter 
Hochwasserbedingungen weiterer Aufmerksamkeit bedarf. Nichtsdestotrotz hängen die Ergebnisse 
von der Richtigkeit der verwendeten Daten, ihrer Auflösung und der Einheit der Analysen ab, was zu 




Ergebnisse werden durch die Vereinfachung der Konnektivität und der Informationen über die 
Resilienz der Notfallreaktion hexagonalen räumlichen Matrizen reduziert.  
Mit dem Konzept von Notfallreaktionsresilienz und seinem Ansatz zur Operationalisierung werden 
aktuelle silodenkende Disaster Risk Management (DRM)-Ansätze mit KAS, Resilienz, Sicherheit 
und räumlichem Denken angereichert, was ganzheitliche und kooperative 
Risikominderungsstrategien ermöglicht. Zu diesem Zweck wird mit dem vorgeschlagenen 
städtischen Notfallreaktionssystem nun eine identifizierte fehlende Verbindung zwischen den 
Anwendungsbereichen der Notfallrettungssysteme, des Katastrophenschutzes und dem Schutz 
Kritischer Infrastrukturen (SKI) hergestellt. Die Verbesserung der Notfallreaktionsresilienz und der 
Widerstandsfähigkeit von Gemeinden durch rechtzeitige Bereitstellung von Notfallreaktion wird mit 
einer verbesserten georäumlichen Vorbereitung für ein adaptives Management erreicht. Angewandte 
Geoinformatik und GIS bieten die Mittel für die Identifizierung, Bewertung, Visualisierung und den 
zeitnahen Austausch einer Reihe von systemischen und kaskadierenden Hochwasserauswirkungen 
erster, zweiter und dritter Ordnung im Hinblick auf ein vertieftes Verständnis der Hochwasserrisiken 
und ein adaptives Management. Die Anpassung wird mit Ansätzen erreicht, die Sicherheitsaspekte 
berücksichtigen und die eine genaue Bewertung z.B. der mit der Verlegung von schwerem 
Rettungsgerät verbundenen Betriebskosten, der humanitären Nothilfelogistik, der Belastbarkeit von 
Gemeinden und KRITIS ermöglichen. Der flexible und interdisziplinäre Charakter der 
vorgeschlagenen Konzepte kann für weitere Anwendungen auf verschiedene SoS unter Verwendung 
unterschiedlicher Gefahrenszenarien wertvoll sein. Sie können für szenarien- und ortsbezogene 
multikriterielle Risikoanalysen und Interdependenzanalysen in verschiedenen Stadtbezirken, 
Landkreisen und Ländern, in denen Überschwemmungen ebenfalls nicht so häufig vorkommen, zu 
Schulungszwecken weiter genutzt werden. In der Arbeit werden auch weitere methodische 
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Life: Sustainability of our complex adaptive System of Systems (body and soul) to everlasting 
encounters with various stressors, causing shocks or damages. 
 
Joy of life: Quick adaptability and transformation to external stressors for maximum System of 
Systems flexibility, towards Resilience. Quicker bounce-back to desirable states (either to ones before 
a stressor’s occurrence or to new ones), while having learned from the experience, absorbed the 





To my parents, Iωάννης Τζαβέλλας and Μαρία Τζαβέλλα 
 





You preserve my joy of life  
 
 
Without you, I would not be able to make it so far.  
Without you, I would not be able to bounce back quickly to joyful states. 
 





List of Contents 
1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Problem Ιdentification, Research Questions, Layout & Methods................................................ 8 
2. Resilient Urban Emergency Response (ER) System............................................................ ..11 
2.1 ER System, Interdependent Resiliencies & Operational Framework ........................................ 11 
2.2 Emergency Response Resilience (ERR) to Floods ................................................................... 28 
2.3 GIS & Spatial Thinking for Operationalisation Purposes ......................................................... 31 
3. The Composite Multi-criteria Risk-based Time-dependent Accessibility  
     Indicator (RITAI) of ERR to Floods ..................................................................................... 35 
3.1 Robustness, Absorption Capacity & Large-Scale Exposure Assessments ................................. 40 
3.2 Redundancy, Adaptation Capacity & Large-Scale FFS Assessments ....................................... 43 
3.3 Resourcefulness, Transformation Capacity & Large-Scale TTR Assessments .......................... 47 
3.4 Rapidity of Response, Response Capacity &Accessibility Assessments ................................... 49 
4. Applied Geoinformatics with GIS for Operationalisation Purposes .................................... 53 
4.1 RITAI’s Benchmarking According to Safety, Security & Spatial Aspects ................................ 54 
4.2 GIS-based Spatial Upscaling Operationalisation Approach ...................................................... 59 
4.3 GIS-Toolkit ............................................................................................................................. 62 
4.3.1 Advantages and limitations .............................................................................................. 67 
4.4 Aggregation & Simplification of Information with Fuzzification & Classification  
 Methods ................................................................................................................................... 69 
5. Operationalisation of the ERR to Floods for Cologne’s Fire Brigades................................. 71 
5.1 Cologne: Case Study, Climatic Characteristics & Flood Scenarios........................................... 71 
5.2 Fire Brigade: ERS for Simulation and Operationalisation Purposes ......................................... 74 
5.3 RITAI’s Benchmarking for Cologne’s Fire Brigades ............................................................... 78 
6. Application of the RITAI in GIS for Cologne’s Fire Brigades ............................................. 79 
6.1 Data Sources, Handling and Transformation for Interoperability ............................................. 80 




6.3 GIS-based ERR Operationalisation Framework for Cologne’s Fire Brigades ........................... 84 
6.3.1 Update of the OSM road network with official road type-dependent ERPS ...................... 84 
6.3.2 Compartmentalisation & Hexagonal Matrixes.................................................................. 85 
6.3.3 Network Analysis ............................................................................................................ 91 
6.3.4 Emergency Response Resilience (ERR) to Floods for Cologne’s Fire Brigades ............... 94 
7. Results and Discussions .......................................................................................................... 95 
7.1 Robustness Under Flood Conditions ...................................................................................... 102 
7.1.1 Discussions of the Robustness ........................................................................................ 109 
7.2 Redundancy Under Flood Conditions .................................................................................... 115 
7.2.1 Discussions of the Redundancy...................................................................................... 123 
7.3 Resourcefulness Under Flood Conditions .............................................................................. 125 
7.3.1 Discussions of the Resourcefulness................................................................................ 131 
7.4 Rapidity of Response Under Flood Conditions/Connectivity & Accessibility ........................ 135 
7.4.1 Discussion of the Rapidity of Response ......................................................................... 144 
7.5 Emergency Response Resilience (ERR) to Floods for Cologne’s Fire Brigades ..................... 149 
7.5.1 Discussion of the ERR to Floods for Cologne’s Fire Brigades ....................................... 152 
7.5.2 Intent of integration of the ERR Concept: Semi-structured Interviews &  
    Qualitative analysis ........................................................................................................ 156 
8. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 159 
List of References ....................................................................................................................... 165 
APPENDIX A – Data&GIS-based spatial upscaling workflow .................................................... 188 
APPENDIX B - Results .............................................................................................................. 196 
APPENDIX C - GIS-Toolkit in detail.......................................................................................... 221 




List of Figures 
▪ Figure 1: Number of reported EWE-triggered hydrometeorological natural  
hazards of Western (Central) Europe (left) between 1990-2019 and affected  
population of Germany by type of natural hazard (right) ...................................................... 4 
▪ Figure 2: Multimethodological approach, research questions (RQ), sections (S)  
and methods ....................................................................................................................... 10 
▪ Figure 3: Graphical model of an urban emergency response system with  
complex adaptive properties (left) and (right) digitisation of the model in  
a hexagonal spatial matrix .................................................................................................. 15 
▪ Figure 4: Road network as a non-directed weighted graph - adapted from the  
theory in [161] ................................................................................................................... 18 
▪ Figure 5: Flood-impacted urban Emergency Response system, indicating  
organisational, technical, financial and social (endogenous and exogenous)  
interconnected cascading risks ........................................................................................... 21 
▪ Figure 6: Conceptualisation framework of the resilience of a SoS, towards its  
operationalisation ............................................................................................................... 23 
▪ Figure 7: Transport perspectives and performance indicators.  
Adapted from [210] for ER road networks ......................................................................... 26 
▪ Figure 8: Urban Emergency Response (System of Systems) Resilience curve to  
riverine floods and flash floods. Based on [124, 212, 213] ................................................. 27 
▪ Figure 9: Emergency Response Resilience (ERR), key features and resilience  
capacities - according to [205, 207] .................................................................................... 30 
▪ Figure 10: The Risk-based Time-dependent Accessibility Indicator (RITAI)  
of the urban ERR - based on the framework in Figure 6 ..................................................... 36 
▪ Figure 11: RITAI - Emergency Response Resilience operationalisation concept ................ 54 
▪ Figure 12: Depth-disruption function/ Flood safety function, relating the flood  
depth with vehicle speed. Adapted from [252] ................................................................... 57 
▪ Figure 13: ERR upscaling spatial assessment GIS-based workflow indicating 
the aggregation of information to different scales (white arrows) ....................................... 61 
▪ Figure 14: GIS-Toolkit: Semi-automated upscaling large-scale spatial  
assessments for flood risk-informed ER road networks ...................................................... 63 
▪ Figure 15: GIS-Toolkit - RITAI methodological workflow in GIS resulting  
in flood risk-informative ER road networks ....................................................................... 64 
▪ Figure 16: The GIS-Toolkit in the Model Builder of the ArcMap 10.6.1. -  
workflow model diagram ................................................................................................... 66 
▪ Figure 17: Estimated temperature increase of the coldest (above) and the warmest  
(below) month of German cities, including Cologne, by 2050 (in degrees Celsius) ............ 72 
▪ Figure 18: German cities with the rainiest days where Cologne (Köln) is the second .......... 73 
▪ Figure 19: Total number of fire brigade deployments limited to the emergency  
rescue and patient transport in Germany from 2000 to 2016  .............................................. 77 
▪ Figure 20: Raster of the flash flood T20 (frequent scenario - left) and the  
flash flood T100 (extreme scenario-right) - see enlarged in APPENDIX A ........................ 83 
▪ Figure 21: Raster of the riverine flood HQ10 (frequent scenario - left) and the  




▪ Figure 22: Distance measurement in hexagons, where d is the value of the  
distance parameter with the geometric centre (centroid) to the right ................................... 87 
▪ Figure 23: Circularity of hexagons ..................................................................................... 87 
▪ Figure 24: Cologne’s tesselation in hexagonal city units of 0.25 km2 (left) and  
transformation of the hexagons to centroids (right) serving as destinations for  
NA analysis for ER purposes ............................................................................................. 91 
▪ Figure 25: Operationalisation methodology of ERR to floods with a GIS-based  
upscaling spatial assessment workflow - see enlarged in APPENDIX A ............................ 92 
▪ Figure 26: Configuration of the Closest Facility algorithm for emergency routing  
calculations. Facilities (left): Cologne’s fire brigades and Incidents (right):  
centroids of city units ......................................................................................................... 93 
▪ Figure 27: ERR hexagonal spatial matrixes - weighting of each city unit of Cologne  
with ERR to riverine floods and flash floods, with the application of  
function 1 in GIS ............................................................................................................... 94 
▪ Figure 28: The Emergency Response Resilience (ERR) concept in abstraction with  
related sections (S) and research questions (RQ) .............................................................. 102 
▪ Figure 29: GIS-based upscaling operationalisation process of the robustness of  
Cologne’s fire brigade system, dependent on the absorption capacity of the  
ER road network .............................................................................................................. 103 
▪ Figure 30: Geolocated exposure of the ER road network to the HQ10 (left) and the  
HQ500 (right) with classified FD considering the safe driving mobility of the fire  
trucks - see enlarged in APPENDIX B ............................................................................. 104 
▪ Figure 31: Safe drivability levels of the ER road network per FD exposure class in  
case of a HQ10 (above) and a HQ500 (below) ................................................................. 105 
▪ Figure 32: Loss of robustness levels for safe driving of the ER road network in km,  
according to FD exposure class in case of escalating riverine floods from a HQ10  
to a HQ500 ...................................................................................................................... 106 
▪ Figure 33: Geolocated exposure of the ER road network to the T20 (left) and the  
T100 (right) with classified FD considering the safe driving mobility of the  
fire trucks - see enlarged in APPENDIX B ....................................................................... 107 
▪ Figure 34: Safe drivability levels of the ER road network per FD exposure class in 
 case of a T20  (above) and a T100 (below) ...................................................................... 108 
▪ Figure 35: Loss of robustness levels for safe driving of the ER road network in km  
according to FD exposure class, in case of escalating riverine floods from a T20 to 
 a T100 ............................................................................................................................ 109 
▪ Figure 36: Geolocated FD levels per 1 m road segment indicate the intensity 
 of the T20  (light to dark blue and red the blocked road segments) and its  
direct impact on Cologne’s intraurban ER road network .................................................. 113 
▪ Figure 37: GIS-based upscaling operationalisation process of the robustness of  
Cologne’s fire brigade system, dependent on the absorption 
capacity of the ER road network analogous to the FD exposure ....................................... 117 
▪ Figure 38: Geolocated vulnerability (classified FFSchange in km/h) of the road  
network to a HQ10 (left) and a HQ500 (right) for timely ER provision in Cologne  




▪ Figure 39: RNMC levels of the ER road network per FD class  
(classified FFSchange in km/h)  in case of a HQ10 (above) and a HQ500 (below), 
 reflecting its endogenous redundancy .............................................................................. 119 
▪ Figure 40: Percentage redundancy levels, according to the RNMC levels per  
FD class, for timely ER in case of escalating riverine floods from a HQ10 to a   
HQ500 ............................................................................................................................. 120 
▪ Figure 41: Geolocated vulnerability (classified FFSchange in km/h) of the road  
network to a T20 (left) and a T100 (right) for delayed or incapacitated ER provision 
in Cologne - see enlarged in APPENDIX B ..................................................................... 121 
▪ Figure 42: RNMC levels of the ER road network, in km, per FD class  
(classified FFSchange in km/h) in case of a T20 and a T100 reflecting its redundancy 
 for timely ER (above), and % redundancy in case of escalating floods from a  
T20 to a T100 (below) ..................................................................................................... 122 
▪ Figure 43: Geolocated classified UFTTRj of Cologne’s ER road network in case of a  
HQ10 (upper left), a HQ500 (upper right), a T20 (bottom left) and a T100 
 (bottom right) - see enlarged in APPENDIX B ................................................................ 128 
▪ Figure 44: Aggregated flood-impacted UFTTR levels for the ER road network in  
km per FD class, in case of the HQ10 and the HQ500 (above) and the T20  
and T100 (below). ............................................................................................................ 129 
▪ Figure 45: Percentage levels of flash flood-impacted (outer doughnut) and riverine  
flood-impacted (inner doughnut) resourcefulness of the ER road network according  
to UFTTR levels in case of escalating flood events. ......................................................... 131 
▪ Figure 46: Hexagonal spatial matrix of city units of Cologne of 0.25km² serving as  
the destinations for simulation of ER with network analysis. ............................................ 137 
▪ Figure 47: Not participating areas in the NA (blue dots) for connectivity and  
accessibility assessments. Cologne’s fire brigades are the red rhombi, and 
the city units are represented by their centroids (black dots). ............................................ 138 
▪ Figure 48: Hexagonal connectivity-informative spatial matrixes with encoded  
accessible city units of Cologne from the fire brigade stations, in case of the HQ10 
 (upper left), the HQ500 (upper right), the T20 (bottom-left) and the T100  
(bottom-right) - see enlarged in APPENDIX B. ............................................................... 139 
▪ Figure 49: Risk-based time-dependent fastest accessibility routes of Cologne’s  
fire brigades to the nearest city units in case of the HQ10 (left) and the HQ500 (right) -  
see enlarged in APPENDIX B. ......................................................................................... 141 
▪ Figure 50: Accessibility patterns above and below the eight-minute response time  
threshold in case of  the HQ10 (above) and the HQ500 (below) with the number of 
accessible sub-locations of Cologne. ................................................................................ 142 
▪ Figure 51: Risk-based time-dependent fastest accessibility routes of Cologne’s 
 fire brigades to the nearest city units in case of the T20 (left) and the T100 (right) -  
see enlarged in APPENDIX B .......................................................................................... 143 
▪ Figure 52: Accessibility patterns above and below the eight-minute response time 
 threshold in case of  the HQ10 (above) and the HQ500 (below) with number of 
 accessible sub-locations of Cologne ................................................................................ 144 
▪ Figure 53: Fire brigade ER risk-based time-dependent accessibility assessments in  




▪ Figure 54: Hexagonal ERR-informative spatial matrixes with ERR levels per  
city unit of Cologne in case of the HQ10 (upper left), the HQ500 (upper right),  
the T20 (bottom left) and the T100 (bottom right) - see enlarged in APPENDIX B .......... 150 
▪ Figure 55: ERR levels of Cologne to the riverine floods HQ10 and HQ500,  
and to the flash floods T20 and T100, with a qualitative classification of the ERR  
according to FD impacts to the accessibility times of each city unit.................................. 151 
▪ Figure 56: Percentage ERR levels to the to riverine floods and flash floods,  
of Cologne’s fire brigade system in case of the HQ500, the HQ10,  
the T20 and the T100. ...................................................................................................... 152 
▪ Figure 57: City units of different ERR levels and accessibility routes.  
In the red circle is a city unit with phenomenically high ERR (green hexagon). ............... 153 
▪ Figure 58: Hexagonal spatial matrix of Cologne’s population density with  
hexagonal spatial units  of 0.25 km2 (left) and hexagonal spatial matrix of the  
density of different CI (potential lighthouses)  and shelters with hexagonal  





























List of Tables  
▪ Table 1: Properties of general systems and complex adaptive systems.  
Adapted based on [120] ..................................................................................................... 12 
▪ Table 2: The urban emergency response system (SoS), with impact levels  
according to flood depths and their identified direct and emerging risks on an  
agent, network and system level......................................................................................... 20 
▪ Table 3: RITAI for the Emergency Response Resilience (ERR) operationalisation -  
ERR features, sub-indicators, metrics and outcomes .......................................................... 52 
▪ Table 4: Sub-indicators classified - Impact of the flood depth (FD) to the status of 
the road segments used for ground-based ERS. .................................................................. 70 
▪ Table 5: Temperatures (with a colour classification from yellow to dark orange)  
and precipitation (with a colour classification from light to dark blue for Cologne) ............ 74 
▪ Table 6: Data used for this study, source of data, type of data and transformation  
for further use in an ArcGIS environment .......................................................................... 81 
▪ Table 7: The road type-dependent ER route planning speeds (ERPS) of Cologne’s  
fire brigades, Source: Cologne’s Fire Brigade .................................................................... 85 
▪ Table 8: Classification of ERR in hexagonal matrixes for ER purposes. ............................. 95 
▪ Table 9: Large-scale robustness operationalisation for the ERR of Cologne’s  
fire brigade system, to floods ........................................................................................... 102 
▪ Table 10: Large-scale redundancy operationalisation for the ERR of Cologne’s  
fire brigade system, to floods ........................................................................................... 116 
▪ Table 11: Large-scale resourcefulness operationalisation for the ERR of Cologne’s  
fire brigade system, to floods ........................................................................................... 125 
▪ Table 12: Urban Flood Travel Time Reliability per road segment (UFTTRj)  
















List of Abbreviations 
 
A                              accessibility 
AF                            after flood 
BF  before flood 
CAS    complex adaptive system 
CI        critical infrastructure 
CIP    critical infrastructure protection 
CIR   
DRM   
DRR 
cities resilience index 
disaster risk management 
disaster risk reduction 
EMS     emergency medical services 
ER     emergency response 
ERR    emergency response resilience 
ERPS    
ERS 
emergency route planning speed 
emergency rescue services 
EWE extreme weather events 
FD        flood depth 
FFS  
FRM      
free flow speed 
flood risk management 
GIS      geographic information systems 
NA       network analyses 
PR         PRegnolato function  
RNMC  
SFDRR   
SoS 
road network’s mobility capacity 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
system of systems 
TTR       travel time reliability 











Extreme weather events (EWE) have increased in frequency and intensity the last decades due to 
climate change, consequently increasing loss events [1] and many suddenly occurring hazards, such 
as floods, cyclones and bushfires [2, 3], provoking the increase of the likelihoods of compound 
hazards and cascading impacts on societies [4]. Many studies on the subject have already identified 
that climate change is the cause of the increase in EWE frequency and intensity, as reported in [1, 3-
15]. The Paris Agreement in 2016 acknowledged that climate change is a common concern for 
humanity, and in the Global Assessment Report [16] on disaster risk reduction (DRR), it is declared 
that the future losses from disasters are expected to increase even more since “most disasters that 
could happen have not happened yet”. Expressly, the European Academies Science Advisory Council 
[5] underlines that “..the amount of floods, with other hydrological events, have quadrupled since 
1980 and have doubled since the year of 2004… Meteorological events, such as storms, have doubled 
since 1980”. This consensus was initially recognised from the international agreement for disaster 
risk reduction (DRR), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (SFDRR) of 
the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction [16]. The SFDRR is intended to ensure that: 
▪ disaster risk, at each level and across all the sectors, is a critical factor in the planning and the 
development, disaster preparedness, recovery and reconstruction and  
▪ it is applied covering risks of all scales (large to small and vice versa), frequencies (low and 
high) and types of disasters (sudden and slow-onset) caused by environmental, natural, 
human-caused, biological and technological hazards.  
 
However, as mentioned in a recent global assessment report on disaster risk reduction [17], 
specifically for disasters triggered from climate change, there is the possibility that the mitigation or 
repair of impacts from realised systemic and cascading risks will not be possible and “changes are 
urgent and must be proportionate to the scale of threat”. Therefore, there is an increasing consensus 
that the adaptive management should address the risk explicitly and suitably [15, 18-20] and inform 
the decision-making based on a deepened understanding of the environment and the diversity of 
emergent risks and opportunities [21]. Specifically, in [22], adaptive management is defined as an 
“iterative organised process that aims to reduce the uncertainties by increasing the knowledge and 
the understanding, while enabling improved management-related decisions over time”. EWE, 
together with the natural disasters and the failure of the climate change adaptation, are placed in the 
top five of the Global Risks Landscape by the World Economic Forum [23] since they can bring 
significant uncertainties in the different management cycles. For example, the interrelation of these 
risks and their impacts are also highlighted in the case of a water crisis potentiality and its consequent 
disruptions to critical infrastructure (CI) and essential services [24] (building urban resilience).  
In regards to the concerns about the increase in frequency and severity of disaster events and their 
consequences that bring into the forefront emerging opportunities of cascading impacts, scientists 
agree that post-event response has to become more efficient and draw on science [25-30], considering, 
for example, the second-and third-order impacts of floods to the timely emergency response. The 
need for timely emergency response is reflected in one of the four priorities of action of the SFDRR 
that calls for “strengthening preparedness for response” [31]. On the other hand, strengthening 
preparedness and response to EWE-induced disasters and cascading impacts is a challenge for the 
scientific community, practitioners and decision-makers.  
The challenge is even higher in complex urban areas, which are nests of highly connected and 




being of the population (transportation, energy, water), followed by uncertainty in the analyses 
process conveyed from such phenomena. Concretely, in order to curb the impact of natural and 
human-caused hazards, the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development [32] recommends the 
development of cities that are safe, inclusive, resilient and sustainable (Goal 11) through the: 
▪ protection and safeguarding of the world’s cultural and natural heritage (Target 11.4),  
▪ reduction of deaths and damages that are caused by disasters (Target 11.5)   
▪ increase in the number of cities that adopt and implement integrated policies and plans    
▪ for a resilient to disasters future, with holistic disaster risk management - DRM (Target 11.b).  
 
Cities are complex and highly dependent on functional interdependent infrastructure systems [33], 
which are more than a simple aggregation of individual services. The neighbouring character and 
affinity of the infrastructure systems cause the increased system of systems’ (SoS) complexity [34], 
characterising cities as complex. In the computer science domain, different definitions exist for the 
SoS, where they are defined as a set of systems, which are independently operational and 
manageable, which indicate the complexity risen when attempting to manage a SoS [35]. Therefore, 
the resilience of a SoS can be defined as the architectural ability of the SoS to defend against emerging 
new threats [35], i.e. architectural adaptation of the SoS to handle external EWE-triggered 
perturbations.  
It is presented in the thesis that the adaptive and transformative design of a SoS enables the 
development of such frameworks, integrating resilience thinking in resilience operationalisation 
methodologies and developed tools following the complexity theory. When managing complexity, it 
is argued that changes from one phase occur if the system reaches a critical state. Minor influences 
may increase fluctuations of a greater magnitude, indicating that the system is unstable [36], revealing 
cascading effects that underlie crises or disasters. When a threshold is reached, cascading effects may 
become evident and often underlie crises and disasters [36, 37]. 
EWE could never be considered a disaster [38]. However, the same EWE, occurring in a densely 
populated environment, such as the urban areas, with a high amount of interconnected CI, are 
calamitous, having severe consequences for the management of cities in the long term [1] and 
consequently for the safety of the population. For this reason, a security perspective is urgent to be 
mainstreamed in DRR and “there is ample room for deepening the understanding of the complex 
links between security and disasters, including disasters prompted by climate change” [39], that is, 
ample room for adaptive management.  
Therefore, this thesis suggests that an evaluation of systemic and cascading impacts of EWE with a 
deepened understanding of their effect must be included in pre-disaster planning for strengthened 
emergency preparedness for resilient emergency response (ER) as well as risk mitigation measures, 
which have gained interest both in the scientific and the practitioners’ communities, but still with a 
silo-mentality. Silo-mentality entails approaches that isolate one CI system for EWE-induced impacts 
(CI security), limiting the research results with one scenario, focusing on pure inherent technological 
impacts without considering the impacts of the system’s environment (socio-ecological). Hence, there 
is an increasing need for DRM conceptual frameworks, methodologies and tools that are integrative, 
adaptive in regards to the goals and transformative, including natural hazard impacts on several 
technical, operational and organisation levels, using feedback loops from various hazard scenarios 
for the enhancement of the safety of the urban population. Such informative feedback loops are 




Therefore, it is proposed that placing the focus on the SoS architecture design enables comprehensive 
resilience assessments by defining its constituent systems and their established relationships 
(networks), which determine the capacities at a SoS level. These capacities are impossible for any 
system operating in isolation, and they require synchronisation of the capacities of the constituent 
levels, providing a higher level of a SoS capacity [35]. Resilience is revealed after a hazardous event, 
and in the case of floods [40], the integration of resilience thinking into the development of an 
operational resilience framework is proposed in the thesis. It is also suggested that resilience thinking 
supports the interdependent resiliencies concept, enables the detailed resilience assessments of each 
constituent system of a SoS separately and collectively, achieves the identification of risk and critical 
states on many levels and scales. 
Resilience thinking in the resilience approaches is even richer since it deals with the dynamics of a 
complex adaptive system (CAS) and the actual uncertainty and addresses the issue of “how to make 
use of the knowledge gained by living with changes” [41]. With resilience thinking, a deep 
understanding of such impacts is achieved with the transformation in risk management called for in 
the SFDRR [4]. For all the reasons mentioned above, resilient ER in complex urban areas is warranted 
and can be achieved by transforming DRM approaches away from traditional silo-based ones. This 
transformation presupposes the integration of resilience thinking, spatial assessments and 
operationalisation tools, combining information from different scales of the system. It is categorically 
presented that DRM is enriched with a resilience-thinking, which is integrated into a developed 
ER resilience (ERR) framework applied on an urban SoS with CAS properties and deals with 
direct, indirect but also emergent risks, triggered from various intensities and probability levels of 
EWE on various scales, such as the riverine floods and flash floods.  
Flood impacts in complex adaptive cities and interdependent critical infrastructures: emergent risks 
identified - Floods in Europe and Germany 
It is broadly accepted that climate change may increase the magnitude and frequency of the riverine 
floods [42-44], affecting people’s lives (as observed in recent years in Figure 1) and CI generating 
substantial economic losses. Urban areas, which are accumulations of highly interconnected CI, face 
various hazards, such as floods, with various consequences beyond their boundaries that damage their 
CI and affect the broader economy [11, 45, 46]. Flood risk probability of occurrence has increased as 
the number of rare EWE, such as floods, are increasing and will continue to [47] around Central 
Europe [8], Germany (see Figure 1) and specifically in local areas, as the city of Cologne [48] located 
in the west of Germany. As mentioned in [49], analyses of various flood events revealed that a 
significant amount of flooding was not associated with riverine floods but occurred far from any 
rivers, also in areas that were not characterised as flood-prone before the event [50-52]. The 
probability of occurrence of EWE increases significantly with an almost analogous increase of 
intensity [48], even on a regional scale. Large-scale floods, i.e. flash floods, have the potential to 
create significant financial losses [53]. Increased exposure to weather-related disasters of people and 
amounts of assets located in high-risk areas from natural hazards have led to increased losses. For 
example, even if the impacts of flash flood events are often limited to small scales compared to large 
riverine ones, in Germany, the damages sum up to several million euros annually due to the increased 






Figure 1: Number of reported EWE-triggered hydrometeorological natural hazards of Western (Central) 
Europe (left) between 1990-2019 and affected population of Germany by type of natural hazard (right)1  
 
 
In recent decades, it is observed that the research and governmental actions that are taken on an 
international and European level have a focus on riverine floods, with damages that sum up to billions 
of euros for a single event [54, 55]. Even though many European countries have their flood protection 
and prevention policies, the Flood Directive [56] provides the background for joint action at an 
international level. This directive aims to guide towards the implementation of DRR approaches - 
reducing adverse consequences of flooding events. The EU Member States have implemented it in 
three consecutive stages:  
▪ flood risk assessments at a preliminary phase, completed in 2011,  
▪ flood risk and hazard maps for flood-prone areas, produced in 2013  
▪ flood risk management plans, concluded at the end of 2015 [57].  
 
The Flood Directive [56] has forced riverine flood-prone cities to extend their flood control 
infrastructures, but despite the efforts, there have been many large-scale flood disasters, for example, 
in Germany, the floods in Dresden (2002) [58] and of the river Rhine in 2013. Nevertheless, 
researchers continue to contend that flood-control infrastructure for cities, e.g., [59, 60], is an 
indispensable part of flood protection strategies, reflecting the entrenched management paradigm of 
controlling nature. On the other hand, flood-control infrastructure does not constitute a reliable 
mitigation approach for climate change uncertainties [61]. The challenge is even more significant in 
cities with densely interfaced and interdependent CI. Therefore, the destructive impacts of EWE-
triggered floods cannot be entirely prevented with flood-control infrastructure, as it is difficult to 
predict their probability of occurrence, which leads to the increased need for strengthened preparation. 
 
Floods and interdependent urban complex adaptive CI in urban complex adaptive cities - need for 
integrative emergency management. 
Towards DRR in Germany, the topic of CI is in focus at a national level, integrated into a national 
strategy [62], a protection concept [63], business continuity, risk management [64] and risk analysis 
[65, 66] guidelines, including aspects such as vulnerability analyses [66, 67]. Furthermore, smart 
 
1 Data downloaded from EM-DAT - The Emergency Events Database, Search Period: 1990-2019, Universite Catholique   
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cities are characterised by various interconnected and interdependent virtual and physical services 
that form complex eco-technological systems that provide advanced services to the institutions and 
the population to manage public resources in optimal ways and involvement of citizens in decisional 
and adjustive processes.  
The smart city concept is interpreted as a process addressed to make cities sustainable and resilient, 
responding quickly to new challenges [68]. However, such high interconnectivity can lead to 
increased vulnerabilities: the ‘vulnerability paradox’. Therefore, the ability of institutional operators 
and service providers to face and manage emergencies is a relevant issue. It makes collaboration 
between the public and private sectors even more necessary [69]. Furthermore, at the CIPRE 
conference in The Hague in May 2017, Mr Pepijn van den Broek from the International Safety 
Research Europe BV mentioned: “The EU has the Civil Protection Mechanism, and Critical 
Infrastructure has a protection mechanism, but there is no coordination mechanism for Emergency 
Management. There is no list of effects that occur after a CI failure.” (personal notes as an attendee 
at the conference). There is constantly an increasing need to identify the interdependencies of the 
various CI and integrate such information into existing or future resilience concepts.  
For this reason, emergency preparedness and response, in the era of highly interfaced and 
interdependent CI and high-intensity perturbations from unexpected EWE, need integrative 
approaches towards DRR. It is argued that it is possible, to some extent, to be prepared for their 
occurrence and consequences by trying to least mitigate or partially prevent their effects in highly 
complex cities. Therefore, it is essential to pursue a deepened knowledge of the connectivity and 
interdependencies amongst CI systems vital for their resilience [70] to external perturbations, such as 
the EWE. CI are complex systems, and failures can occur, resulting in domino failure effects on 
different interconnected CI impacting the population living in close (but also far) geographical 
proximity to those failures. These domino effects of CI failures and their effect on the population of 
an area can be identified through different analyses. As mentioned in the report of Argonne, the 
national laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy [71], analysis capabilities should evolve 
towards integrating methodologies and tools. Evolvement entails a better integration and 
comprehension of cyber and physical dependencies, coupling and response behaviours, types of 
failures, and operational characteristics and state (or efficiency) of CI assets. However, detailed 
information is more often found in guidelines isolated for individual sectors, e.g., hospitals, 
emergency power supplies, and fuel supplies.  
There is, therefore, a constantly increasing need to identify the interdependencies of the various CI 
and the cascade disaster-related risks. For this purpose, dependency curves were initially conceived 
and developed for an individual asset, with the concept being expanded for systems. Precisely, 
bottom-up dependency curves combined with top-down approaches can capture the overall 
interactions among several sub-systems (e.g., CI, population, economy, and government) to better 
understand a region's resilience [72]. Therefore, another topic emergent from one of the seven global 
targets of the SFDRR [31] emphasises the need for more monitoring indicators to significantly reduce 
disaster damage to CI and basic services’ disruptions [73]. Following these needs, eight European 
countries collaborated on research that has been conducted in the European project “Smart Resilience 
- Smart Resilience Indicators for Smart Critical Infrastructures”, coordinated by the European virtual 
institute for integrated risk management (EU VRI EWIV), for the identification of indicators towards 
smart, resilient CI, leading to the so-called “smart resilient” cities. Therefore, critical elements in 




strengthening the system’s links (robustness) and planning for alternatives (soft and hard 
redundancies and resourcefulness) to enhance a region's resilience and of communities. 
Knowledge of the interdependencies of CI assists a better understanding of the dynamics of their 
interplay. Scientists argue that a poor understanding of these dynamics may result in poor 
coordination between decision-makers and disaster managers and, consequently, in ineffective 
response in the course of a disaster, before, during and after [74-76]. Dependency curves are the tools 
used to determine changes in the impact on a systems’ goal as a function of time [77]. One 
improvement of the dependency curves suggested from [71] is their integration in an emergency 
operations capability. The dependency curves provide a deepened understanding of the 
consequences of an incident and support incident management activities. Therefore, it is also 
supported in the thesis that generating dependency curves can be the first step towards the 
enhancement of the capability of the emergency operations, as argued in [72], to determine the 
changes of the impact on a geographic area and thus create simple dependency curves with widely 
used spatial tools, such as GIS [77]. Approaches and tools utilised to develop such curves serve 
to aggregate the information in various scales essential for a deepened understanding of the 
risk, specifically in cities with complex interfaced and interconnected CI. 
Integrative risk management, the concept of interdependency identification from a CI resilience 
perspective, combining CIP and emergency management strategic goals, was analysed partially in 
the project “CIRmin - Critical Infrastructures Resilience as a Minimum Supply Concept. CIRmin was 
funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) for several scenarios 
[78]. One example is that interdependencies of CI are analysed and combined qualitatively (via 
interviews with local stakeholders and cross-impact analysis via workshops) and quantitatively (via 
GIS-based upscaling spatial assessments) with interdependency analyses of CI, identifying cascading 
and emergent risks towards enhanced crisis-preparation in the face of an extreme riverine flood 
scenario in Cologne [79]. For an integrative risk management strategy, a GIS-based methodological 
approach was chosen to be combined with cross-impact analyses to analyse the intersecting relevant 
elements of the individual systems and their relationships both structurally and spatially. In [80], a 
practical alternative to the extensive data collection and evaluation is necessary for a wholly 
quantitative assessment of the complexity of the overall system under study.  
Flood impacts afar from direct ones - emergent risks - need for integration in emergency response 
planning 
Since floods have direct impacts on the population and the CI that can be assessed with diverse 
interdependency analyses approaches, international attention has also been given to indirect flood 
impacts. Specifically, international attention has been drawn to the indirect financial impacts of the 
floods caused by reduced CI functioning.   
Hence, for example, the European Floods Directive 2007/60/EC [56] addresses flood impacts on 
financial activities caused by transportation disruptions and the need for capturing the diversity of the 
consequences caused by flood events [46, 81-83] are an essential focus. Floods and their range of 
impacts portrayed by: 
▪ direct (e.g., physical damage to transport infrastructure) and  
▪ indirect (e.g., disruption to traffic flows, business interruption. increased emissions, health, 
and environmental effects) impacts 





Although direct damages could be consistent [84], in [85] it is asserted that the reductions of the 
performance of transport systems due to flooding is the most disastrous factor for the societies, and 
it has been estimated at around one hundred thousand British pounds per hour, for each main road 
affected [86, 87]. Meanwhile, studies show that roads are among the leading causes of deaths in cities 
during flooding due to vehicles being driven through flooded roads. For example, studies reveal that 
the risk of being involved in a car accident while experiencing EWE and EWE-triggered hydrological 
events (e.g., floods) is up to 25 times higher [88-90]. Others as [91, 92] address, that accidents are 
related to the risk of driving through flooded road network. Furthermore, studies have proven that 
most fatalities during floods occur from attempts to drive or walk through flooded roads [85, 92-96]. 
When risks are interpreted for decision-making based on experience, people consider multiple 
characteristics of risks, apart from the severity of the threat or the magnitude of the potential 
consequences. They also rely on their ability to act for the uncertainties and ambiguities of the risk. 
Therefore, vehicle-related flood fatalities, rescues, and safety of the operating personnel due to 
driving through floodwater are a significant emergency management issue for emergency services.  
Timely ER provision becomes even more challenging with the increasing occurrence of EWE and 
EWE-triggered hazards such as riverine floods and flash floods, specifically in complex urban areas. 
ER, and the pre-set strategic goal that is timely ER provision for securing the population's safety is 
jeopardised and driven towards failure and fatalities when emergencies demand driving through 
flooded road networks. 
Furthermore, the operations’ costs (in time and money) are increasing when the transfer of equipment 
or resources should be rerouted due to highly flooded roads. Driving, and in general, operating under 
flooded conditions, puts at risk the lives of the emergency responders and the emergency rescue assets 
(vehicles and equipment). This type of risk is tightly connected with the risk perception of the 
emergency responders, which is different from the civic drivers, and as mentioned in [97], the 
rerouting behaviour is different; the call of duty is placed above personal safety. There are studies 
[97, 98] conducted on the Australian State Emergency Service (SES) personnel that have associated 
the risk perception of driving through flooded roads with a misperception of height or flood depth, 
water velocity and location type [99]. Against training instructions that prohibit such risky driving 
behaviour, 54.8% had driven through floodwaters, with most personnel experiencing operations 
under flooded conditions. In Germany and the city of Cologne, interviews with local officials revealed 
that driving slowly, when and where the conditions allow (own risk perception) is conducted in 
cooperation between the personnel for clearing the flooded road from floating objects. According to 
the Thomas Theorem from the sociology domain, “if men define several situations as real, they are 
real in their consequences”, which means that the perception of a situation is not objective; the 
interpretation of a situation causes the actions. From a risk perspective, the theorem could also be 
translated as follows:  an interpretation of the level of risk causes the actions taken, and the results of 
the actions will reveal if the interpretation was simply a misconception of the situation and a 
misjudgement of the actions taken. Some studies present the number of fatalities caused by driving 
through floodwaters, which portrayed a constant increase, most of which are caused while driving 
four-wheeled trucks [97, 99]. Such statistics and outcomes support the expectation that the 
occupational exposure and the nature of the emergency service work is a risk factor that needs further 
attention since they lead to the result that the misperception of the risk from emergency responders is 
caused due to increased duty-related responsibility. Throughout the thesis, based on the theoretical 
background presented, it is supported that there is a growing need for integration of safety thresholds 
into developed strategies and concepts towards the safety of the emergency responders and security 




When emergency rescue vehicles are operating on degraded or even impaired intraurban roads due 
to flooding, the accessibility and response times increase. The accessibility concerning response 
times, specifically in regional scales, is an indicator of relevance for assessments and integration 
in ER plans since it is tightly related to the critical functionality of the emergency response, that 
is, timely ER provision. Accessibility as a concept and its measurement has received significant 
attention in transport literature and regional science [100-103]. For Germany in [104], the power 
accessibility indicator (dynamics of commuting accessibility) was analysed on a national level and 
revealed a trend towards heterogeneity in the commuting network, where the ‘city-network’ seems to 
play a significant socio-economic role. This thesis proposes that with the increasing frequency of 
EWE, higher importance should be given to the accessibility indicator and analyse its 
performance under the stressor of various intensities and types of floods. This information, 
integrated into emergency management strategic plans, will be valuable for a strengthened 
preparedness for response, as prioritised in the SFDRR. Strengthened preparedness for response 
entails developing DRM strategies, conceptual frameworks, and integrative impact models that 
combine various cascading risks occurring from domino failures (“safe” within thresholds and 
catastrophic) of the urban ER system after riverine and flash flood occurrences. Nevertheless, DRM 
still lacks spatial assessment tools that consider those above-identified cascading impacts (risks) of 
various intensities, enabling fast decision-making through strengthened preparedness called in the 
SFDRR [31].  
 
 
1.1 Problem Ιdentification, Research Questions, Layout & Methods 
Disaster risks continue to ascend, and international frameworks, such as the SFDRR, call for more 
action on strengthening the preparedness for response, with adaptive management strategies that 
address risk explicitly and proportionate to the scale of the threat to advance the decision-making 
with a deepened understanding of the environment and the variety of emergent risks and 
opportunities. It is identified from the author that aspects of safety of the population, the safety of 
the emergency responders operating under sub-optimal conditions, such as the flooded (EWE-
triggered) and security of rescue assets (fire brigade buildings, rescue equipment storages and 
rescue vehicles), have not been extensively analysed scientifically. Additionally, the connection 
to application fields such as fire brigades, civil protection and critical infrastructure protection 
is not established yet. Therefore, the goal of this thesis is to contribute to the overall goals of saving 
lives by cutting down losses on CI functioning, with the provision of more detailed risk analyses and 
boosting community resilience by enabling emergency managers to utilise: 
▪ operationalisation adaptive resilience frameworks for SoS with CAS properties, such as the 
urban ER system (e.g., fire brigade system) 
▪ large-scale hazard scenario-based, system-wide spatial resilience assessments of an ER road 
network, explicitly assessing its robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity, for 
further performance analyses, with the application of graph theory and network science with 
GIS tools 
▪ large-scale hazard scenario-based, system-wide exposure, vulnerability and risk assessments 
of an ER road network, with applied geoinformatics and GIS tools 
▪ large-scale hazard scenario-based, system-wide connectivity and accessibility analysis with 




▪ system-wide hazard impact curves and statistical analyses for enhanced preparedness for 
compound or escalating events through,  
▪ geovisualisation techniques and GIS for the exchange of information between the ERS system 
and CI operators, providing the means and tools for enhanced collaboration towards the safety 
of the population, the safety of the emergency responders and safety of the interconnected CI 
in an urban ER system. 
 
Following the aforementioned conceptual background and identified gaps, the following key research 
questions (RQ) will be answered throughout the thesis. 
 
RQ1 
How can urban emergency response resilience (ERR) to riverine floods and flash floods 
be conceptualised towards operationalisation using graph and CAS theory? 
RQ2 What is an urban ER system, and how does CAS theory identify its functional 
properties?          
RQ3 
How can the urban ERR of a fire brigade system, to riverine floods and flash floods, be 
operationalised, considering interdependent cascading and emerging risks on several 
scales, with GIS? 
RQ4 
How can spatial assessments be utilised to operationalise the robustness, redundancy, 
resourcefulness, and rapidity of ERR on several scales? 
RQ5 How can large-scale exposure, vulnerability and risk be assessed with applied 
geoinformatics, GIS tools and graph theory? 
RQ6 How GIS and network science enable identifying system-wide connectivity on various 
scales and levels, enabling citywide accessibility performance analysis with 
accessibility patterns and ER route pre-planning? 
RQ7 How can GIS, graph theory, network science, fuzzification, geovisualisation and 
resilience matrixes accelerate the processes, raise awareness and form a basis for further 
collaboration between civil protection, CI operators and emergency managers? 
 
 
A combination of quantitative and qualitative methods has been used and is presented throughout the 
text, with verification of use and further suggestions for improvements for further application of the 
concept of ERR to urban ER systems. In Figure 2, there is a diagram of the multimethodological 











2. Resilient Urban Emergency Response (ER) System 
Because there is no concept or model of an urban emergency response system ready to suit the needs 
for addressing its constituent CI and their networks that build relationships between them, it is 
necessary to conceptualise it and model it. The development of its concept, presentation of its model, 
definition, and identification of its operational properties are essential since they further enable 




2.1 ER System, Interdependent Resiliencies & Operational Framework 
Emergency response services (ERS) have been used as a case study for modelling systems of 
systems [106]. They have geographically distributed constituent systems that must respond to 
spatially diverse events promptly. Major accidents often require firefighters to rescue victims from 
vehicles or buildings, emergency medical services (EMS) personnel to be dispatched to the injured 
and transfer them to the nearest hospital, and police to secure accident scenes, direct traffic around it 
and conduct investigations, which cause traffic disruptions. Even though most of these ERS are 
unique to their respective organisations, some services' duplications are expected. Fire brigades often 
provide basic medical assistance, where they would be the first to arrive at the accident scene. In case 
of floods, they are the first to respond for relief and rescue, and despite the flood situations, they must 
operate and be timely under any weather condition. Therefore, ERS are forming their system of 
systems (SoS) in the environments they operate. This external environment of operation (complex 
adaptive urban system - city) is also a complex SoS constituent from clusters of SoS. 
Therefore, it is suggested in this thesis that for a strengthened preparedness for response (as called 
in the SFDRR), it is essential the provision of a zoom-in designation to the individual urban ER 
systems and of detailed flood impact information of various flood intensities that can affect the 
functionality of the system (timely ER response or else timely accessibility). So, to answer the RQ2, 
based on the response capacity of an ER system in a compact urban area, the urban ER system is 
defined in the thesis as a SoS with complex adaptive system (CAS) properties.  
A complex system has multiple individual agents and components highly connected and 
interdependent, to the extent that emergent behavioural phenomena and reductionist approaches, 
such as simple theory, are not suitable for their explanation [107]. However, through the system 
dynamics’ approach [108], leading to sustainable developments, it is possible. CAS (see Table 1) are, 
furthermore, non-linear and self-organising systems of various diverse elements (networks and 
agents), whose interactions define the whole system and enable new patterns to emerge that are more 
than merely the sum of the parts [109, 110].  
Self-organising systems are constituent from self-organising networks that, as mentioned in [111], 
“optimise the number of attractors without becoming unstable, but they evolve their complexity” and 
form the interactions between the constituent systems of CAS. These interactions represent flows 
of information with feedback loops throughout the system, which are the source of the system’s 
behaviour [112].  
Most systems and complex adaptive systems cannot be analysed merely by their components but 
must be viewed holistically [108, 109]. Complex systems such as cities produce self-similar forms 




perturbations, they keep their topological relations allowing for structuring data based on feature 
adjacency and connectivity principles. As mentioned in [116], a topological relation is preserved if 
the object is rotated, scaled or translated. This notion is taking from the complex network theory [117, 
118], adopted for the systems’ research providing the network modelling ability of, for example, the 
roads, with nodes and edges being the representatives of physical components such as junctions and 
intraurban streets. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in [119], this theory provided a comprehensive approach for evaluating 
the underpinned generic properties of the complexity of system topology, i.e. robustness and 
resilience [120]. It is proposed in the thesis that the complex network theory, applied to SoS with 
CAS properties (i.e., urban ER system), enables operationalisation of such properties, risen from the 
complexity of a system’s topology. Operationalisation is achieved by aggregating risk information 
from large scales on a network and system level (network, system and their components) to smaller 
scales, i.e., all the interdependent constituent systems, the entire SoS and their built relationships 
through networks. 
 




In general, from a CAS perspective, urban areas should be observed in a cross-sectoral (local, 
regional, global) context with interdependent components of urban development, interacting as a 
whole [37]. Various studies characterise the urban areas as socio-ecological systems that impact and 
are impacted by the natural environment [122] - they are developed considering the environment of 
the components in which they consist. Furthermore, the CI are part of an urban environment, i.e., 
cities, as mentioned in section 1, and consist of clustered and highly complex SoS, which involve 
highly complex CI systems. Therefore, they create unique environments for themselves and society 
[123], allowing classification according to physical characteristics. Similarly to the axiom of 
Aristotle, seen from a complex systems lens, the oneness can be seen in the urban ER system as 






               Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.6 [=1045a]: The whole is superior to the simple unity of its parts  
(not a simple aggregation of its sum). 
 Regarding the difficulty that has been declared/said for both definitions and numbers, what is the 
reason for one? (one concept?). Because of all that have more parts, and it is not the whole thing 
(oneness), but the parts, there is some reason; because as in the bodies, in others, is the touch and in 
others is the stickiness or some other relevant ailment. So the definition is a reason not with sections 
(parts) just like the Iliad, but a single one   
Word to word translation of the ancient Greek Aristotle’s Axiom – for a free translation, see in 2 
 
The CI, composing the entire urban ER, are therefore interdependent through a “reason”, as is called 
from Aristotle, and has been given identity from [70], through the characterisation of their 
interdependency, or else relative relationship:  
▪ Physical interdependency - the material outputs of each CI is dependent on the state of the 
other  
▪ Cyber interdependency - the state of the CI depends on information transmitted through the 
information infrastructure  
▪ Geographical interdependency – state changes in several CI are results from a local 
environmental event  
▪ Logical interdependency – all the connections that are not physical, cyber, or geographic. 
 
Aristotle declared that the whole is superior to its parts. The whole, which can be considered a 
complex adaptive SoS, is not merely an accumulation of its systems’ properties but has superior 
properties. This notion can be embedded in the SoS with CAS properties, which are complex, 
dynamic systems with evolving properties, have learned from external shocks, have self-organised 
individually, have improved their systems, and become more effective against external perturbations 
to their core capacity (critical functionality). According to [124], capacity is the ability of a system to 
absorb a disruption without losing its capability, i.e. critical functionality [125]. Also, resilience is 
defined in [126] as the system’s capacity to respond or adapt to a singular, unique and most often 
radically surprising event. 
For this reason, it is argued in the thesis that for improvement of the whole, that is, enhanced 
resistance of a SoS to external perturbations for quick response and recovery, compartmentalisation 
to its parts is essential. Thus, it is also argued that enables the revelation of cascading risks that often 
underlie crises and disasters, as mentioned in [37]. The revelation is evident after critical states are 
reached, and changes from one phase (pre-hazard) to another (post-hazard) occur in the systems [36]. 
In [107], it is also mentioned that approaching such critical states, minor influences (on large scales) 
may lead to increasing fluctuations of a greater magnitude (on smaller scales), indicating that the 








suggests their division into network-oriented systems (road network, electricity grid, 
telecommunication grid) and object-oriented systems (fire brigades, hospitals, schools, elderly 
homes). This division, according to physical characteristics, allows further compartmentalisation to 
smaller components.  
CI compartmentalisation in smaller components is achieved using the graph theory and the 
complex network theory (part of the graph theory), which introduced nodes for the 
characterisation of entities and links to illustrate the relationships between facilities. The 
compartmentalisation enables further in-depth interdependency identification towards the 
operationalisation of the resilience of the systems to external stressors. Additionally, the nodes and 
the links' spatial location are critical elements for analysing complex interactive connectivity and 
interdependencies in an entire SoS, considering the different risks for the two mentioned above, CI 
divisions. Consequently, the compartmentalisation of a SoS, its constituent systems, CI, and 
networks enabled from the graph theory allow for its digitisation in geographic information 
system (GIS). The digitisation of the CI systems and their networks assists with the build of databases 
in a GIS environment. These databases can include information on the systems’ characteristics, 
enabling their handling for spatial analyses towards identifying and assessing a wide range of flood 
impacts. Therefore, to answer the RQ2, combining the graph theory, the compartmentalisation of the 
CI, and the complex urban area, the urban ER system is introduced. Furthermore, the thesis argues 
that the urban ER system consists of these CI used in an emergency response system in urban areas 
(complex systems), that is, ERS housing buildings (nodes) and the road network (links) used for ER 
provision (SoS), with its governance to depend on three agents and their collaboration.  
The safety of the population (Agent 1 - civil protection) is dependent on quick response times, that 
is, fast accessibility (Agent 2 - emergency management), highly reliant on reliable road networks 
(Agent 3 - critical infrastructure protection). These three agents in a city decide interdependently 
and dependently around various strategic protective and safety goals of different foci. Reliable 
transport systems are valued for their safety, travel time, cost and undisrupted regularity of service 
[128]. These characteristics are impacted, and regularity of service, that is, drivability towards timely 
ER (travel time), together with safety and costs (in time and money), become one of the priorities for 
strengthened preparedness for ER, specifically with increasing urbanisation and increasing EWE in 
urban areas. Such priorities also call for tight collaboration between the three agents for common 
agendas, as previously presented.  
The presented graphical model and its digitised form represent an urban ER system, aiming to 
untangle the complexity of the ER SoS in complex cities for further flood impact assessments. The 
cities are represented merely as a beehive of various city units, with each city unit to be representative 
of the clustered population and interfaced CI of their cover area (city units/scale of city-system 
analysis). They also serve as potential incident areas that need timely ER, despite the weather or flood 
impacts on the ER complex adaptive SoS. For simplification, the ER SoS will be referred to as an 






Figure 3: Graphical model of an urban emergency response system with complex adaptive properties (left) and 
(right) digitisation of the model in a hexagonal spatial matrix 
 
 
The representation of a SoS with CAS properties, such as the urban ER system as presented in 
this thesis, employs a graph and uses the techniques provided by the branch of mathematics called 
graph theory. Throughout the thesis, it is argued that the representation of the urban ER system with 
a graph enhances its redundancies and resourcefulness towards resilience when also combined 
with the complex network theory, which reveals, as previously mentioned, the relationships 
between the constituent systems and the entire urban ER with its environment. Firstly, with the 
complex network theory, various analogies between specific graph metrics are possible to be 
established (i.e. authority and degree), as well as several risk variables - exposure, resilience 
(capacities), vulnerability, reliability - enabling the exploitation of these analogies for a deep 
knowledge of a natural hazard’s impact on the exposed system (structure, weaknesses, etc.). 
Secondly, it is possible to use the graph as a tool for the propagation of the damage into the entire 
system, not only for direct but also indirect and cascading effects, and ultimately, to better understand 
the risk mechanisms of natural hazards in a complex adaptive SoS, towards adaptive and integrative 
risk mitigation strategies.  
CAS theory has been applied in the concept of CI, where the complex interfaced and 
interdependent CI are presented as a SoS with CAS properties [121]. It has also been applied in urban 
resilience concepts, seeing cities as a CAS that, after a shock, need a constant feedback loop for 
adaptation and transformation to new “normalities” [107] that are enhanced or decreased resilience 
states. Resilience is a notion of relevance since it is interdisciplinary and has been included worldwide 
in DRM strategies as it offers a systemic approach to risks and analysis of risks, their conveying 
issues, the territories, population and management services [129]. Despite the synchronous nature of 
resilience in the DRR discourse, rare agreements exist regarding preferred methods for building 
disaster resilience in disaster and hazard affected communities [130-132]. In [133], it is mentioned 
that a CAS aims to provide an understanding of a complex emergent behaviour at a macro level by 




all CAS are characterised by their ability to learn from their environment, i.e., transformative 
characteristics.  
Consequently, CAS can be constitutionally characterised by a panarchy or the ability to be influenced 
dynamically or adapt to changes that emerge endogenously or exogenously of the system [134, 135]. 
Therefore, CAS thinking is relevant in DRM approaches when dealing with EWE and EWE-
triggered hazards. 
DRM from a CAS thinking assists to find common ground for integrative DRR approaches through 
a resilience lens [136], specifically in complex systems. The application of systems thinking 
(including CAS) in understanding disaster resilience is not new [109, 137, 138]. CAS highlight the 
importance of researching disaster resilience (dynamic concept) through the theoretical point of view 
of the CAS theory [136]. DRM has utilised concepts, such as risk and vulnerability, to explain the 
susceptibility of humans to disasters with the formulation of possible explanations and tools for 
reducing the risk. EWE that impact extreme flows have resulted in a shift towards flood resilience 
and have caused a cultural change in (flood context-specific DRM) flood risk management (FRM), 
suggesting the integration of complex adaptive systems (CAS) theory in FRM approaches [139].  
When resilience is defined, conceptualised and operationalised, it requires a combination of top-down 
and bottom-up FRM approaches and an overall integrative approach to identify the interdependence 
between temporal and spatial scales [139]. Therefore, CAS engineering entails the transformation 
of the systems and their transition to a new normality. Thus, the systems are characterised by a 
constant flux through informative feedback loops that call for adaptation and transformation. In 
systems (SoS) that most cities are, these informative feedback loops are cascading impacts, after 
perturbations from a stressor (e.g. floods), analysed with identification of various interdependencies 
between interfaced CI. Towards this direction, the concept of CI was introduced in [140], where a 
conceptual framework incorporating potential risk cascades in current FRM approaches suggests that 
CI resilience should be a function of hazard, vulnerability/resilience. 
Considering the cascading impacts of floods presented in section 1, the thesis suggests that it is 
necessary for the urban ER system, is essential the identification of perturbations first in large-
scales, caused by direct but also emergent flood risks, towards resiliency of the system under 
flood stress, followed by transformation, i.e. resilience thinking. Transformation is meant the risk 
of failure of the critical functionality of the system, identified through endogenous and exogenous 
redundancies of the system, reflected on its resourcefulness for rapid recovery and further potential 
transformation (it will be covered in sections 3.2 and 3.3). When specifically aiming to answer the 
first main RQ1, it is argued that the resilience of an urban ER system must focus on spatial 
assessments of the flood impacts on safety and time of response (delayed ER or incapacitation), which 
jeopardises the safety of the population and causes economic losses, for a range of scales. Therefore, 
ER system efficiency (performance/serviceability) assessments must include flood impacts on: 
▪ the population - via timely response 
▪ vehicle-related flood fatalities - by considering safe driving mobility through flooded waters 
▪ operational costs (in time and money) - by providing flood-depth adaptive route pre-planning 
and  
▪ the collaboration of task forces - by aiming to undisrupted collaboration after transforming 





The safety of the population (civil protection) is dependent on quick response times. It depends on 
fast accessibility (emergency management) and is highly reliant on a travel time reliable road network 
(critical infrastructure protection). TTR’s most commonly accepted definition views reliability as 
“the probability that the system can function to an acceptable level of performance, for some given 
period” [141]. TTR is a measure of the serviceability measure, in terms of transport, of the service 
provided by transportation networks. Therefore, a network that provides a high level of service (i.e. 
undisrupted transport) has a high level of travel time reliability, i.e. serviceability. For a review of the 
current terms and TTR measures, see [142]. In the transport network, TTR is vital for assessing the 
performance of a road network under the influence of EWE, i.e. reductions of traffic speeds and 
therefore of the TTR from the perspective of transportation agencies and for trip-related decisions of 
the general public [143].  
As a risk identifier and multi-faceted term for vulnerability/robustness/resilience of the transport 
networks, reliability has been analysed in a wide variety of studies [144-152]. With the increasing 
urbanisation and the frequency and intensity of the EWE (riverine floods and flash floods) in cities, 
these are the characteristics that are impacted and are deteriorating the regularity of urban ER systems' 
service, i.e. timely ER provision, which becomes even more difficult. Therefore, for a deepened 
understanding of the flood impacts on the urban ER system, it is supported throughout the thesis 
that understanding the flood impacts (direct and indirect) on its networks is essential.  
Hence, quantifying the features that establish a resilient urban ER system with the combination of 
graph theory and network science is possible. 
 
“Behind each system studied in complexity, there is an intricate wiring diagram or a network 
that defines the components' interactions. We will never understand the complex system 
unless we map out and understand the networks behind them” [153] 
 
Graph theory and network science [154] establish themselves as an appropriate field of study to tackle 
matters of system resilience, as already previously mentioned. Networks have measurable properties 
that can quantitatively and directly assess the resilience [155-159] of complex systems. Graph theory, 
as applied to network science, assists with simple graphical models of the road network. As an 
example, road networks are simply transformed into weighted graphs. In a graphical representation 
of a road network (Figure 4), intersections and streets can be modelled by nodes and edges. That is, 
the road network (i.e. weighted graph) is a combination of the notions of distance and location in a 
dual-graph [160] as introduced in the network analysis of urban streets [161] utilising the complex 
network theory [117, 118]. 
In addition, different streets of a road network have different lengths, which is an attribute modelled 
by assigning the length to each edge number serving as its weight (edge weight). This weight is the 
cost or else impedance, reflecting real-world attributes such as distance, time and latency. In case of 
floods, this weight can be the flood-impacted travel time from node to node, which can impair the 
road network’s serviceability. The road network systems are analysed as physical networks, 
consisting of nodes (intersections) and links (road segments). In the urban street networks, edges are 
typical representations of street/road segments and the nodes of the junctions where two or more 





Figure 4: Road network as a non-directed weighted graph - adapted from the theory in [162] 
 
 
The graphs enable data structure to deal with real-world information and incorporate road traffic 
dynamics [163]. Furthermore, these characteristics of graphs can be utilised, for example, to improve 
the ability to avoid or limit the direct and indirect effects (exposure and speed changes respectively) 
of hazard events (such as flooding) where possible.  
Such hazard-related impact analyses need a higher level of comprehension of the behaviour of 
networks (from a road segment level to the entire road network) under hazard conditions, enabled by 
the complex network theory [120]. 
The behaviour of networks and improved modelling methodologies and techniques allow for 
assessing mitigation alternatives to reduce the hazards’ impacts [164]. For this reason, in the case of 
floods, the impacts on the road network, i.e. physical (on nodes and links), need to be addressed with 
various climate models enabling simulation ability for current and future events [165] and in large 
scales [166]. Scientists agree that for enhancing the effectiveness of emergency plans, information on 
both vulnerabilities and risks must be identified in local scales [167, 168]. Therefore, it is argued 
throughout the thesis that such agreements entail large-scale flood impact assessments on the road 
network, followed by propagations to the entire urban ER system. 
Large-scale assessments on flood impacts in order to be analysed must be benchmarked considering 
the critical functionality of the urban ER system, i.e. timely ER provision and safety of the population. 
An adverse event in an urban area, such as riverine floods and flash floods, flood depth (FD) is 
appropriate for benchmarking the ER system and will be used further. FD is the primary risk factor 
taken into consideration in many flood impact-related studies of various research foci, such as 
(indicatively) risk perception, trafficability, vehicle stability, mobility disruption, mobility 
preparedness, accessibility, and economic losses and delays, i.e. travel time reliability (TTR) [85, 97, 
142, 169-191]. For a resilient (timely) ER provision, identification of various impacts according to 
flood depth (FD), direct and emergent (indirect of second-and third-level) are presented in Figure 5. 
Identification of such impacts is supporting these notions from a CI perspective [72], from an FRM 
one [139] and a combination of both [140]. Categorically, the bottom-up dependency curves can be 




systems (e.g., CI, population, economy, and government) for a deepened understanding of the 
resilience of a region [72] or community [137].  
Therefore, this thesis discusses that for research focusing on the emergency response, the 
benchmarking considering flood depths for safe driving allows for further efficiency assessment of 
the urban ER system under several flooded conditions to enhance the population's safety. In the era 
of unexpected EWE, there exists an ever-increasing need to recognise the value and importance of a 
comprehensive interpretation of the plethora of interacting social and technical processes, considering 
socio-technical regimes, i.e. the population and their safety in ER plans under various flood scenarios. 
Therefore, it is argued that the representation of an urban ER system with CAS properties allows for 
identifying cascading flood impacts on several levels of the network, considering interactions with 
its environment (see Table 2), and allowing further resilience assessments. 
The resilience concept emphasizes the temporal development after an event stressing the rebound 
phase after an impact [40]. The ability to bounce back to desirable states entails the timely recovery 
of defined critical functions and basic structures [192]. Timely recovery depends on communities’ 
access to resources and their organisational capacities before and during the occurrence of a 
disturbance [31, 73, 83]. The emergence of innovative measures also plays a role [193], 
conceptualising disasters as a catalyst for change, enhancing the preparedness phase for resilience 
[194]. The consideration of the urban areas as dynamic systems (i.e. CAS), suggests that policy 
responses often derive from an interrelated set of decisions in decision cycles, where factors that 
shape initial decisions (early phase) affect further decisions [195]. For a CAS, such as the urban ER 
system, focusing on the operationalisation of only the recovery speed, as a resilience assessment, 
oversees the ability for transformation into new and less vulnerable states. Therefore, within resilience 
research and consistency, when considering resilience in FRM, temporal and spatial scales should be 


















Table 2: The urban emergency response system (ER SoS), with impact levels according to flood depths and their identified direct and emerging risks on an agent, network and 





Therefore, following the disaster and emergency management cycles, which are often interconnected 
(e.g. emergencies occur before, during, and after a disaster), it is argued that DRM needs to be 
advanced. Advancement, considering the needs mentioned above, is achieved with integrative 
resilience concepts considering cascading risks and impact consequences triggered from EWE in 
complex city environments towards strengthening the preparedness for response by characterising an 
urban ER system with CAS properties. The resilience concept allows for considering unexpected 
events, such as the EWE and their disruption to the emergency response system. Viewing the 
resilience concept from a CIP lens, integrating “safe failure” into the design structures promotes a 
higher degree of flexibility, accounting for a diversity of flood-related cascading risks [196]. 
Therefore, the thesis suggests that a resilience concept dealing with DRR and impacts of EWE, such 
as floods on the urban ER system, should consider cascading risks on organisational, technical 
(endogenous), economic and social (exogenous) environments (see Figure 5), viewing the process 
with resilience thinking due to the complex adaption capacity of the system. 
  
Figure 5: Flood-impacted urban Emergency Response system, indicating organisational, technical, financial 
and social (endogenous and exogenous) interconnected cascading risks 
 
 
The research conducted in the thesis aims to advance the general understanding of the resilience 
of CAS, such as the urban ER system, and shift the focus from the principal focus of recent 
studies on ‘what can be damaged’ after floods. That is, a shift away from the silo-based thinking of 
DRM approaches to ‘how can it operate best under substandard conditions’, considering users 
(emergency responders and population) and their behaviours from resilience thinking to 
restore capacities. Therefore, the focus of analysis is shifting to resilience-based capacity and 
efficiency assessments of the urban ER system. These are quantifiable characteristics in many DRM 
approaches, specifically in regards to infrastructures. In [197], quantitative risk assessments are 
intelligible and effective for developing risk management practices, only when the disruptions and 
infrastructure functions are similar to those that have occurred in the past since the impacts are well 
identified and defined. Risk assessments and related DRM, as currently implemented, have several 
shortcomings, such as:  





▪ the limitation of the research to the quantifiable aspects of a system for the prevention of 
failure of single components with engineered solutions, omitting consideration of the more 
extensive system and 
▪ the overall acceptance of residual risks without preparation for their future occurrence or 
preparation for their potential updated states.  
 
An effort to ‘look at the whole’ of an issue is embedded in resilience thinking, according to the 
commonly used resilience concept [198]; to include a relevant problem environment in one’s 
definition of a modelling, governance problem or design.  
Therefore, for the operationalisation of an urban ER system, resilience is chosen. The resilience 
concept acknowledges the fundamental interdependence and interrelatedness of all things [199] after 
identifying critical functionalities and thresholds. As argued and presented in the previous section, 
resilience thinking is a prerequisite in CAS systems when resilience is defined.  
Resilience thinking must be captured in the conceptualisation framework and the definitions of the 
properties towards operationalisation. Hence, this entails combining top-down and bottom-up 
FRM/DRM approaches and a more integrated/aggregate approach to the interdependencies between 
temporal and spatial scales. From a CAS perspective and towards the conceptualisation of the 
resilience of a SoS, the “interdependent resiliencies concept” is proposed, where resiliencies regard 
its clustered CI that compose its constituent systems. For the assessment of the resilience of a SoS to 
hazardous events that reveal its resilience levels, it is suggested, the development of a top-down 
assessment approach focusing on its resilience features and depending on its constituent systems’ 
resilience capacity levels, which are further dependent on the resilience of its clustered CI. The 
interdependent resiliencies concept, suggested in the thesis, further proposes the combination of 
the top-down approach with a spatial upscaling operationalisation approach for a 
comprehensive resilience assessment of the SoS, assessing the risk and the resiliencies of its 
networks and constituent systems on larger to smaller scales in the face of hazardous events (e.g. 
floods) (see Figure 6). Specifically, in Figure 6, the interdependent resiliencies concept can be 
operationalised by combining top-down approaches (black arrows) and spatial upscaling methods 






Figure 6: Conceptualisation framework of the resilience of a SoS, towards its operationalisation 
 
 
So to present the flux of resilience and risk information across the systems and networks of a SoS, 
for comprehensive assessments of its resilience to hazardous events, white arrows are used. It is stated 
in [125] that a resilience management framework includes risk analysis as a central component. The 
risk analysis depends on the characterisation of the threats or hazards, such as floods, vulnerabilities 
and consequences of adverse events on the systems’ capacities, to determine the expected loss of 
critical functionality.  
In [124], capacity is defined as the ability of a system to absorb a disruption without loss of capability. 
For example, the resilience capacity index (RCI) is a term used to describe the ability of a 
geographical region to adapt to changes and is used to compare the ability of different metropolitan 
regions to handle disruptions.  
This thesis argues that the critical functionality of the urban ER system is determined on the systems’ 
level after EWE-triggered disruptions in the networks’ level according to FD levels. Therefore, this 
enables the encapsulation of the flood impacts on the constituent systems’ resilience capacities, 
modelling simulations towards operationalisation, absorbing, adapting, and transforming rapidly to 
respond in case of floods, thus making it resilient. Additionally, it is argued that risk assessments 
conducted on large scales and network levels enable the identification of the constituent systems’ 
capacities of the urban ER system (SoS with CAS properties) for further resilience assessments or 
flexibility assessments (ill-functioning SoS, but self-organising for future resilience). For this 
purpose, the impact of the FD levels on the hierarchical urban ER system characteristics is of focus 
throughout the thesis to benchmark its capacities towards operationalisation. The benchmarking 
assists the untangling of the system's complexity, as analysed below, and follows the umbrella 
concept that resilience enables analyses of the interactions across various domains and scales [200]. 
More specifically to the resilience systems’ concept, in Germany, the Federal Ministry of the Interior 
(BMI) in 2018 refers to resilience, considering the critical functionality of a system, and it is defined 




to function. The ability to function refers to the criticality assessments conducted on the studied 
systems, which enable the system’s threshold and the definitions of the priorities on a temporal and 
spatial scale [139], after which criticality levels are assessed according to the risk and expected losses 
[125]. Furthermore, this is also reflected in the Cities Resilience Index's urban resilience term [201]. 
The CRI is formed from the consortium of the Rockefeller Foundation, 100 Resilient Cities (100RC), 
where resilience is described as “the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses 
and systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow no matter what kinds of chronic stresses and 
acute shocks they experience”. In the Cities Resilience Index [201], the features of resilience are 
introduced, which cities and CI need: i) flexibility, ii) redundancy and iii) robustness (or hardening). 
In this report, redundancy refers to the “spare capacity purposely created within systems for the 
accommodation of disruptions” characterising redundancy as “duplicating how a need is met” and 
flexibility of systems is characterised by their ability to “change, evolve and adapt to changing 
circumstances”.  
Specific to CI networks, in [202], redundancy is defined as “duplicating the means by which a need 
is met” and flexibility as” meeting multiple needs through multiple different components”. These 
definitions help characterise different scales of the same resilience properties [203] and incorporate 
resilience thinking from a CAS perspective. In [201], it is also mentioned that “robust” systems are 
those, which can “withstand the impacts of hazard event without significant damage or loss of 
function”. The definition of robustness is adopted from the official transport resilience definition of 
the United Kingdom [204], “to withstand the impacts of extreme weather, to operate in the face of 
such weather and to recover promptly from its effects”, provided after the devastating EWE in 
2013/14 [205].  
The US Transport Research Board defines resilient a transport system that can “withstand the 
impacts of extreme weather, to operate in the face of such weather and to recover promptly from its 
effects” [206]. With a focus on the emergency operations and their interdependence on the reliability 
of the transport network to provide timely ER, the US Transport Research Board [206] conducted a 
report highlighting the importance of transit in emergency evacuations with a transport resilience 
thinking following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
in 2005. It was highlighted that both the capacity and resilience of transit and highway infrastructure 
affect the levels of success of the use of transit in an emergency evacuation [207].  
These definitions of resilience and its properties either focus on DRM approaches for a city-network, 
a CI and CI networks, or altogether, have as common ground the extension of functionality margins 
of the systems, either actively or passively.  
The National Academy of Sciences [208] definition of resilience places risk in the broader context 
of a system in its ability “to plan and prepare for, absorb, respond to, and recover from disasters 
and adapt to new conditions”. Continuing, “an important feature of resilience captured in this 
definition is the temporal dimension: the ability to recover and retain critical system functionality in 
response to a wide range of threats, both known and unknown.” In the thesis and regarding the critical 
system functionality of an urban ER system, the identification of the hierarchy plays a significant role 
in pinpointing the “zero point” of the cascading risks, analogous to the functionality for a deepened 
understanding from larger-scales to smaller ones. Thus, identification of the hierarchy assists with 
untangling the systems’ complexity and the development of risk mitigation approaches.  
When dealing with SoS with CAS properties, it must be prioritised to find the hierarchy between the 
interdependent networks. For example, the road network is highlighted in Table 2 because it serves 




system’s degradation after the occurrence of floods is highly affecting the urban population and ERS, 
as presented.  
The CAS are hierarchical and non-linear, and therefore, adapted from [209], a SoS with CAS 
properties is a system where the ‘higher’ levels in hierarchy serve the ‘lower’. As aforementioned, 
the ‘higher’ in the hierarchy in an urban ER is the road system and therefore, its transport 
characteristics (Figure 7) will be the ones considered for operationalisation, that is, accessibility 
according to connectivity, depending on traffic and mobility disruptions. Connectivity is an 
indicator used in many resilience concepts (social, economic, environmental/physical and 
institutional) since it brings humans, objects, attributes, and economies to a connected network 
fostering constant adaptation, transformation and resilience. Moreover, it is supported throughout the 
thesis that it can be a valuable indicator for large-scale analyses, providing insights on the level of 
resilience of urban areas with an upscaling approach. This notion has been adopted from the concept 
of local spatial resilience [210]. In the thesis, connectivity is adopted as a weather impact identifier 
reflecting on the accessibility of an urban area or CI, such as the road network and the ERS buildings. 
Furthermore, in this era of increased frequencies of EWEs and considering the tight interface and 
interdependence of the ERS, the road network and the population (capturing the socio-economic 
environment), it is suggested that:  strengthened preparedness for ER is achieved with connectivity 
analysis of the urban ER road network, adaptive ER route plans and flood risk- and place-based 
time-dependent accessibility assessments. 
To that end, flood impacts on the system of the ER road network caused by, for example, speed 
changes and consequently travel time changes, will affect the critical functionality of the urban 
ER system, i.e. citywide timely ER. The latter flood impact is reflected in the accessibility 
component and the time of response of the system. So to identify the robustness and flexibility 
(redundancies and resourcefulness levels) of the urban ER system, the multi-scale analysis with 
a zoom-in and zoom-out effect from larger to smaller scales, enabling the information feedback 
loops, is required when assessing the resilience of a CAS system (urban ER system). 
For this reason, and moving away from the so far conducted silo-approaches of accessibility 
assessments, the three transport perspectives that are included in transportation planning, i.e. as 
mentioned in [211], are the traffic and mobility, and the focus for the resilience assessment of an 
urban ER system, conducted in the thesis. The thesis suggests that taking from these transport 
perspectives for adaptation (see Figure 7), the ER road network’s system functionality is operational 
after consideration of the following focal traffic and road network characteristics: 
▪ traffic characteristics of the ER road network – Free-Flow Speeds (FFS) and Travel Time 
for efficiency assessment of the ER road network and further ER route planning purposes 
(used from each ERS for operational ER route planning after the occurrence of incidence),  
▪ mobility characteristics of the ER road network - road network’s mobility capacity (RNMC) 
for safe driving of rescue vehicles through flooded waters, according to ERS capacity in 
resources, i.e. rescue vehicles of different heights  
▪ accessibility of the ER road network - citywide accessibility based on a travel-cost approach, 
depending on the connectivity of the ER road network, used as a weighting factor for further 






Figure 7: Transport perspectives and performance indicators. Adapted from [211] for ER road networks  
 
 
The risks of the systems, particularly the impacts of stressors (floods) to the system (direct), its 
characteristics (indirect second-order) and its environment (indirect third-order), are interdependent, 
and an adverse event has a cascading impact effect on all its levels. A CAS is in a constant state of 
flux and is usually balanced between stasis (the extremes of order) and chaos (anarchy). Shifting the 
emphasis on impact analysis rather than on the probability of occurrence analysis [212] is relevant 
when dealing with unpredictable EWE such as riverine floods and flash floods on an urban ER 
system. Therefore, the flood intensity factor is introduced into the curve (Figure 8), providing 
opportunities for strengthened preparedness for response.  
Intensity is defined as a discrepancy from frequent/regular events [10], and therefore, high intensities 
characterise extreme events. For this reason, a focus on the flood intensity shifts the emphasis of EWE 
analysis to the impacts’ estimation, away from the siloing in current DRM approaches that focus on 
the determination of the occurrence probability.  
Intensity impact analysis is highly relevant also for SoS with CAS properties since a CAS is a best-
fit tool for the analyses of systems characterised by a constant change -“functioning at the edge of 







Figure 8: Urban Emergency Response (System of Systems) Resilience curve to riverine floods and flash floods. 
Based on [125, 213, 214] 
 
 
Therefore, in answering the RQ2, in the SoS functionality profile (Figure 8), risk in a system is 
interpreted as the total reduction in the critical functionality. Additionally, resilience, as adopted 
from [125], is revealed after a flood event at a large-scale (bottom-up scaling approach) and small 
scale (resilience of the SoS with CAS properties) and both, risk and resilience are related to the 
slope of the absorption curve and the shape of the rapidity curve. The slope of the curve is indicative 
of the temporal effect of the adverse event. Transformation occurs at the network level for the 
rapid recovery of the SoS and its return to updated normalities regarding the initial functionality. 
It is argued that assessments of transformation levels, it is argued that are indicative of the risk of 
failure of the functionality of the constituent systems and the entire SoS. 
The ERR curve is based on the concept presented for the resilience curve from [125], combined with 
hazard intensity thresholds integrated into the resilience concept from [213] and the concept of 
operational survival, introduced from [214]. It is presented in the thesis that risk must be interpreted 
with the overpassing of these thresholds so as to provide optimal flexibility to the urban ER 
system. This overpassing of thresholds is additionally leading the system to function with a state at 
“the edge of risk or else chaos”, but still giving the opportunity after absorption of the stressor’s 
impact, for transformation to a new regime, towards global/overall transformation of the system and 
resilience. Therefore, the risk could be a part of how systems function, considering risks from a 
temporal and scale aspect to understand its role better.  
Risk as a part of a systems’ function is proposed in [215], where it is stated that the reduction of risk 
without an understanding of its role within the larger socio-ecological system might reduce the 
system’s overall level of disaster resilience. It has been specifically demonstrated that the 
determination of the operating performance of an operation, the minimum performance towards 




As minimum operating performance is characterised by the level at which the operation can 
minimally function without causing additional damage or system failure [202]. Such notions are 
relevant in the complex adaptive urban ER system since stability/equilibrium is not an option in 
complex systems and SoS, and a decrease of stability is expected analogously to the level of 
complexity [216]. For example, wrong decisions taken at an agent level, for the routing paths 
leading to an incident area, without considering the impact of a flood in the RNMC at the route-
planning phase, increase the probability of the risk for delayed or blocked ER provision, as well 
as, the risk for the lives of the emergency responders. Consequently, the resilience of the system 
is jeopardised at many levels, as indicated in Figure 5.  
As mentioned in section 1, the operating performance is reflected in the dynamic nature of the urban 
resilience, which presupposes that policy responses often derive from interrelated decisions in 
decision cycles where factors that shape initial decisions, at an early stage, affect further decisions 
[195] at a later stage (i.e. driving through flooded waters) - based on the Thomas mentioned above 
Theorem. Resilience is being used as a term emerging from ecology to describe the capacity of natural 
ecosystems [217], which are examples of CAS that maintain or recover their functionality in the event 
of perturbation, considering the rise of systems thinking [200]. In systems-thinking, the performance 
of the complex systems (following the Axiom of Aristotle) and, as mentioned in [218], is more than 
the performance of its parts; in the case of complex adaptive SoS, more than the performance of its 
constituent systems. Therefore, the resilience analyses of these systems should focus on the 
relations between their constituent systems and their adapted interactions for a potential 
emergent performance, utilising its flexible identity.  
Cities, as previously stated, are complex and constantly adapting systems, and consequently, ER is 
following this constant adaptability; therefore, resilience is equally applicable in the way it is 
managed. For this purpose, in the case of a SoS such as the urban ER with CAS properties, 
resilience must also be seen as a cluster of interdependent resiliencies of the constituent systems, 
their components and relations that reveal their resilience capacities. As an example, it has been 
demonstrated in several studies that there is a strong resilience interdependency between the resilience 
of cities and the CI resilience under the stressor of floods [219, 220].  
 
 
2.2 Emergency Response Resilience (ERR) to Floods 
In this section, the RQ1 is answered by identifying the critical functionality of a system so to assess 
resilience combined with evaluations of the temporal profile of system recovery in response to 
adverse events. Therefore, the ERR management to riverine floods and flash-floods, adopted from 
[151] and adjusted to the subject, should evaluate cross-domain alternatives designed to enhance the 
ability of the urban ER system to:  
▪ plan for various intensities of diverse flood type events  
▪ absorb the stress technically and in operations  
▪ transform so to recover rapidly 
▪ predict and prepare for future flood events in order to adapt to their potential flood impacts. 
▪ prepare for potential escalating or compound flood events. 
 
It is widely accepted that different impacts of floods on communities, economies or ecosystems are 




and surveys, online or personal) in disaster risk, vulnerability and resilience studies [221]. Most of 
the resilience concepts are mainly assessed through qualitative approaches or semi-quantitative [151]. 
For example, [222] identified four dimensions of earthquake resilience: technical, organisational, 
social, and economic. The measures of resilience such as robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness 
and rapidity, known as the 4R features of resilience, were then aggregated to minimise a function of 
the probability of system failures, the consequences of such failures, and the recovery time [223]. The 
4R features of resilience have been used extensively from scientists since they are widely 
recognisable and enable interdisciplinary adoption of approaches, methodologies, metrics and tools, 
and according to the context, they allow for quantification approaches of resilience, which are rare. 
They are appropriate for a simplification of the complexity of the information that can entail 
assessments of highly complexed systems and environments and allow for adaptation and 
transformation, which is essential when assessing SoS with CAS properties (urban ER system), under 
the stressor of EWE.  
Generally, the research aims to advance the perception of risk regarding a wide range of multi-level 
and multi-scale flood impacts. Recent flood impact studies focus on ‘what can be damaged’, but the 
thesis focuses on answering the question ‘how can it operate best under sub-optimal flood conditions’ 
at a minimum operational performance in order to restore capacities, while considering safety and 
security aspects, enhancing the safety of lives and security of assets. As presented in section 2.1, the 
urban ER system is modelled and narrowed down to those CI, which are tightly interconnected in 
urban areas and are primarily used by emergency managers in a crisis/disaster event, i.e. the road 
network and the emergency rescue service of research (ERS). Considering the need for resilience 
thinking in resilience conceptualisations towards operationalisation frameworks, extending the 
capacities and resilience of the interfaced systems of a SoS, the resilience of the urban ER system 
must envisage the: 
▪ CAS identity of the urban ER system,  
▪ the need for integrative resilience approaches due to the increasing EWE (climate change),  
▪ need for identification of cascading impacts (direct and indirect) for integrated 
▪ appropriate benchmarking considering safe driving mobility of the rescue vehicles and timely 
ER. 
 
Throughout the thesis, the idea of an urban ER system as a SoS with CAS properties has been 
discussed. The combinatory network relation between the ERS and the city-network is identified as 
the road network, as presented in Figure 4. Therefore, it is suggested that, when dealing with EWE, 
the ‘geographicalness of a flood’, i.e. the geographical perspective and its impacts on several scales 
and levels, need to be assessed for enhancement of the emergency response resilience (ERR) on a 
city level. Therefore, Emergency Response Resilience ERR (Figure 9) is considered a system of 
systems that it is expected to plan for and withstand the impacts of extreme weather of various 
intensities, to operate at a sufficient level after absorption of the impacts, in the face of such weather, 
and to transform rapidly for recovery.  
A key feature of the resilience captured in the ERR’s definition is the flexible dimension (see Figure 
8), highlighting the ability to transform so to retain critical system functionality in response to various 
EWE, that is, timely ER delivery under any flood condition. The proposed definition of ERR is 
considering the definitions of the national academy of science [208] and the transport network 
resilience [206], integrating the CIP lens with “flexible” resilience properties (robustness, 




flexibility they can include to aggregate information from different temporal and spatial scales and 
their strong interrelation (interdependent resilience properties – see Figure 9). The definition is aiming 
to give a CAS identity to the urban ER system’s resilience definition.  
In this way, the flexible ability to the SoS for sub-optimal functioning is provided through the 
extension of its redundancy and resourcefulness, which is not resulting in high functionality 
losses (delays or blockages of ER, decreased safety of the population) or damages (rescue 
vehicles, decreased safety of the emergency responders).  
Therefore, an urban ER system, so to be resilient, must be characterised by its: 
▪ Robustness: the efficiency of the ER system to sustain its identity, under the direct impact of 
any stressor, providing safety of the people and security for all its networks objects 
▪ Redundancy: the ability of the ER system for absorption of direct and indirect impacts of the 
stressor towards adaptation and further transformation (passive redundancy), providing 
alternatives for building capacities (active redundancy) 
▪ Resourcefulness: the capacity of resources of the ER system (active and passive risk) under 
direct and indirect impacts of any stressor 
▪ Rapidity: the ability of the ER system to rapidly recover from the direct and indirect impacts 
of any stressor, sustaining its functionality while transforming to a new updated regime. 
The definitions are based on the transport network resilience concept and definitions mentioned 
earlier. 
Nevertheless, despite the conceptualisation of a SoS’s resilience and its four key features according 
to context enabled from its character, as mentioned in section 2.1, there is still a lack of 
operationalisation frameworks that combine the CIP perspective and the geographical 
perspective. Moreover, focusing on intraurban CI while also considering the interdisciplinary 
concept of spatial resilience and CI resilience. In general, there is scarce literature using spatial 
assessment tools for disaster/flood resilience operationalization, which impairs the credibility of the 
multi-surface resilience concept for both science and decision-making.  
 
 






2.3 GIS & Spatial Thinking for Operationalisation Purposes 
In this section, the ERR is conceptualised for operationalisation. Proceeding to answer the RQ1, it is 
highlighted in [224] that common challenges in resilience operationalisation frameworks when 
building a resilience concept towards becoming more operational are, after specification of 
boundaries: 
i. the definition of analysis’ scale, both geographical and temporal, answering the question 
‘resilience of what to what?’ 
ii. the identification of potential end-users (‘indicators for whom?’) and potential purposes 
(‘indicators for what?’)”.  
Respectively, in a reframing of the resilience concept in [225], the importance of scale was 
highlighted, and it is stated that many of the processes, which drive and shape resilience, “operate on 
larger or smaller scales than the urban or national scale and they often vary between scales”. Thus, 
the question in regards to scale was added - “resilience at what scales?”   
At this point, and towards operationalisation of the suggested ERR concept, more questions are 
added:  
iii. “which data and tools are needed”’ - in terms of the use of official/authoritative and open-
source data and of integrative and interdisciplinary methods used combining different theories 
and algorithms with geospatial assessment analysis tools and methods) and 
iv. “how can indicator assessment results be gathered, handled (in an interoperable way) and 
organised in various scales?” - in terms of geovisualisation techniques that allow for a 
straightforward interpretation of the flux of information from larger to smaller scales and 
transferability between the different stakeholders fostering communication and collaboration 
 
Consequently, ERR is conceptualised in a way for the evaluation of the interdependencies among 
systems and the socio-technical values, as well as the potential cascading impacts, integrating 
security, safety and geographical factors. For the operationalisation of the concept, scenarios enable 
resilience analysis to address various futures, appreciating the uncertainty and dynamics of various 
physical and social factors and the knowledge and understanding over several time spheres [40]. The 
graph model (in Figure 4) and calculations of operational losses can be further integrated into the 
resilience planning, enabling the assessment of many event pathways.  
In this way, system loss statistics can be determined with different alternative mitigations for various 
hazard scenarios, such as floods of various intensities. For inclusion of the ‘geographicalness’ of a 
flood and integration of the geography perspective into the ERR concept, applied 
geoinformatics are used in GIS. In the author's previous work, it has been demonstrated that GIS 
(and remote sensing) are appropriate for simple data transfer and mapping [226]. It has also been 
demonstrated that they can also play a significant role in connecting and analysing data in holistic, 
integrative ways, resulting from the development of user-centred and scale-specific concepts 
[227] that current DRM approaches lack. GIS can be coupled, for example, with various 
methodologies for simulation purposes and examination of the socio-economic behaviours of an 
individual or a group of agents in a complex system, such as cities, in response to the increased EWE, 
aggravated from climate change, or different natural and human-made disasters.  
As previously stated, in the engineering of a CAS for identifying spatial resilience assessment 
indicators, such as a geolocated change in travel times of a road network exposed to floods, the 
coupling of bottom-up with top-down approaches is essential. For example, a methodology that 




modelling [228]. Identifying risk areas (of population, of CI) is shifting the wheel towards 
assumptions that GIS can be seen as a vital/critical infrastructure for improving, understanding, and 
handling risks and disasters.  
The need for better and easier decision-making has resulted in the development of spatial technologies  
[229]. Decision-makers use technology to simplify numerous tasks, and cities become more informed, 
prepared, and resilient [16]. Spatial technology advancements, such as GIS, are utilised in resilience 
planning and emergency management. Complex decision-making is required in planning processes 
to prioritise allocating limited resources to people at risk [230]. Moreover, these difficult decisions 
are merely spatial, with their failure of implementation laying between the high interconnectedness 
and complexity of systems, e.g. the urban ER system. Emergency managers include spatial 
components in assessing the potential hazard impacts or identifying the best evacuation routes during 
disasters [231]. When dealing with EWE, such as riverine floods and flash floods, many of the 
critical problems that arise are intrinsically spatial. For example, spatial problems cover issues 
related to the extent of the disasters, on-site crises and the number of people in need with exact 
geolocation and emergency fuel tanks needed for operational purposes. Spatial problems are assessed 
through extensive risk analysis before, during and even after a crisis/disaster. An essential step of 
the risk analysis is answering the questions “What can go wrong? What is the likelihood that it would 
go wrong? What are the consequences?” [232]. Answers to these questions help risk analysts identify, 
measure, quantify, and evaluate risks and their consequences and impacts [233].  
Therefore, this thesis argues that GIS offer appropriate tools for answering such questions. They 
provide the resources for the gathering, handling, analysis, transformation and communication of data 
associated with the issues mentioned earlier towards operationalisation of ERR.  
GIS became recognised and are utilised as a major tool for monitoring and analysing human crises 
and natural hazards in recent decades, analysing the impact of different natural and human-made 
hazards on different geographical regions. The development of the capabilities of the GIS 
visualisation is vital for the analysis of CI dependencies and interdependencies, especially for the 
visualisation of cascading and escalating failures at a regional level. Through GIS, the fast integration 
of different kinds of spatial information enables faster decision-making by identifying several types 
of interdependencies and their visualisation, which accelerates the decision-making processes [79, 
80, 226, 234]. This capability offered from GIS visualisations to address second-and third-order 
dependencies can integrate the results from the analysis approaches to generate cascading and 
escalating failure curves [235]. It is further argued that the knowledge on such interdependencies of 
different CI, which occurs through GIS applications and visualisations, can lead to timelier 
emergency response through meaningful mitigation and preparation plans after conducting risk 
analysis on defined scales. After identifying the hazards, assessing the risks, and prioritising the 
values (i.e., assets of greatest value), both tactical and strategic plans can be formulated. The 
advancements of information communication technologies are essential for improving the efficiency 
and accuracy of emergency management systems with the utilisation of modern data-processing 
techniques [236]. Up-to-date and correct information are prerequisites for timely emergency 
management and response to save lives and assets at risk, achieved with geovisualisation techniques 
and GIS. Each emergency management phase, utilises geospatial applications (including GIS) [27, 
168, 231, 237-243].  
The capabilities of GIS regarding modelling and simulations are further utilised to practice response 
and conduct recovery plans during non-disaster times. They assist decision-makers to understand near 




developing frameworks that assist emergency managers and are tightly related to the road 
transport system. Therefore, regarding complex problems conveyed from SoS with CAS 
properties [244], such as the ER urban system, so to be able to be solved, the following are necessary:  
▪ accessible and high-resolution data,  
▪ localised knowledge for update and handling of data,  
▪ built of trusted relations with local CI operators and stakeholders,  
▪ retrieval and verification of data from local stakeholders for applying the methodology 
suggested in the following sections towards the operationalisation of ERR. 
 
It is furthermore examined that GIS with Network Analyst tools provide the means for connectivity 
network analysis, amongst the various networks of a SoS, providing critical information for the 
preparedness phase, as well as the response phase, in regards to service ranges of emergency 
response through the: 
▪ ODOrigin-Destination cost matrixes - finds and measures the least-cost effective paths 
(regarding distance or time) throughout the network from multiple origins to multiple 
destinations.  
▪ Routing - finds the least-cost effective paths (regarding distance or time) from a specific 
destination to different ones. 
▪ Service area analyses or else service of coverage (SOC) - finds the area that can be reached in 
a specific time or distance from a specific origin. 
 
In general, routing has become indispensable as a critical infrastructure service for the navigation of 
fire and rescue vehicles. Therefore, the thesis argues that routing, as a key component of the 
emergency response, should also be analysed under specific crises after extreme events such as 
riverine floods and flash floods. Disruptions in routing are affiliated with disruptions to the 
transport network, i.e. road network, which are indicators of deterioration of the transport 
resilience. EWE-triggered disruptions in routing are affiliated with the inherently spatial flood 
risks, which bring the geographical perspective to the forefront. Additionally, spatial risk 
assessments deal with road and route interruptions due to EWE [245]. Therefore, it is argued that 
when the road is considered a weighted graph (see Figure 4) with its nodes and edges, it is untangled. 
Hence, resilience/reliability/vulnerability assessments to floods for DRR can focus on these road 
components for further risk analysis and system failure identification.  
Research on transport network reliability and resilience to a variety of disasters demonstrates 
that disruptions to particular nodes of the network can result in different degrees of disruption [144] 
that further result in adversely affected travel on a degraded or network (delays) or damaged network 
(incapacity of ER delivery-vulnerable/critical). Therefore, it is essential to start utilising road 
network analyses methods [246] by adopting vulnerability and criticality assessments with 
geographic context [147], achievable with GIS. Current studies in transportation resilience research 
focus on the development of frameworks and quantification methods [151]. These approaches include 
the specification and definition of resilience indicators, such as total traffic delay [152], economic 
loss [247], and post-disaster maximum flow [248].  
Additionally, there is abundant research in the transport system domain integrating vulnerability and 
criticality assessments such as the: 




▪ exposure of single links of the transport network to traffic [251] 
▪ road categories related to the average maximum speed [87, 181, 252] 
▪ the level of the reduction in the average maximum speeds that corresponds to a safety speed 
function [253, 254]. 
 
Information related to these features is inherently spatial, and spatial assessment tools that 
forecast EWE impacts (riverine and flash flood) are necessary. GIS, as mentioned earlier, are 
ideal for the development of such tools (and frameworks) assisting emergency management with the 
organisation of data produced and owned by different agencies for analyses and visual displays of 
important information before and during an emergency event [226, 234]. They are also valuable tools 
for visualisation of resilience assessments, providing a basis for collaboration and communication 
between various stakeholders [227] towards the adaptation of the metrics for the transformation of, 
for example, cities [255] and transportation networks [212, 256]. For planners and decision-makers, 
it has been demonstrated that exact geolocated information regarding the length of potentially 
flooded road segments is important information [226], as it reveals the exact location of people and 
assets, assisting accurate evaluation of the associated risks [12]. Such spatial information provided, 
also enriched with data gathered from volunteers in the area (people at risk or in surrounding areas), 
can be valuable tools in the hands of emergency responders for quick identification of the flood extent 
and timely effective ER [226].  
Spatial information is also highly relevant to the geographical concept of place. Additionally, the 
geographical concept of a place is used as “a part of space” [257]. The perception of a place is 
generally an all-encompassing integration of location names and other properties [258, 259]. As 
mentioned in [260], because places are not isolated but interconnected in many ways [261], it is 
crucial for the understanding of characteristics to understand a place’s contextual information (i.e., 
its connection to other places). These connections link a set of places to a network, which indicates 
the predefined geographic contexts for the places [262], combining the CAS thinking and the graph 
theory, as presented in section 2.1. In the complex urban ER (see Figure 3), the places are modelled 
as city units of a city. The connections between the networks are of focus for spatial assessments. 
Those connecting networks between the city units and the ERS buildings are made with the road 
network (hierarchical approach). Therefore, the untangling of a complex system can be achieved. 
The network theory (graph theory) enables the untangling of the complexity of the road network with 
analyses on the network’s topology to its nodes and links, providing alternative measures of link 
importance applied on transport networks worldwide [150, 263]. According to [104], the topology 
issue implies a focus on the network configuration and its properties (such as connectivity, centrality, 
clustering) for analysing the related impact on the behavioural dynamics of the network itself (such 
as timely ER). Therefore, it is argued in the thesis that the location of the ERS plays a vital factor 
for emergency management, for example, for the location planning of fire brigades [188] and 
allocation of ambulances [185]; for reviews on the subject, see [264, 265]. However, the location of 
ERS, i.e. topology of the ERS system, is dependent on the network topology and its performance 
in regards to flood-impacted citywide accessibility. ER is tightly associated with accessibility, a 
distinguishing factor of ERR, serving as an indicator in many resilience frameworks, such as urban 
resilience, community resilience, neighbourhood resilience, transport network resilience, and traffic 
resilience.  
Accessibility, therefore, is associated with the rapidity of the response of the emergency responders 
in case of an incident (crisis, disaster, car accident, fire). The road networks in complex urban areas 




functioning provision) is tightly related to the resilience of communities, which rely upon fast 
connection to shelters, CI blue light services [266]. For Germany, this can be relevant for the so-
called ‘lighthouses’, which are suitable shelters or locations providing the minimum emergency 
supplies for the everyday continuation of living, for example, in case of long-lasting blackouts. Within 
the framework of the German research project “Catastrophe-protection lighthouses” 
(Katastophenschutz-Leuchttürmen), a concept was developed for contact points for the population in 
case of a crisis. As stated in the project description, such lighthouses are “… public buildings, such 
as schools or public service office buildings, which remain supplied with electricity even during long-
term blackouts. As glowing islands in the dark, they give people hope that there are water, warmth 
and help” [267]. Therefore, for flood risk reduction for humans (regarding access - safety), the 
building themselves (CIP-security) and the interdependent roads, resilience assessments are relevant 
and must be considered in the assessments. A crucial concern for emergency activities towards timely 
responses is the logistics of operations, which is highly relevant with the lighthouses and the road 
network accessibility after flood occurrence [171, 268, 269].  
As demonstrated, the importance of the road network to the ER is high. When regarding floods, 
identifying areas more likely to be cut off in case of a hazard is fundamental for FRM and 
preparedness [270]. For this purpose, as demonstrated in section 2.1, when assessing risk, the 
following identifiers are considered,  
▪ the hazard - one of the key metrics being the flood depth and flow velocities,  
▪ the exposure - associated with spatial information in regards to the extent of the hazard  
▪ vulnerability/reliability - such as the widely used damage-loss functions [271-273], also 
including resilience as a reciprocal of reliability.  
 
This articulated consideration of risk is functional in research, such as the research conducted in this 
thesis, that accounts for natural (floods) and built environment characteristics (transportation 
perspectives previously displayed). For this purpose, accessibility is a primary factor in transport 
network resilience, e.g. road network. The road network in an urban ER system is higher in the 
hierarchy of networks (see Table 2). Therefore, the thesis proposes that the operationalisation 
assessments should first focus on the road network system since perturbations occurring on this 
system trigger the snowball effect of cascading flood risks. Lastly, answering the RQ1, for the reasons 
mentioned, accessibility is selected as a suitable driver also for ERR, and the thesis suggests that 
strengthened preparedness for response is achieved through a “satisfactory design of an urban ER 
system”, considering its CAS properties, for timely ER provision under any flood condition.  
 
 
3. The Composite Multi-criteria Risk-based Time-dependent Accessibility  
    Indicator (RITAI) of ERR to Floods 
An urban ER system is a system in constant flux, and its optimal design is a difficult achievement 
due to the complexity of its networks. Nevertheless, as discussed in the thesis (see section 2.1), the 
resilience thinking in the developed resilience framework of ERR is shifting the focus from simple 
‘damage loss functions’ to integrative ones with a combination of results from the assessment of 
various cascading impacts on different levels and scales of the system. For this purpose, the 




indicator of the ERR to riverine floods and flash floods, which is a composite multi-criteria Risk-
based Time-dependent Accessibility Indicator (RITAI) for the support of decision-making. The 
RITAI is a combination of top-down scenario-based (commonly used for identification of cascading 
impacts, CI and hazard-related resilience assessments) and place-based approaches introduced from 
[137] (used in risk and resilience assessments), with a suggested spatial (bottom-up) upscaling 
analyses (see Figure 10). The indicator allows for identifying first-, second-, and third-order impacts 
of floods of various intensities on a road network level, with a spatial upscaling analysis for the 
efficiency/serviceability assessment of the entire urban ER system, presented in classified hexagonal 
spatial matrixes (city network). 
 
 
Figure 10: The Risk-based Time-dependent Accessibility Indicator (RITAI) of the urban ERR - based on the 
framework in Figure 6 
 
In Figure 10, the concept of the urban ERR is presented in an operational form and is composed of 
the resilience of the urban ER system (SoS), the resilience of the CI (emergency rescue buildings and 
road network), and it interrelates with risk, such as flood events.  
It is suggested, according to Figure 6 (i.e. conceptualization framework of the resilience of a SoS), 
that ERR is operationalised with the Risk-based Time-dependent Accessibility Indicator (RITAI) 
under the stressor of floods, supporting decision-making, with a combination of a top-down approach 
and a bottom-up GIS-based (scenario- and placed-based) spatial upscaling analysis approach. Hence, 
it is argued that the identification of risks in different scales combined with the interdependent 
constituent systems’ resiliencies and their resilience capacities enable the resilience assessment of the 
entire SoS, which is further visualised in spatial resilience informative matrixes.  
Categorically, the RITAI’s performance reflects on the rapidity of the response of the urban ER 
system under flooded conditions, that is, reflection on the time-dependent accessibility on pre-
defined response time thresholds from the ERS considering flood impacts on the ER road network’s 




The indicator’s performance relies on the performances of the sub-indicators (robustness, redundancy 
and resourcefulness) endogenously and exogenously, i.e. interdependent resiliencies of systems and 
CI. The sub-indicators of the RITAI for operationalisation of the urban ERR to floods focus on the 
transportation characteristics (as mentioned above) of an ER road network, i.e., traffic, mobility, 
connectivity and accessibility, and consider the hierarchy of the urban ER system. The performance 
sub-indicators are assessed with applied geoinformatics conducted in GIS, with bottom-up 
(upscaling) spatial assessments of a top-down methodological approach. Upscaling, or bottom-
up approaches for quantifying the information from larger to smaller scales, commonly use point 
measurements upscaled to areal coverages while utilising thematic maps or remote sensing products 
[274].  
Such approaches are most commonly used in spatial ecological models that rely on spatial data layers, 
at appropriate scales for the ecological process, analysing scale, resolution and patterns [275]. The 
issue of scale mainly deals with the decrease of the uncertainties occurring from the aggregation of 
information. Such issues have motivated further research overcoming such issues occurring of the 
commonly used spatial-aggregation methods (random rule, majority rule, nearest‐neighbour rule and 
spatial scan statistic as in [276]), resulting in the production of multi‐dimensional grid‐point scaling 
algorithms addressing the quantitative spatial upscaling of categorical information with minimum 
loss of information [277].  
The thesis further proposes that exposure assessments (direct flood damages) reflecting on the 
robustness of the system should start with a focus on the road segment level (large-scale of first 
analyses), proceeding to the entire road network and urban ER system, with the aggregation of 
information through geovisualisation techniques. According to the exposure levels reflecting the 
absorption capacity of the constituent systems, disruptions of the safe driving mobility are assessed 
on this scale of analysis, considering changes in the speed flows, reflecting the vulnerability of the 
ER road network and its adaptation for transformation capacity levels. Additionally, on the scale of 
analysis, it is also suggested that the assessments of the travel time reflected on their TTR reveal the 
impact of the flood risk on a network level for further degraded rapidity of response of the entire ER 
road network. Vulnerability is considered a flood risk identifier, and reliability an interdependent 
identifier of the flood impact on a network level, assisting the resilience assessment on a system level. 
That is, this combination of risk and resilience identified on road segments (network and constituent 
systems’ level) impacts the connectivity of the entire road network and the entire urban ER system, 
i.e. risk identified on a SoS level (zoom-in and zoom-out ability of the suggested upscaling spatial 
assessment methodological approach). 
Consequently, the connectivity of the SoS is impacting the accessibility of the urban ER system, 
assessed on the scale of city units, proceeding with the further aggregation of information with 
minimum losses, occurring from uncertainties conveyed from the data used. This thesis also presents 
that accessibility assessments, dependent on the system's connectivity on a network level, reveal the 
resilience levels on a SoS level. The accessibility resilience identifier assesses the degradation or 
impairment of the urban ER system (i.e. SoS with CAS properties) reflected in the response times 
(accessibility time) and its rapidity feature (response capacity). Precisely, the upscaling 
operationalisation methodological approach consists of the following metrics, reflecting on different 
resilience capacities of a SoS, dependent on the constituent systems’ resilience capacities 
(interdependent resiliencies): 
▪ Exposure → absorption capacity - reflected in the robustness of the ER road segments 




▪ ER road network mobility capacity (RNMC) → adaptation and transformation levels 
(risk on a network level) - considering safe driving mobility of emergency responders - 
reflected on the active and passive redundancies of the ER road segments built for timely ER 
provision,  
▪ Travel time reliability (TTR) of the ER road network → resilience on a network level 
considering safe driving mobility of emergency responders - reflected on the resourcefulness 
of the ER road segments for timely ER provision (interdependency with the endogenous 
redundancies of the system), and  
▪ Citywide accessibility → rapidity for response/serviceability capacity (resilience on a 
SoS level) of the urban ER system under various flooded conditions that results from scenario-
based simulations with network analytics and reveals risk on a SoS level - reflected on the 
rapidity of response aggregated to a city unit level of the emergency responders according to 
the entire ER road network’s connectivity for timely ER provision. 
 
The suggested hazard-, scenario-based resilience analysis aims to provide insights of a CAS 
engineering towards resilient ER for the enhancement of the safety of the population, while also 
considering the safety of the emergency responders, i.e. safe driving mobility capacity of the 
emergency rescue vehicles, in case of riverine floods and flash floods, supporting fast decision-
making. Therefore, the RITAI is developed to assess a citywide ERR to floods and is based on the 
functionalities of the urban ER system's network systems (capacities) at various scales. That is, the 
RITAI assesses changes in the system on a micro-scale (e.g. road network system) and their impacts 
on a macro-level (e.g. ERS system, city system).  
Each ERS system uses different route planning speeds according to the road types for route plan 
preparedness and operational route planning (route planning in case of an incident/crisis event) for 
timely ER provision. Such emergency route planning speeds (ERPS) result from empirical speed tests 
around the areas of service or official speeds from guidelines used universally over the years. From 
my own experience on the issue, unfortunately, not all the ERS have the financial nor the staffing 
ability to use modern technologies such as GIS so to accelerate the process, and some, even if they 
do, refuse to utilise them because “I am used to using my methods” - short-sighted approaches due to 
years of experience. Years of experience, from an emergency responder to a civil protection officer, 
is another risk factor that must be considered in future strategies considering the safety of the 
emergency responders since these individuals are the ones that are most likely to drive through 
flooded waters [99] and are the ones that are not open to an adaptation of new approaches. 
Nevertheless, this risk factor will not be included in the operationalisation methodology suggested in 
this thesis. 
The ERPS of an ERS (fire brigades, EMS, etc.) integrated into road network databases form the ER 
road networks. As suggested in this thesis, the ERR assessment is based on the ER road network of 
the ERS of fire brigades (covered in section 5.2). The flood impacts are assessed considering the risk 
factor of FD. As mentioned in previous sections, the FD is a significant risk factor affecting many 
levels and scales of the urban ER system. Flood impacts, according to FD, the benchmarking process 
of the system’s functionality, that is, timely ER provision – the safety of the population - and safe 
driving mobility of the emergency responders according to the rescue vehicle’s flood driving 
capacity. Additionally, the scope of the RITAI is to provide the resources and knowledge for a 
base understanding of ERR for further: 




▪ communication between various stakeholders, fostering their cooperation by identifying 
critical socio-technical interdependencies for long-term adaptation plans.  
 
The scientific community already recognises the vital importance of transport networks to emergency 
response. Resilient, i.e. reliable/uninterrupted transport networks, are vital for maintaining social 
networks [278] for protection, in case of extreme riverine flood events, of the vulnerable population 
of refugees in an urban area foreign to their culture, beliefs and language [226]. They are also vital 
for the provision of timely emergency services under flooded conditions [279, 280], including 
evacuations of hospitals and refugee shelters [226] and backup plans in case of compound events of 
extreme riverine floods and blackouts [234]. However, the more complex the environment under 
study is, the more difficult the ERR quantification/operationalisation becomes. Therefore, this thesis 
suggests that urban complexity and its impact on various ERR levels are addressed by 
compartmentalising each case study area, i.e., spatial matrixes.  
Compartmentalisation of CI networks and systems allows the production of detailed risk 
informative matrixes, enabling the gradation of information provided from a local level (large-
scale) to a regional, giving a detailed overview of the impact of the stressor on the under-study 
system. The gathering and classified representation of information for each matrix cell/city unit 
of the case study area become easier and manageable, with the geovisualisation techniques resulting 
in in-depth cascading risk assessments revealing the resilience of the SoS in various scales 
(upscaling approach) and levels. The reveal of resilience in various scales and levels, furthermore, 
enables integrative decision-making of different end-users and a more fundamental understanding 
and overview of cascading risks, potentially occurring on a local and regional level, which therefore 
builds the basis for further collaborative actions towards enhancement of the safety of the population. 
End-users can be emergency rescue planners, traffic planners, urban planners, and energy providers, 
(e.g. electricity, water, gas). The suggested spatial upscaling methodology is used in a similar form 
in decision-making, where decision-makers are involved in the decision scaling process, which 
originated in response to issues arising regarding the best approaches for processing and utilising 
climate change projections for adaptation planning [281]. Decision scaling has the same general 
problem formulation and structure of frameworks for decision analysis [282]. The decision scaling 
process, according to [281], includes the i) decision framing, ii) estimation of EWE-informed risks 
and iii) climate stress test. As also mentioned in [281], traditional frameworks of decision analysis 
initiate with the retrieval and gathering of information on the decision in structured ways, using four 
categories: 
▪ choices - e.g., to adapt or not; plan A vs plan B,  
▪ uncertainties - e.g., future climate extremes, future population densities,  
▪ consequences - e.g., net benefits, damages, resilience capacities,  
▪ connections - e.g., system diagram, system model.  
Those above are integrated into the conceptualisation of an urban ER system and its representation 
as a graph (system model – see Figure 3). The graph reveals the connections between the constituent 
systems and the ERR, as applied to the urban ER in case of floods. 
Specifically, the operationalisation methodology of the ERR with the RITAI, which is explicitly 
designed to integrate all of those mentioned above, is:  
▪ revealing risks on a system, network and agent level (system model), enabling the 




▪ “climate stress testing” with its implementation on various flood scenarios (uncertainties), 
after  
▪ testing the constituent systems’ flexibility for absorption, adaptation and transformation, 
revealing their resilience capacities (consequences), resulting in 
▪ the identification of the entire system’s risk revelation depending on the constituent systems’ 
connectivity and 
▪ providing the opportunity to adapt through the accessibility assessments (choices of ER route 
plans), aggregated and classified in spatial ERR matrixes, providing additional choices for 
advancement through adaptation and transformation, fostering integrative and adaptive 
management. 
 
Complex information (such as those mentioned above) integrated into the decision-making can lead 
to wrong decisions taken during crises. Therefore, simplifying information is critical for several 
officials because they have to deal with emergencies, requiring a proper preparation phase through 
situational analysis of complex environments and a time-efficient response for enhanced recovery 
times. Additionally, the suggested flood-impact bottom-up (upscaling) spatial dependency curves, 
combined with the top-down approach suggested before, aim to capture global/overall 
interactions among the several sub-systems, providing a means for operationalising the complex 
adaptive SoS, i.e., the urban ER system. It is argued throughout the thesis that complex SoS needs 
untangling for the identification and even forecasting of potential cascading risks, considering the 
extreme flood events of various types, towards adaptive and collaborative disaster risk mitigation 
actions, enhancing the community resilience of an urban population. In the era of unpredictable EWE 
occurrence, where extremes will be the norm and not the exception, experts have already identified 
that transformational thinking and actions must be a prerequisite for facing future challenges towards 
enhancing community resilience [283] and neighbourhood resilience [230]. 
Undisrupted ER provision of emergency services under flooded conditions, which is a vital resilience 
identifying component in the resilience mentioned concepts, needs reliable road networks, along with 
the production of depth-disruption curves for safe driving of emergency vehicles [280], towards the 
quantification of the climate change impact on the disruption to the road network, is insufficiently 
studied [128]. Therefore, it is further argued that the zoom-in and zoom-out effect of the aggregation 
of information from larger to small scales and vice versa when assessing the resilience of SoS with 
CAS properties, i.e. interdependent resilience features of interdependent complex adaptive systems 
that the interdependent resiliencies concept (see Figure 6) is essential. More specifically, it is 
suggested in the thesis that for a deepened understanding of the flood risk and its relation with the 
resiliencies assessed on many levels and scales, the large-scale spatial assessments of urban 
robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity of response to riverine floods and flash floods 
of frequent and rare probability of occurrence, are necessary. It is further suggested that it is also 
necessary to utilise the frequent scenarios (regular), depicting the present situations and the “potential 
extreme futures” to forecast the futures and strengthen the preparedness for response in urban areas.  
 
 
3.1 Robustness, Absorption Capacity & Large-Scale Exposure Assessments 
The difficulty of meeting the needs identified above to quantify climate change impacts on the road 
network, increases. The increase results from the complexity of the cities and their interfaced CI, such 




hazards on the transport network initiate with exposure assessments since the flood risk in urban areas 
is inherently spatial. Exposure depends on the likelihood and intensity of the selected hazards. 
Intensity is defined as a discrepancy from frequent (regular events) [10], and for this reason, high 
intensities characterise extreme events. Therefore, focusing on the intensity shifts the emphasis of 
extreme event analysis to the impact estimation rather than determining the probability of occurrence 
[212]. Flood impact estimation is essential for large-scale intraurban assessments for further 
encapsulation of potential futures, in present risk mitigation methodologies, towards enhancing the 
resilience of urban SoS. 
For this reason, the choice of different flood scenarios is a necessity for forecasting flood impacts. 
Forecasting such impacts in complex urban areas entails large-scale flood impact assessments. In this 
way, the efficiency of the urban ER system can be analysed adequately, providing insights into current 
and future potential situations. In this thesis, the quantified flood impact analysis of the transport 
network used for ER is considering the safe driving mobility of emergency vehicles under flooded 
conditions, based on benchmarking the functionality of the urban ER system. The benchmarking is 
conducted with the defined hypotheses and thresholds (see sections 4 and 6.3), set, according to the 
road type and the FD impact on safe driving through floodwaters; additional impedance costs and 
flood-impacted travel times, which are expected to cause delays or incapacitation to the ER provision. 
For a comprehensive overview of the flood impacts, direct flood impact assessments are the first step 
and include FD spatial information (geolocated FD values). The spatial analyses for ER purposes are 
the situational analyses conducted at the first step of an emergency management cycle for time-
effective ER, mainly in the preparedness phase. Situational analyses are indicative of the damage 
extent of hazardous events, such as floods. In particular, the exposure assessments result in the value 
of the exposed elements, i.e. objects potentially impacted by a defined hazard scenario for a specific 
environment [284], which in our case are the road segments. The impacts on the transport network 
need to be addressed with various climate models enabling simulation ability for current and future 
events [165]. The impact analyses include the additional in-depth analyses essential for identifying 
vulnerabilities and risks to increase the effectiveness of emergency plans, specifically at a local scale 
[167, 168]. Provision of emergency services under flooded conditions needs resilient and reliable 
road networks and the production of depth-disruption curves for safe driving of emergency vehicles 
[280] to quantify the climate change impact on the disruption to the road network, which is 
insufficiently studied [128]. For the flood-impacted system under research for selected flood 
scenarios, the exposure assessments indicate vulnerability/robustness; thus, they indicate the potential 
loss of nodes and links (presence of infrastructure) that can affect the ERR negatively. Therefore, the 
first measure of the flood impact on the transport network is the proportional loss of the total length 
of road segments that have been affected by the various FDs.  
The suggested graph model of the urban ER system assists the process, allowing for further 
operationalisation steps. As mentioned in previous sections, the term robustness is chosen because 
the time dimension is not included [256] at this step of the analysis. Generally, the robustness of ERR 
is operationalised through the exposure assessments, resulting in values on the potentially affected 
road segments with FD information (direct flood damage), which can be valuable for ER purposes 
but also for civil protection authorities, humanitarian responses traffic and urban planners, CIP 
strategies, and insurance and investment planning. Regarding floods, it has been proven that the exact 
location of people and assets are critical factors for the accurate evaluation of the associated risks 
[12]. Therefore, direct damages geographically located, i.e. proportional losses in infrastructure, 
which in this thesis is the total length (in kilometres) of roads that have been affected, are the first 




applied methodology is the quantification of the impact of the flood on the road network on a large 
scale and the driving ability of rescue vehicles to operationalise ERR in complex urban environments.  
From a CAS engineering perspective, robustness is considered in this thesis as the level of 
exposure of the ER road network to different riverine and flash flood depths, allowing for effortless 
driving or changes that do not affect the functionality (i.e. ER provision).  
Starting from large-scale robustness assessments via exposure assessments of the road network to 
different FDs of selected riverine scenarios, an exploration of the robustness of the system of ER 
follows, towards operationalisation of ERR, considering safe drivability and potential ER time delays. 
In this way, the absorption capacity of the urban ER system is assessed with the aggregation of 
information, indicating the extent of the selected riverine flood model. Riverine floods are extended 
around a river, with the extent to be dependent on the phenomenon's intensity. The potential coverage 
(probabilistic/forecasting models) of the flood determines the exposure of the road network to riverine 
floods and the direct damage of the infrastructure. On the other hand, exposure assessments of the 
ERS buildings, such as the fire departments to floods, could also be valuable for the ERS system to 
increase the robustness of their urban ER system to these potential hazards. Apart from the service 
area coverage (SOC) of each fire department, for assurance of timely ER, the cooperation of the fire 
departments’ collective forces must remain undisrupted. For example, different types of rescue 
vehicles are located in different departments and may not be available for ER purposes due to high 
flood exposure of the geographically dependent road network. 
Furthermore, studies have proven that roads may be closed even if they are not inundated due to the 
status of the neighbouring road links [179]; that is, floods indirectly impact road links due to 
geographical proximity. This particular flood risk of the transport network was introduced by [285], 
and it is argued that easy interpretation of such indirect impacts is achieved through geovisualisation 
techniques (classification, visualisation) and GIS spatial assessments. The concept applies to the 
sudden EWE, which also aggravate flash floods, resulting from the projected increase in the 
probability of extreme rainfall across most of Europe and the mean precipitation intensity [286]. 
Therefore, the need to analyse the impacts of hydrometeorological phenomena in major urban centres 
becomes highly essential. Nevertheless, flash floods are not a common hazard scenario for impact 
analysis on the transportation network for emergency preparedness, but primarily for traffic 
disruptions [85, 165, 287], while many impact studies focus on the impact of riverine flood exposure 
and usually examine the impacts with one extreme flood scenario of the 100-year probability of 
return. Flash flood models have been used for flood risk preparedness enhancement via early warning 
systems [176, 288-293], urban resilience strategies and traffic disruption, but the impact on the 
transport network for a large-scale (city scale and road segment scale) taking into consideration safety 
of driving (mobility factors) and functionality loss for ER purposes, lacks attention from the scientific 
community. 
The reasons for this may lay between the lack of information regarding flash flood intensities and 
frequencies on the local level and either due to the lack of tools for advanced and detailed spatial 
analyses. Despite the increased demand for a better understanding of the urban road network risk to 
flash floods (pluvial flash floods), until 2005, very few studies have attempted to systematically 
examine the potential impacts of these flood events on a large scale of urban road systems.  
The reason is the lack of adequate data and observations that concern road flooding, the difficulty in 
numerically modelling the flash flood dynamics and the complexity of cascading effects of flooding 
on transportation systems, in general, [294] and specifically, on roads [143, 295]. Of the existing 
studies, a number is often conducted for flood emergency evacuations [296], logistics [13], 




designed for the identification of the interruption of a road network due to a hazardous event from a 
multiscale perspective [299]. The previous studies mainly focus on regional (basin) scales and 
intercity levels, considering poorly the flash floods at the intraurban level. Therefore, the results of a 
study conducted in Shanghai, utilising flash floods as the primary flood scenario for several years of 
occurrence probability, have been used for risk analysis of the intraurban road network of the city 
[179]. The results of this study from [179] prove that the pluvial/flash flood is found to lead to a 
proportionate, but nonlinear impact, on intraurban road flood risk.  
The algorithm suggested in the study mentioned above uses a risk factor, the road blockage with an 
FD threshold of 0.3 m and gave results regarding the time duration of road closures for each flash 
flood scenario. Also, in [287], a different approach was introduced, where they proposed an FD-speed 
reduction function. After carrying out video analysis and with a GIS-based origin-destination matrix 
method, they found critical road links in Newcastle, UK, by measuring traffic counter data before and 
after flash flood scenarios. However, it is not clearly stated whether the roads were blocked or the 
drivers chose to delay their journeys. The actual FD from the event was not recorded, and therefore, 
the study could not validate the proposed function with actual data. The same approach was followed 
for the same under-research area using a 200-year riverine flood scenario [165], extracting risk 
matrixes for potential traffic disruption due to flooding.  
Following the needs mentioned above, it is proposed from the thesis that the large-scale spatial 
assessments of ERR to floods must consider riverine and flash floods of different probabilities 
of return (regular and extreme). Furthermore, as suggested from the RITAI, the normalisation of 
the road network, that is, segmentation of the road network to one-meter segments, assists further 
large-scale flood impacts in speeds and travel times (second-order flood impacts/indirect). In this 
thesis, the ERR concept integrates aspects from the spatial resilience concept of socio-ecological 
systems [300] and the transport network resilience [151] towards efficiency assessments of the urban 
ER system to floods, from cascading local vulnerabilities to regional resilience assessments. For 
further enhancement of the preparedness phase, it is also proposed that comparative analyses of the 
results between the same flood types of different intensities, presented in flood impact curves, are 
providing a first overview of the flood risk impacts. The flood impact curves have a goal also to raise 
awareness for the overall absorption capacity of the urban ER (to selected flood types), which reflects 
the robustness of the system in case of compound and escalating events.   
 
  
3.2 Redundancy, Adaptation Capacity & Large-Scale FFS Assessments 
Road networks are becoming increasingly vulnerable due to unforeseen extreme, escalating or even 
compound scenarios such as disasters, accidents, and other emergencies, which cause disruptions. 
Disruptions are not only related to direct damages identified through exposure assessments, as 
presented in the previous section 3.1 but they are also related to several aspects of the road network, 
i.e. traffic flow and network connectivity and accessibility. However, the recovery from such 
disruptions becomes more challenging over time due to the diverse network flow demands that can 
directly affect the connectivity of the entire network [301], impacting the accessibility of the network 
itself and its interdependent ones.  
For the integration of such flow disruptions in the ERR operationalisation methodology, the speed 
and the travel time (see section 3.3) are the only traffic properties considered for further assessments. 
As mentioned earlier in the thesis, the integration of flow disruptions is enabled after considering the 
road network as a weighted graph [162], which combines the graph theory and the network science 




handling of real-world information and the capability to incorporate various dynamics of the road 
traffic [163] for further network analyses of intraurban roads [161] (see Figure 4).  
The traffic volume, the traffic demand, congestions or queuing, due to the inundated road network 
are factors that will not be considered, but it is suggested that these factors could easily be integrated 
into the proposed methodology and assessed. Usually, in ER planning, these traffic properties are not 
considered since it is expected that the drivers will assist free-flowing driving of the rescue vehicles 
in cases of emergencies (author’s outcome from interviewing fire brigade officials). For this reason, 
ERPS in the ERR concept proposed in this thesis is considered the FFS following the term used in 
traffic flow theory, “ the speed when there are no constraints placed on a driver by other vehicles on 
the road” [302].  
In general, weather conditions (rain, snow, wind speed and visibility loss) have an impact on three 
predominant traffic-related areas that and these are i) the traffic demand (density of vehicles), ii) 
traffic safety, and iii) traffic operations and flow [250, 303]. The suggested methodology and the 
RITAI are considering the safe driving of the rescue vehicles through flooded road segments and the 
traffic flow (changes in FFS and TTR) for timely ER operations. Several definitions are used for the 
FFS [252]. In the United States Highway Capacity Manual [304], FFS is defined as the theoretical 
speed when the density (of vehicles) and flow rate on the study segments are zero. Diversely, in the 
definition of FFS, the Transportation Research Board considers the environmental factor: “the speed 
of vehicle travel at which drivers feel comfortable travelling under the physical, environmental and 
traffic control condition on an uncongested section of multilane highways” [206]. Therefore, the 
physical conditions (status of the road network), the environmental conditions (weather conditions) 
and traffic (traffic volumes) have an impact on the FFS, giving motivation for further investigations 
on the matter. For example, studies in different regions such as Greece [305], Vienna [306] and Spain 
[307] estimated changes in traffic characteristics, such as reductions in FFS and speed-at-capacity 
(referring to speeds proportional to vehicle density) increase as the rain and snow intensities increase. 
Several studies focus on post-disaster traffic control management for the emergency management 
domain and specifically on the impacts of a potential hazard. In [308], it is suggested a model for 
post-disaster traffic control management (PD-TCM model), which is tested in-situ taking into 
consideration the urban transport network’s FFS changes and a temporary traffic control strategy that 
can help to meet the demands of the emergency rescue time and minimize the negative impact on 
society. A literature review on the topic is also demonstrated, which mostly indicates that research 
focuses on post-disaster traffic regulation actions to be taken before and after earthquakes and 
landslides. One article is focusing on the setting methods of the regular rainfall for traffic regulations 
during strong rainfall to initiate and to remove traffic regulation based on rainfall predictions [309] 
and traffic light density-based control management [310], so to assist the timely ER. 
Further to the suggestions for post-disaster traffic control management, according to the author’s 
knowledge, there is no study demonstrating urban case-based methodological achievements for large-
scale spatial impact analyses of riverine and flash floods to the FFS, according to the Road Network’s 
Mobility Capacity (RNMC), for timely ER. From a CAS engineering perspective (network design), 
RNMC / adaptation and transformation capacity is introduced as the speed-flow capacity of the 
road network for safe driving mobility and as the metric for the redundancy of the road segments and 
the road network for timely ER under flooded and safe driving conditions. The definition is formed 
after taking into consideration several studies conducted in the field of transport and traffic in an 
attempt to capture both purely static topological indicators (from the conducted exposure 
assessments) and the impact of traffic conditions (FFS reductions according to safe mobility in 




in the technological fields of engineering, system design, and computer science is well established, 
with the definition to focus on the ability of a system to self-organize, “… a process whereby internal 
structure and functions re-adjust along with changing circumstances” [311].  
Thus, for the systems’ engineering, redundancy could be defined as the extent of degradation that a 
system can suffer without losing some particularised elements of its functionality [312]. 
Additionally, in a network context, redundancy refers to the degree of spare capacity in the network 
and is defined as the existence of more than one means to accomplish a given function [313]. From a 
CIP protection perspective and, expressly, from a reconstruction of network connectivity perspective, 
in [313], it is stated that there is an increasing need to achieve the network connectivity promptly, 
after the network’s damage from a disaster. Low connectivity of the road transport network affects 
the redundancy, which is also defined as the availability of different paths for each set of Origin-
Destination (OD) pairs in the road transport network. According to the latter definition, in [314], 
redundancy is differentiated into two types: the active and the passive. Active redundancy is the 
alternative number of routes preserved under natural conditions by speed adjustments (connectivity 
and accessibility analysis). The passive redundancy is the one that could be used to represent backup 
options that are only used in case of disruptions (ER planning under flooded conditions). In this 
context, in [301], the importance of redundancy is underlined since the lack of it in a network might 
be catastrophic because of delays, especially during emergencies, and the degradation of services. 
The term has also been used, focusing on the redundancy importance of a link based on flow-based 
traffic factors such as flow-based efficiency importance (vehicles/hour) and impact-based efficiency 
importance (vehicles/hour) [145].  
Towards resiliency, in [315], it is suggested that the redundancy of the road transport network is one 
of the resilience indicators. In addition to damaging consequences (in case of rapid evacuations), it is 
explicitly suggested that insufficiency of the redundancy can have significant, consequential impacts 
on the level of service of the road transport network [313]. Therefore, in [316], it is argued that 
redundancy has a significant impact on the resilience of road transport networks since it represents 
the spare capacity of the road transport networks under different hazard/ stressful scenarios. 
Moreover, in [317], it is reported that distributed redundancy improves the resilience of a complex 
system. Under this notion, in [318], it is also identified that for the quantification of redundancy, the 
“node to node” (instead of “zone to zone”) combination of both traffic flow variations and 
network topology is necessary. Redundancy, in the transport network resilience domain, is 
considered as a measure of efficiency importance (level of service) of a road network in case of 
disruptions/closures after loop-calculations on smaller-scale road segments (road links), mostly in-
situ, not using real-world disaster impacts, “zone to zone” (instead of “node to node”) and for local 
and social traffic purposes (not ER).  
There are efforts from the impact studies domain to consider the effects of EWE on the road network’s 
speed flow, combining both traffic flow variations and network topology for assessment of the 
impacts. The RNMC introduced in this thesis as a metric for the quantification of the “road segment 
redundancy”, that is, large scale, “node to node” flood impact assessments, towards 
operationalisation of the ERR, is taking from the flood impact assessment concept used in transport 
network resilience concepts, towards criticality assessments of the transport networks (road and rail). 
Furthermore, few studies consider safe driving mobility under flooded waters for ER purposes; 
however, they are conducted on a smaller scale for analysis, i.e. road link [165, 319]. Additionally, 
these studies are conducted for civil purposes and are not providing information for ERS. For this 




road segments of an urban ER system, which allow for improvements of the complex systems’ 
resilience (interdependent resiliencies between the systems and networks). Therefore, it is argued that 
predefined road segments allow the minimization of uncertainties from information aggregation to 
smaller scales due to the detailed geospatial analyses. 
Nevertheless, uncertainties cannot be omitted in the conducted large-scale second-order flood-impact 
assessments (as suggested for the RITAI) since they are conveyed through the inherent uncertainties 
of the flood models. For example, if an area is identified, through the data used and first exposure 
assessments conducted (see section 3.1), as highly flooded (according to the choice of the critical 
threshold), the second-order flood impact assessments, in regards to RNMC, will return results as 
non-linear but analogous to the FD exposure. Therefore, the probabilistic flood models used for flood-
impacted mobility assessments must be either up-to-date and high resolution or should occur from 
high-coverage of interest area, hourly-updated early warning systems, providing near real-time flood 
inundation depths. 
Several studies underline the importance of a reliable and resilient road network from a mobility 
impact assessments perspective [85, 280]. However, they have a silo thinking, focusing on a specific 
catchment area considering one scenario of flood intensity (e.g. 100-year flood occurrence 
probability) affecting part of the road network (centre of the case study area) and focusing on risk-
accessibility assessments to one CI, the hospitals. Nevertheless, they constitute examples of the 
importance of GIS and spatial assessments, which can provide, through geovisualisations, 
information on the scale of a road link in easily interpretable GIS maps.  
Additionally, to the need identified from the impact assessments for identifying reliable road 
networks, in [320], the quantitative demonstration of the reliability is enabled by designing the 
systems for high reliability. From a system’s perspective, it is argued that the redundancy in technical 
systems should be understood as a design paradigm [320]. According to this notion, it is argued that 
redundancy not only enables designers to design for high reliability, but it also allows for the 
quantitative demonstration of the reliability, following the suggestion of the engineering of a network 
system, that redundancy should be used as an indicator for reliability.  
Therefore, from a design of the road structure engineering perspective, RITAI is suggesting the pre-
design (rebuild) of redundant and reliable road network databases enabling timely ER, with 
considerations of large-scale flood impacts on the RNMC for safe driving under flooded conditions, 
for the ERR assessment to floods, wth large-scale flood impact assessments. Levels of the RNMC on 
a local level reveal the passive redundancy of the ER system to provide timely ER, which affects the 
active redundancy of an urban ER system Redundancy identified in different scales in a system of a 
SoS with CAS properties can be used as resilience indicator. Therefore, in the thesis, it is argued that 
enhanced redundancy in a system of a SoS with CAS properties, such as the urban ER system, results 
in enhanced resilience, identifying risks exogenously and endogenously. Thus, if the ER road 
network, after the shock of a flood causing disruptions, is assessed as highly redundant, then the entire 
urban ER system is characterised as redundant since the RNMC (passive redundancy) is undisrupted 
and the ER provision is possible with the utilisation of various route paths (active redundancies). 
Therefore, the thesis proposes that after adaptation and transformation of an urban ER system, self-
organisation is quicker when operating on a redundant ER road network, enhancing the ERR to 
respective hazard scenarios. A redundant ER road network is also reliable for providing safe driving 





3.3 Resourcefulness, Transformation Capacity & Large-Scale TTR Assessments 
System approaches to the safety of complex systems, from a reliability engineering perspective, focus 
on the unintentional changes resulting from endogenous forces, such as random component failures 
[321]. In contrast, system robustness strives to prevent, mitigate and recover from unintended changes 
caused by exogenous forces [320], such as riverine floods and flash floods. Identifying unintended 
changes in the urban ER system and encapsulating endogenous and exogenous changes in the system 
will result in delayed or even impaired ER provision. It is suggested that the road segmentation also 
enables further large-scale, node to node vulnerability assessments. The vulnerability represents a 
network's susceptibility or a link to failure [322], where “failure expresses a considerable deviation 
from the normal functioning state of the link or network”.  
Therefore, a non-functioning or ill-functioning road or road component (node or segment) will 
appoint costs on the user (in our case, the ERS) in terms of time losses, additional operation costs 
(higher costs of fuel consumption) or other costs as a result of delays and diversions (e.g. life losses). 
Any threat to the reliability of the transport network constitutes a vulnerable spot, a weakness [261, 
322]. Vulnerability is the probability of susceptibility of a system’s element to potential disruption 
(on different levels). Hence the vulnerability can also be considered as a two-component concept. 
The concept in which probability and consequence are the two main attributes of study is, as 
mentioned in [146, 323], the probability of susceptibility with consequences for the serviceability. So 
far, in the ERR concept, vulnerability is also considered as a two-component concept as also 
suggested from [146, 322, 324], in which probability and consequence are the two main attributes, 
where the probability of susceptibility (RNMC) has a consequence on the serviceability (timely ER). 
According to this notion, the definition of reliability of the road network is as follows: the probability 
that one or more of its links does not fail to function [322]; therefore, it can maintain satisfactory 
functionality at any given time [148, 325].  
In various studies in the network domain, network vulnerability is referred to as the decrease of 
performance due to disturbances [145, 326] and specifically for the road network, the vulnerability 
refers to as the “susceptibility to incidents that can result in considerable reductions in roadway 
network serviceability” [327]. If associating the term “reliable” with the term “operable” and 
therefore associating the term “vulnerable” with the “non-operable”, then reliability means “non-
vulnerability or exhibits a high degree of operability under any circumstances” [322]. In other words, 
the concept of vulnerability can be considered as the reciprocating one for robustness [328, 329]. 
Additionally, the reliability (at the flipside of vulnerability) can be considered the metric revealing 
the system's resilience on a network level. Therefore, in the ERR concept, the reliability of an ER 
road network for timely ER under flooded conditions is defined as the probability that a high number 
of its components (road segments) will provide the means for ER under flooded conditions depending 
on the RNMC (passive redundancy) levels. As previously stated, redundancy quantifications carry the 
vulnerability factor in the context of the degradation of serviceability of the road segment for timely 
ER due to decreased RNMC (serviceability), i.e. passive redundancy. Taking from the engineering 
of networks [320], where it is affirmed that the redundancy should be used as an indicator of reliability 
(see section 3.2), the RITAI is also suggesting the integration of the reliability, as the indicator of the 
relation between the risk and the resilience of the ER road system. The engineering of networks is 
utilised towards the design of reliable road network databases for reliable accessibility routes in the 
face of floods. Reliability depicts the resourcefulness towards timely ER provision, and the 
resourcefulness of a road network is quantified with the metric of the travel time reliability - TTR 




redundant and travel-time reliable road segment, providing timely ER and active redundancies 
(exogenous / road segment reuse in ER route planning for alternative routes), depending on passive 
ones (endogenous), in the face of floods. 
The impact of flood events on the road network in complex urban areas, causing changes in the FFS 
(levels of redundancy), indicates the vulnerable road segments and will result in changes in the travel 
time of every road segment that is the TTR, defined in this thesis as, Urban Flood Travel Time 
Reliability (UFTTR). UFTTR considers the active and passive redundancy of the ER road network 
for timely ER, adding the risk factor in the analyses. Risk is translated in delays of the ER, occurring 
from changes in the travel time of the road segments that depend on their transformation levels in the 
course of a flood type and intensity. Therefore, in the ERR concept, the reliability, i.e. 
resourcefulness of a transport network, can be defined as the probability that a road segment will 
provide timely ER under flooded conditions, according to the RNMC levels (redundancy). The timely 
ER is achieved with ER delivery within defined time thresholds used for ER plans and can vary 
between the ERS and the region. Therefore, according to FD, benchmarking and the definition of 
thresholds (see previous sections 2.1 and 3) is essential for the ERR assessments. 
In this way, the concept of the RITAI towards operationalisation of ERR to floods suggests that the 
timely ER (rapidity feature of urban ER systems) after floods is achieved with ER delivery within 
defined time thresholds from each ERS and is dependent on the mobility status of the ER road 
network for safe driving (robustness) and its impact on the FFS (redundancy). According to the 
author’s knowledge, few studies exist, specifically from the impact studies domain, that consider TTR 
calculations for emergency response purposes under the impact of floods, used for the “forecasting” 
of timely ER delivery in complex urban systems. For example, in [280], information is provided on 
mobility preparedness in case of floods, but only for the centre of the case study, for one CI (the 
hospitals) and with the use of one flood scenario (100-year flood). However, they are using several 
human safety and mobility functions for risk assessments, including hazard and impact analysis, to 
provide an understanding of risks to people during a flood emergency. Additionally, GIS studies are 
conducting OD-matrixes to optimise the respective systems under several impacts [182, 187, 330].  
These studies provide information on the travel time of a direct and linear route and not of the actual 
road links, which could add further travel costs due to the infrastructural morphology (e.g. 
roundabout, turn, one-way road, bridge) and the geomorphology of the area (e.g. curved road causing 
accumulation of rainwater). The concept of resourcefulness during disasters is introduced in 
emergency management, mainly emphasising human factors. In the ERR concept, the satisfactory 
functionality of the road segment, that is, the provision of ER delivery under flooded conditions, is 
analogous to the reliability of the road segment itself.  
This relation can also be verified from other studies oriented to the quantification of disaster 
resilience. Specifically, in [222], it is argued that resourcefulness and redundancy are strongly 
interrelated to create redundancies, which did not exist before the occurrence of the stressor to the 
system. The example used for presenting this strong interrelation is the strong dependence of 
technology use from emergency managers, rendering it critical [227] for the emergency response 
delivery; if technology fails or is destroyed, the response is affected [226]. Concerning the ERR and 
taking from the disaster resilience, changes in resourcefulness and redundancy will affect the shape 
and the slope of the recovery curve and time, affecting the rapidity (see section 2.1) and robustness 
of the ER system. 
The rapidity and the robustness of an entire system can be improved with redundancy and 




that timely ER (reflecting on the rapidity feature) is achieved using a robust, redundant and 
resourceful road network, as defined in this thesis (see section 2.2). It is also argued that built ER 
road network databases using forecasting probabilistic flood models of various types and intensities 
strengthen the preparedness for response and decrease ER times through i) pre-planned ER routing 
and ii) operational routing considering flood risk information towards safe driving mobility. 
Moreover, a practical GIS-based methodological workflow and a developed GIS-Toolkit is 
demonstrated in section 4.2, semi-automating the process of large-scale flood impact assessments on 
robustness, redundancy and resourcefulness. It is also demonstrated how geovisualisation and 
fuzzification (assignment of fuzzy variables) processes utilise the fuzzy set theory, which will assist 
the aggregation of information to the entire ER road network, as the RITAI suggests, adding to the 
redundancies and resourcefulness of the urban ER system, towards timely ER reflected on the 
enhancement of rapidity. Geovisualisation regards techniques used for import, handling and 
classification of data for easily interpretable visualisations in maps and fuzzy variables and are 
qualitative considerations regarding the information on the capacities of the systems of the urban ER 
system on several scales. Considering the resilience capacities of the systems of the urban ER system, 
the RITAI suggests that ERR is operationalised with assessments on citywide accessibility of a 
selected ERS, considering the resilience mentioned above features of the urban ER system and 
reflected on its rapidity of response.  
 
 
3.4 Rapidity of Response, Response Capacity &Accessibility Assessments  
The thesis proposes that the rapidity of the response of an urban ER system is enhanced with reduced 
accessibility times, thus timely ER, dependent on the TTR (risk levels) of the road network and 
consequently of the connectivity of the urban ER system after occurrence of selected flood scenarios. 
Therefore, accessibility is an increasingly important risk factor, and, as also mentioned earlier, it is 
proposed as a driver for resilience, specifically in complex urban environments. Population growth 
in urban areas is directly analogous to increased emergency response demand due to the increasing 
needs of prehospital emergency medical care (emergency transit) needed by the population [331, 
332]. EWE [245] and floods [86] severely impact various CI and particularly on the road network. 
The road network is an essential CI for fire and rescue services and the backbone for delivery of 
timely ground ER, transport of goods and the population. Transport is also the critical component in 
sustaining national productivity through the movement of people in “large commuting catchments 
and goods in the ever-increasingly complex and time-sensitive supply chains” [333].  
Therefore, research has associated transport networks with accessibility measurements serving as a 
socio-economic growth indicator [334]. Therefore, it is essential to use road network analytics [246] 
by adopting vulnerability and criticality assessments with a geographic context [147] for risk-based 
accessibility assessments. For the case of floods, geolocated information on the UFTTR, as suggested 
in section 3.3, provides a detailed overview of the possible level of degradation of the ER efficiency 
regarding timely accessibility in predefined response times, considering vulnerability assessments. 
The response times [335] of several ERS (fire brigades, medical services) are crucial for the 
emergency response planning, and particularly in regards to accessibility, the emergency response 
route planning [242, 279, 336].  
Therefore, timely ER must be provided between specific time thresholds, which are identified as 
sufficient worldwide; approximately eight minutes (plus/minus 2 minutes) is the most commonly 




accessibility. Several definitions have been given to accessibility, starting back from the 1920s [340]. 
A review of the different definitions and their measurements, with applications on the German 
commuting network, can be found in [104, 334].  
Accessibility, in emergency management, is commonly used as a response time-based efficiency 
factor for the evaluation of the performance of the ER of several ERSs in terms of timely ER 
provision, in the predisaster phase for planning but also during and after various disaster/crises, to 
shelters [341], vulnerable populations, evacuation and location optimisation for emergency 
humanitarian logistics [188, 342-346]. In this thesis, the RITAI for operationalisation of ERR 
quantifies the impact of the floods on the response times by considering the redundancy and 
resourcefulness of the road network regarding timely ER provision and safe mobility capacity 
through driving under flooded conditions. Road networks underpin mobility, and since 
accessibility according to [347] refers to the ‘properties of the configuration of opportunities for 
spatial interaction’, it can be argued that the measurements of the accessibility are indicative of the 
high spatial dependence on the status of the road network (physical and geographical 
interdependency) with the serviceability level that is under study (timely ER provision). The road 
network status regarding free mobility provision to travellers can be hindered by the EWE’s impact 
on the road network. The main concern and focus for emergency activities are the logistics of 
operations and road accessibility [348]. The leading indicator towards the operationalisation of ERR 
suggested in this thesis is accessibility, which is a risk-based indicator.  
 
Accessibility, in the ERR concept, is defined as the time of response of the ERS to the nearest city 
units that can be reached under any flood event. It is dependent on the impact of the flood on the 
road-type dependent FFS (redundancy) and, consequently, the urban flood travel time (reliability) of 
the ER road network segments (UTTR). As suggested in this thesis, the large-scale impact 
assessments are enabled using graph theory and network science (see section 2.1), identifying the 
connectivity and accessibility levels of the urban ER system under the stressor of floods. In [104], it 
is argued that it is helpful to analyse the related type of stable/unstable evolution and the leading 
conditions to the system's resilience in the presence of shock or perturbations.  
In [165], this theory is acknowledged for improved impact modelling of the climate extremes and 
their implications in transport.  
The conceptualisation and the operationalisation methodology of ERR to floods are also formed 
around this theory. Specifically, the focus shifts on the untangling of the complexity of the urban ER 
system, from resilience analyses on its interdependent CI, with a particular focus on the road network 
(for reasons mentioned above). As suggested, the urban ER system also consists of a complex 
beehive of city units. The compartmentalisation of the urban area in components of similar size will 
further aid the accessibility and connectivity analyses of the urban ER system, reflecting on the 
response capacity of the systems after the shock of disasters (floods).  
For comparison analyses for various states, the accessibility measurements consider the flood impacts 
on the travel times of the interconnecting road segments between the ERS buildings and the closest 
city units. The identification of flood risks in different systems and various scales is therefore enabled. 
This outcome shows that the methodology also provides results of the centrality of the road segments; 
tested performance for timely ER considering safe driving through flooded waters. Centrality 
measures are used generally to measure the degree of importance of specific nodes/links in a street 
network [334].  
These measures aim to quantify the influence capacity of the node, either to be influenced or to 




of “betweenness centrality” has been used in strategies towards reducing the impacts of EWE to the 
infrastructure networks [287], indicating critical road network links potentially profoundly impacted 
by floods in regards to safe driving through flooded waters. The betweenness centrality reflects the 
extent to which a node lies between pairs or groups of other nodes of the graph, indicating the extent 
that a node is an intermediate in the communication over the entire network. In general, network 
analyses conducted with GIS have been proven effective for such centrality measurements in network 
concept generation methods [159]. The thesis discusses that betweenness centrality conducted with 
GIS and applied on scenarios of local flooding indicates areas affected by the impact of floods that 
are not physically nor geographically interdependent [353], which has also been identified through 
the application of the methodology. This identification is possible after weighing each city unit 
centroids with comparison accessibility analysis results between flood events and non-flood events. 
After classification, according to accessibility thresholds of the ERS (benchmarking of timely ER) 
under research, the visualisation of the flood impacts to the urban ER in the form of ERR matrixes is 


































Table 3: RITAI for the Emergency Response Resilience (ERR) operationalisation - ERR features, sub-
indicators, metrics and outcomes 
Emergency Response Resilience (ERR) to flood events in urban areas 
Risk-based Time-dependent Accessibility Indicator (RITAI)  








ERS and  
ER Road Network exposure 
 
Extent of exposure 
to the hazard per 
road segment and 
network length in 
kilometres 
▪   Exposure assessment of the entire ER 
road network and ERS buildings through 
FD information (per scale of analysis – 1m 
road segments) 
▪ Definition of critical thresholds (critical 
FD) 
▪ Geovisualisation of information, after 
classification, on the entire road network 
▪ Flood intensity impact curves of the entire 
road network and analysis after 
fuzzification regarding the safe driving 









transformation capacity – 
Risk identifier on network 
and system level 
 
ERS and ER Road Network 
Capacity   
FFS change and 
speed flow-based 
impact according to 
ERS capacity on 
rescue vehicles 
(height of rescue 
vehicles) 
▪ Calculation of impacted FFS according to 
critical thresholds (per scale of analysis) 
▪ Comparison analysis of FFS (per scale of 
analysis) 
▪ Geovisualisation of information, after 
classification, on the entire road network 
▪ Flood intensity impact curves of the whole 
ER road network and analysis after 
fuzzification regarding the safe driving 






Transformation capacity -  
Resilience identifier on 
network and system level 
 
Road Network and ERS 
Travel Time Reliability 
Travel time change 
and impacted travel 
time reflecting on 
the travel time 
reliability (TTR) of 
the road segments 
▪ Calculation of impacted travel time (per 
scale of analysis) 
▪ Comparison analysis of TTR (per scale of 
analysis) 
▪ Geovisualisation of information on the 
entire road network(maps) 
▪ Flood intensity impact curves of the whole 
network and analysis after fuzzification 
regarding the road network’s safe driving 








capacity – Resilience 
identifier on a SoS level 
 
Efficiency of ERS according 
to performance 
levels/efficiency of the road 
network for timely ER 
 
Routing paths and 
calculations of 
response times for 
the closest city units, 
before and after 
flood events  
 
 
*’ closest’ refers to 
the fastest reachable 
city unit from an 
ERS building and is 
defined according to 
the regulations of 
the ERS 
▪ Connectivity (risk identifier on a SoS 
level) and Accessibility analysis (resilience 
identifier on a SoS level) based on flood-
impacted ER road networks 
 
 
▪ Network Analysis, before and after a flood, 
for ERS of choice, covering the entire case 
study area 
▪ Geovisualisation of information, after 
classification, on the entire road network 
▪ Comparison analysis of accessibility 
▪ Geovisualisation of information, after 
classification, on the entire case study area 
– ERR matrix 
▪ Flood intensity impact curves for the entire 
case study and analysis after fuzzification 
regarding the road network’s safe driving 




4. Applied Geoinformatics with GIS for Operationalisation Purposes 
The RITAI is spatially assessing from large scales to smaller (see Figure 11 - general 
operationalisation concept), with the aggregation of information indicated with the blue arrows and 
the combination of a top-down (interdependent resilience features reflected in the interdependent 
resilience capacities) and upscaling spatial approach. The flood impacts are on a road segment level 
as aggregated to the entire road network and the city units (bottom-up dependencies and upscaling 
assessment approaches). Robust, therefore, is an urban ER system with characteristics (identity-
critical functionality) that are not exposed to floods, and the safe driving ability is not affected. The 
intact identity of an urban ER system is related to unaffected critical functionality from the floods, 
which are stressing the system’s (in the sub-systems and the entire system), traffic, mobility, 
connectivity, and accessibility characteristics. With the suggested set of a critical FD that extends the 
absorption capacity, it is supported in the thesis that the urban ER system will enhance its adaptation, 
transformation and response capacity after enhancement of the same capacities of the CI of which it 
consists, tested for their flexibility under the stressor of selected flood scenarios.  
Thus, the redundancy (active and passive) is enhanced by enhancing the adaptation capacity of the 
urban ER system for timely ER according to the rescue vehicle’s safe driving mobility capacity, 
considering the safety of the emergency responders. According to [314], redundancy is differentiated 
into two types: the active and the passive. Active redundancy is the number of alternative routes that 
could be preserved under natural conditions by various measures such as speed adjustments 
(FFSchange), and the passive one could be used to represent backup options that are only used in case 
of disruptions. In the case of floods, the passive redundancy is referring to the FFSchange impacted 
from the FD. These road segments or flooded roads still allow for safe driving mobility of rescue 
vehicles for ER provision, but with added delays, i.e. the active redundancies are also enhanced – 
more alternative ER routing paths (see section 3.4).  
Furthermore, the urban ER system's resourcefulness focuses on the UFTTR of the ER road network 
since the critical function of the urban ER system is highly related to the travel times. TTR is 
dependent on the transformation capacity of the urban ER system up to levels that ER provision is 
still possible, reflecting on the potential risks (delay or incapacity). Finally, the response capacity of 
the system is reflecting on the rapidity feature of the ERR. Network analytics and graph theory, 
combined with GIS tools, are utilised for further connectivity and accessibility analyses. As the last 
step towards operationalising the ERR assessment, accessibility is used as a metric of the response 
capacity. It is argued that the response capacity is highly dependent on the connectivity of the system 
and is assessed with network analytics. After rebuilding the flood-impacted urban ER road network 
with the updated characteristics mentioned above (flood-impacted FFS and travel times), connectivity 
is assessed. During the network analysis process, only robust, redundant and resourceful roads that 
will be used for timely ER provision will participate and will be benchmarked as suggested. 
Visualisation of the city units participating in the network analyses provides a first overview of the 
connectivity of the urban ER system. It further raises awareness for future safety issues of the 
population settled in city units that are highly flood-impacted (blocked city units for ER provision). 
After the flood-impacted network analyses resulting in redundant closest routes for each ERS station, 
accessibility times are used as a weighting factor of the city units. Accessibility patterns serve as a 
first overview of the response capacity of the urban ER system after floods.  
Comparison results of the accessibility times (before and after a flood event) indicate the response 




accessibility assessments, the flood impact on the service of cover (SOC) of each ERS station, as well 
as each city unit's evacuation or resource/medical transit capacity, is also assessed.  
 
 
Figure 11: RITAI - Emergency Response Resilience operationalisation concept 
 
 
4.1 RITAI’s Benchmarking According to Safety, Security & Spatial Aspects 
For a practical application of the RITAI towards the operationalisation of ERR, the concept behind 
ERR is described step-by-step with an explanation of the different functions used. The RITAI is 
presented on a general level. Benchmarking the ER's critical functionality (timely ER provision) is 
provided with selecting the appropriate critical FD. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, benchmarking 
allows for the revelation of cascading impacts. For the ER system, i.e. SoS with CAS properties, the 
cascading impacts of floods are assessed with the RITAI, enabling information flow from large to 
smaller scales and various levels (agent, network and system) through large-scale risk analyses (see 
section 3).  
The characteristic value of the RITAI is the difference between the time accessibility of all city units 
during a flood event and the accessibility in the normal state. It, therefore, applies as: 
 
𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐼 =  𝐴𝐴𝐹 − 𝐴𝐵𝐹            (1) 
 
The RITAI (function 1) indicates the ERR levels of the city units of an urban case study area. RITAI 
is the result of the difference between 𝐴𝐴𝐹  (the total accessibility after a flood event (riverine of a 
flash flood) and 𝐴𝐵𝐹 (total impacted accessibility in minutes after a riverine or a flash flood), from 




Time-dependent accessibility plays a fundamental role in the transport network and specifically in 
emergency response operations. Firstly, it relates to all the nodes in the network. Secondly, it is a 
crucial instrument for exploring both slow network dynamics - characteristic of the network supply 
side (infrastructure development) - and fast network dynamics - typical of the demand side 
(mobility/collaboration of operations increase). The assessment of the accessibility used is conducted 
with a travel-cost approach, widely used for impact assessments related to transportation. The 
measure of accessibility can be interpreted as the level of connectivity of the nodes and the 
functionality (timely ER) of the urban ER system. The total time of accessibility 𝐴 (function 2) is 
calculated as the sum of the individual travel times from the nearest fire station to the respective 
“closest city unit” 𝑖. It is essential for the case study area and the ERS under research to define the 
threshold of response, which is the one that will define the “closest city unit” and the fastest routes. 
 
𝐴 = ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖                      (2) 
 
where 𝑇𝑖 is the travel time from the start of the response (ERS buildings) to the nearest place of action 
𝑖 , i.e., “closest city unit” following the fastest routes. 
The travel time 𝑇𝑖 (function 3) is calculated from the summarisation (SUM) of the times needed to 
cross each road segment of the fastest route, from the ERS building to the city unit (place of 
action/incident area). In the following function, the time required to pass a route (/road segments) 
refers to its impedance (time costs) 𝐼. It applies to the travel time: 
 
𝑇𝑖 = ∑ 𝐼𝑗
𝑚
𝑗                         (3) 
Risks jeopardising timely ER are identified in this level of analysis and for the system of the ER road 
network. They are dependent on the impedance, which is the travel costs added in the urban ER 
system. These travel costs are occurring after the adaptation and transformation of the road-type 
dependent free-flow speeds (FFS), per segment, according to FD or else road-type dependent route 
planning speed (ERPS). 
The impedance 𝐼 (function 4) in the thesis is a simple model used, which calculates the impedance 
from the segment length divided by the assigned ERPS of the segment, used for each ERS for ER 
route planning. 
𝐼𝑗 =  
𝑆𝑗
𝐾𝑗
                                (4) 
where 𝐼𝑗 is the impedance, 𝑆𝑗  the length of the segment 𝑗 and 𝐾𝑗  the maximum driving speed of each 
segment 𝑗. 
The segment length is normalised to one meter (1 m), and in this way, the analysis is local, integrating 
the geography perspective in the ERR concept, including large-scale intraurban speed change 
analyses. The driving speed depends on the ER road type-dependent maximum assigned driving 
speed for the road type of the segment 𝑗 (𝑁𝑗) before a flood event and after a flood event, dependent 
on the flood depth (𝐹𝐷𝑗) of the segment 𝑗 and its impact on the emergency route planning speed - 
ERPS. The impedance, after calculation, is assigned to each road segment 𝑗 before the flood events 




each segment is also essential for the various hypotheses, which are configured according to the 
mobility capacities of each emergency rescue service (ERS), considering safety issues such as flood-
depth disruption to rescue vehicle mobility. For a case-specific application of the methodology, the 
configuration is based on the assignment of maximum driving speeds (free-flow speeds - FFS) to 
each road segment for route planning purposes from each rescue service. Therefore, an update of the 
road network with specific information on maximum road type-dependent speeds, used for route 
planning of the ERS, is essential for each case study area, resulting in ER road networks.  
To quantify flood impacts in FFS and travel time, according to FD and considering safety issues of 
the emergency responders and security of the rescue vehicles, the road network of a selected case 
study area is updated after each flood scenario (riverine floods and flash floods). The update regards 
information on the impact of the flood to the maximum driving speeds, i.e., endogenous redundancy 
and the travel time reliability, i.e. resourcefulness and the status of the road network in general for 
timely ER provision, reflecting on potential delays or blockage of emergency response (rapidity of 
response). The update of the flood impact on the route planning speeds is performed in a road network 
database in GIS, using various flood scenarios to capture an image of potential futures. The ER road 
network’s capacity for timely ER, i.e., the passive or else endogenous redundancy of the system, is 
enhanced by providing one more redundancy to the urban ER system, by extending its connectivity 
and accessibility, with the use of the flooded roads that allow for safety of the population, the 
emergency responders and for the security of their assets. Concerning transport network resilience, it 
has been demonstrated that rapidity can be increased by adding just one more redundancy [203]. 
Following this notion and considering the need for the population's safety via timely ER, the 
following hypotheses are suggested to quantify the impact of floods on the ERPS on each 𝑗. The 
benchmarking considers the FD and the different capacities of each ERS in the heights of rescue 
vehicles.  
These hypotheses are formed for modelling, automation of calculations and assessments of the 
exposure (FD per segment) and vulnerability (ERPS/FFS per segment) of the ER road network after 
the stressor of various flood types and intensities. The absorption and adaptation levels of the urban 
ER system are therefore reassigned to each road segment (scale of analysis) by i) extending the 
endogenous redundancy of the system in regards to safe driving mobility through flooded waters, 
according to ERS rescue vehicle capacity and ii) transforming the ER road networks, for fast 
accessibility/timely ER provision. The calculations of the flood-impacted ERPS/FFS per road 
segment and the reassignment to each road segment are conducted according to the following three 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: If the flood depth is 0 (zero), which means an unaffected ER road network (i.e. not 
exposed to FD), then the network keeps its identity (characteristics). The road type-dependent ERPS 
𝐾𝑗 used from each ERS for ER route planning towards timely ER provision, remains the same and is 
assigned for each road segment. If not, the FD is greater than 0 (zero), the 𝐾𝑗 is calculated using the 
following depth-disruption function [253], 
 
PR = 0.0009 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝑗
2 − 0.5529 ∗  𝐹𝐷𝑗 + 86.9448  (5) 
where the speed PR is the maximum acceptable velocity, which ensures safe control of the driving 
vehicle given the depth of water; in our case, the rescue vehicles. In this way, the safe-driving 
mobility of the rescue vehicles is considered and, consequently, the safety of the emergency 




observational and modelling studies reviewed in [253], leading to a curve developed to indicate the 
FD impact on the vehicle road speed (Figure 12). Precisely, a depth damage function, such as PR, is 
a function that results in providing information for what fraction of total value at risk is damaged at 
different inundation depths [354]. The results for each flood scenario will give an overview of the 
reliability of the road network segments for timely ER provision. 
 
Figure 12: Depth-disruption function/Flood safety function, relating the flood depth with vehicle speed. 
Adapted from [253]3 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: If the maximum flood-impacted ERPS, resulting from the previous calculations from 
the PR function, is higher than the ERPS used from the ERS for timely ER, then it is assigned to the 
road segment to provide timely ER. If not, then the maximum ERPS assigned to the road segment 
remains the same. 
For the application of the hypothesis, it is a prerequisite the definition of the maximum allowed FD 
thresholds for safe driving through flooded roads. Through the curve (Figure 12), each ERS can 
configure the thresholds and, therefore, the hypotheses analogously with their capacities in equipment 
and area of service. For example, the fire brigade departments are equipped with fire trucks, which 
they deploy due to their ability to drive through flooded roads (4-wheel drive - 4WD cars) up to 0.6 
m (see Figure 12). This FD value is estimated from experimental and observational values in a 
literature review conducted in [185, 253, 355-357]. Therefore, it is suggested that the value of FD 
equal to 0.6 m or 0.75 m can be a threshold of choice for fire brigades equipped with 4WD fire trucks 
for applying the methodology.  
In the road network database, the hypothesis aims to configure the calculations to return to each road 
segment the 𝐾𝑗 , when the road segment is not flooded and to assign the new calculated PR speed 
according to each 𝐹𝐷𝑗. The resulting PR road type-dependent speeds are expected to have lower 
values than the 𝐾𝑗 because of the flood impact. In this way, the urban ER system is adapted to the 
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flooded conditions, and extending the ERR curve, i.e., slower rapidity feature but with remaining 
functionality. 
Hypothesis 3: If the flood depth is higher than 300 mm (or else 𝐹𝐷𝑗 > 0.3 m), then the maximum 
ERPS/FFS to the road segment value assigned is 2.0748 km/h, which is close to the walking speed; 
this value is correspondent of the 300 mm of 𝐹𝐷𝑗 resulting from the PR formula. For more 
information, see [253].  
At this step, expansion of adaptation capacity is performed with the modelled configuration of the 
FFS, according to the rescue vehicle’s capacity and safe driving characteristics, for the fire brigade 
system of an urban area with a dense road network, where ER must be time-efficient under any 
weather condition. Function 5 of the hypothesis demonstrates drivable flooded road segments after 
the assignment of the minimum and maximum thresholds of 𝐹𝐷𝑗. The hypothesis aims to return 
information on the safe driving mobility (drivability) through flooded road segments for specific FD 
thresholds, transforming the particular road segments to walking paths (maximum allowed driving 
speed is close to the walking speed, i.e., 2.0748 km/h). This allows for adaptation and transformation 
(redundancy) and risk (resourcefulness) threshold extensions towards timely ER (rapidity) and 
enhancement of ERR. 
As presented above, the methodology for the configuration of the input information according to the 
demands and needs of each case study area and analyses conducted in different scales is essential. 
Most fire brigades are deployed with rescue vehicles, which can still drive through flooded road 
networks. However, even if function 5 loses its validity for 𝐹𝐷𝑗 > 0.3 m, it is assumed that the most 
used vehicles of the fire brigades have a driving ability to the height of approximately 𝐹𝐷𝑗 = 0.5 m. 
Therefore, in this thesis, the minimum value of speed for function 5 is considered the one 
corresponding to a 𝐹𝐷𝑗 = 0.3 m and the maximum to 𝐹𝐷𝑗 = 0.5 m. For 𝐹𝐷𝑗 > 0.5 m the value is set 
to zero, and the flooded road segments of 𝐹𝐷𝑗 ≥ 0.5 m are set as blocked and impassable. However, 
in this case, and if possible, different routes can be selected for ER route planning; otherwise, a 
destination cannot be reached (inaccessible/zero ER delivery).  
Identification of blocked destinations is indicative of the need for measures taken, either for protection 
of the spatially related number of population (geographical interdependence), buildings and different 
CI, for the enhancement of response times and of the specific impacted road segment for the increase 









𝑁𝑗  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝐹𝐷𝑗 = 0 𝑜𝑟 ( 𝐹𝐷𝑗 > 0   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑁𝑗 < 𝑃𝑅)
  𝑃𝑅   𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝐹𝐷𝑗 > 0                    𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑅 < 𝑁𝑗 
   2. 0748  𝑓𝑜𝑟   𝐹𝐷𝑗 > 0.3         𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝐷𝑗 < 0.5
  0 (𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑)                              𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝐹𝐷𝑗 > 0.5
     (6)  
 
Function 6 aims to assign each road segment (scale of analysis) the updated maximum allowed road 
type-dependent speed (RPS) 𝐾𝑗 after integrating the impact of the FD on the driving behaviour of the 
fire brigade vehicles for emergency rescue routing plans. Therefore, it transforms the traffic 




 On the one hand, it adds delays to the ER time, but on the other hand, it enhances the redundancy 
and resourcefulness of the urban ER system. In this way, the ER, even if delayed, is still a possibility 
and extends the connectivity of the urban ER system. 
While no adaptation and transformation has taken place, the resilience of the urban ER system is 
expected to be lower. For example, without the extension of the passive redundancy in the system, 
considering the RNMC for safe driving under flooded waters, the blocked functionality margin will 
expand, lowering the ER curve depicted in the rapidity feature. 
The walking speed, even if delaying the ER, still enhances the response capacity. When rescue 
vehicles operate under flooded conditions, there are occasions (up to the rescue vehicle’s safe driving 
mobility capacity) that they need to reach destinations by driving through flooded waters.  
In this case, the danger of floating objects transferred from the flood velocities (gully tops, garbage, 
stones), which can damage the engine, can hinder or even entirely block the emergency response 
delivery or reduce driving speeds close to walking speeds. When driving through deeper flooded 
roads, until the flood depth (FD) that is possible (mostly till 𝐹𝐷𝑗 = 0.5 m or maximum till 𝐹𝐷𝑗 = 0.75 
m), it is essential for the emergency rescue drivers to know if floating obstacles will damage the fire 
truck. To avoid damages and further accidents, a rescuer walks through flooded roads ahead of the 
fire truck and clears the way. The driving speed of the fire truck is then close to the walking speed, 
following the pace of the firefighter. In the case of Germany, this has been verified by fire brigade 
officials and volunteers of Cologne’s fire brigades, which is the case study used for ERR assessments 
(see section 5). 
 
 
4.2 GIS-based Spatial Upscaling Operationalisation Approach  
“The fundamental mission of emergency management is to propose an operable, accurate, 
and cost-effective plan to cope with different unforeseen events” [237] 
 
According to FD, the benchmarking of the urban ER system, considering safe driving mobility of 
emergency rescue vehicles, extends the redundancy (passive and active) while consequently 
enhancing the resourcefulness of the system for ER provision. When disasters occur, even with 
considerably minor added delays (see section 5.3 - accessibility thresholds) in the provision of rescue 
and humanitarian relief, in the delivery of rescue equipment (rescue boats, ladders), and the transit of 
patients or doctors, this extension of redundancy and resourcefulness of the urban ER system is of 
value. It is argued that in urban areas, large-scale geolocated and visualised knowledge of FD with 
the information on the cascading flood impacts on the road network system can enable the 
identification of risks (flood impacts) on different scales and levels. Consequently, ERR can be 
enhanced with risk-informed and adaptive ER road network databases for adaptive ER route pre-
planning, indicating the accessible areas in a city (city units). 
In the preparedness phase, many roads can be impassable (non-drivable/blocked) due to high FD ≥
 0.5 m, and some others can still be drivable due to lower FD [0.01, 0.3) meters. The status of the ER 
road network regarding the level of a flood (direct flood loss) impacts the safe drivability/mobility 
capacity of the roads from rescue vehicles, which is dependent on the mobility capacity of different 
rescue vehicles (various heights and types) of each ERS. This issue can be tackled with the provision 




The developed methodology results in providing updated road networks with information on drivable 
and travel time reliable road segments for timely ER, which will enhance the efficiency of ER delivery 
in case of floods with ER route pre-planning, according to information in regards to the geolocated 
safe driving mobility capacity and citywide accessibility. The update occurs from the assignment of 
the new state of the ER free-flow speed (ERPS - traffic characteristic), which is the impacted FFS 
according to flood depths. Comparison analysis between the two states (normal and flooded) is 
visualised, providing exact geolocated information on degraded traffic characteristics.  
Geovisualisation of the level of change indicates which road segments are travel-time reliable for use 
in ER route planning and the ones that are expected to add delays to the operations and should be 
avoided. Therefore, the opportunity is given to the ER route planners to either omit them from ER 
route planning or raise awareness for the vulnerability of the identified road segments for future ER 
operations under flooded conditions. Based on the updated ER FFS, travel times of each road segment 
are re-calculated, and the travel time reliability (TTR) of each road segment is assessed after 
comparison analysis before and after the occurrence of floods. The results visualised are providing a 
detailed overview of the urban flood travel time reliability (UFTTR). Different levels of UFTTR 
provided for each road segment provide further geolocalised information on the impacts of the floods 
to the main critical functionality of the ER road network, that is, timely ER provision. 
Additionally, connectivity analyses are conducted with network analytics for each updated ER road 
network with information on the cascading impacts of the floods on their traffic characteristics. 
Consequently, accessibility analyses can be conducted using the updated ER road networks and the 
time difference of the accessibility before and after the type-based flood risk occurrence of different 
intensities. These values are assigned to each city unit, providing information on the ERS efficiency 
and the RNMC for safe driving through flooded waters and operationalising the ERR in urban 
environments. The outcomes of the methodology are visualised in ERR matrixes, after classification, 
indicating the level of resilience of the city units of action regarding the risk-based and time-
dependent accessibility, aiming to enhance the rapidity feature of ERR to riverine floods and flash 
floods. It is argued that resilience assessments on different levels in a system combined with GIS 
tools, methodologies and geovisualisation techniques enhance the robustness, redundancies, 
resourcefulness and rapidity of the response of the urban ER system. 
Specifically, the scenario-based GIS methodological framework of the operationalisation of the ERR 
is presented in Figure 13. The figure displays information aggregation from components to the 
constituent systems, the networks, and the SoS with CAS properties, i.e. the urban ER system. The 
system is presented as a network graph model of its sub-systems/components (road segments and 
centroids of city units). Flood models are used as external factors stressing and affecting the urban 
ER SoS, its systems and networks, leading to system distortion (delayed or impaired ER provision to 
the city units) and consequently to population safety reduction, potential vehicle-flood fatalities and 
an increase in operating costs.  
In a GIS environment, the urban ER model is created by the abstraction of its components as nodes 
(emergency rescue buildings and centroids of city units), links (road network), road segments (after 
spatial separation and normalisation) and the base-layer (case study area/beehive of city units). In the 
suggested model, each component is defined by its quantitative attributes, which have been identified 
to have a significant impact on the ERR to riverine floods and flash floods and are reflected in each 
feature of the ERR; safe driving mobility of the emergency responders, travel time and accessibility 




With semi-automated calculations through a developed GIS-Toolkit (see next section 4.3), the road 
network is normalised to one-meter road segments, and this is the scale of analysis for exposure, 
vulnerability and risk assessments depicted accordingly on the robustness, redundancy and 
resourcefulness of the ER road network for timely ER provision. 
 
 
Figure 13: ERR upscaling spatial assessment GIS-based workflow indicating the aggregation of information 
to different scales (white arrows) 
 
 
The normalisation enables the focus of the ERR assessments on local scales (large scales). 
Assessments as exposure assessments of the FD on an ER road network indicate the absorption and 
damage levels of the floods to the network and the entire urban ER road system due to high 
interdependence and interconnectedness. Vulnerability assessments are indicative of the 
transformation of the traffic system’s characteristic ERPS/FFS, which lead to flood-impacted travel 
times, indicative of the adaptation capacity of the urban ER system. Risk assessments are depicted on 
the newly calculated flood-impacted travel times, which are indicative of the transformation capacity 
levels of the urban ER system, i.e. reliability. All of the information above is integrated into updated 
flood-impacted ER road network databases. 
Furthermore, the urban ER system properties, such as network connectivity between its systems and 
accessibility, are analysed with graph theory combined with network science (network analytics). 
That is the reconstruction of ER road networks with risk attributes and search of the closest 
surrounding city units using GIS tools such as the Network Builder and Closest Facility (accordingly), 
reflecting on the resourcefulness and the rapidity features of the ERR. For citywide efficiency 
assessment of the urban ER under flooded conditions, these simulations are carried out from the 
emergency rescue buildings to the closest city units, followed by comparing the system functionality 
before and after the flood events based on the sub-systems’/components’ level of functionality. Levels 




According to the defined thresholds, the ER road network’s segments (node and link components) 
are weighted with flood-impacted travel times, which reflect on the impedances that are the potential 
delays or even blockages of ER provision.  
The centroids of the city units (city network’s nodes) are weighted with accessibility response times 
from the closest ERS building. High-resolution geovisualisation of distortions caused to the road 
network system and, consequently, to the urban ER system as a whole, by riverine floods and flash 
floods, demonstrates the usefulness of GIS for modelling and geovisualisation techniques for the 
presentation of the results in regards to urban ERR.  
Geovisualisation implies the adaptation of scientific visualisation to maps, as formerly called 
“geographic visualisation” and then, for simplification, renamed “geovisualisation” [358]. 
Geovisualisation is “the set of visualisation tools, allowing interactive explorations of geolocated 
data in order to build and provide knowledge without a priori assumptions” [358], and it includes 
fields such as scientific visualization, mapping, image processing, knowledge extraction and GIS 
[255]. Geovisualisation techniques, combined with ERR assessments, result in the identification of 
local ERR on several levels. Through such complex scientific information visualised in easy 
interpretable ways, the scope is to open a dialogue around the concept and integrate local (but not 
only) stakeholders into clarifying the concept. Moreover, to provide easier access to this concept 
based on i) semi-automated data analyses with the provision of the GIS-Toolkit and ii) processing 
and visualisation with the design of maps, as it has been presented for various other forms of resilience 




The exposure assessments result in the value of the exposed elements, i.e. objects potentially impacted 
by a defined hazard scenario for a specific environment [284]. The GIS-Toolkit enables semi-
automatic large-scale flood exposure assessments of the ER road network (per j road segment - the 
scale of analysis). It is built to capture the exact flood extent with decimal precision (exposure of the 
ER road network to floods), i.e. FD values integrating this information in the ER road network 
database, per scale of analysis, i.e. FDj assisting further the vulnerability assessment of the road 
network to different flood events in great detail. As previously mentioned, vulnerability is the 
information on the FD per road segment (FDj), a direct exposure assessment (physical flood damage), 
and, therefore, a robustness assessment of the road network to the four selected flood scenarios. The 
GIS-Toolkit provides the ability to capture the exact flood extent with decimal precision and integrate 
it into the road network database, assisting further vulnerability assessment of the road network to 
different flood events in great detail. The combination of this information results in risk assessments 
of the road network to floods in complex environments through updated road networks that provide 
information on the impact of the FD to the FFS towards a comprehensive assessment of ERR (as 
aforementioned) with network analyses conducted in a GIS environment. ERR to riverine floods and 
flash floods for an urban ER system is operationalised utilising flood scenarios - models. These types 
of flood data are always provided in raster form and are used as a basis for FD extraction in GIS-
based exposure assessments. The flood models are usually in a raster form. The extraction of raster 
values to line vectors is an issue that can be overcome with the GIS-Toolkit.  
The updated, risk-informative ER road networks are resulting from the suggested GIS-Toolkit (Figure 




▪ automatic compartmentalisation/segmentation of the road network in the case study area to 1 
m segments (normalisation) - large-scale analysis,  
▪ import the FD information to each segment (from raster to vector lines) and 
▪ absorption of the impact of the FD to the maximum allowed ERPS using the PR function 
(function 5) and the K function (function 6), after consideration of the hypotheses of the 








The RITAI in GIS suggests the building of ER road databases, resulting from the GIS-Toolkit. These 
databases provide on the scale of analysis (one-meter road segments) flood depth (FD) information 
revealing the geolocated road network’s flood exposure and its geolocated vulnerability, reflected on 
the free flow speeds (maximum allowed ERPS) that are used for timely emergency response planning. 
These ER risk-informative road databases serve as the basis for further travel time reliability, 
connectivity and accessibility assessments (multi-scale risk and resilience) under flood conditions. 
Safety and security aspects are integrated through the different hypotheses suggested for the 
configuration of the GIS-Toolkit and the adaptability of the approach, according to the rescue 
vehicles’ capacity that is dependent on the FD. 
In this way, further multi-scale flood risk information flow for flood risk and resilience assessments 
are enabled with aggregated flood-risk and cascading flood-impact information in complex 
environments towards a comprehensive assessment of the urban ERR.  
The GIS-based methodological workflow implemented with the GIS-Toolkit in a GIS environment 
(ArcMap) is presented in Figure 15. Specifically, it is portrayed the first part of the application of the 
RITAI in GIS, that is, the procedure for the aggregation of FD information from a raster data type 
(flood model) to a line vector (road network) and flood-impacted emergency route planning speeds 




According to the three hypotheses, the implementation of the PR function (function 5) benchmarks 
the safe driving ability of the rescue vehicles through flooded waters and returns flood-impacted 
ERPS. The three hypotheses are assisting the calculation and assignment of the ERPS per scale of 
analysis, with the Kj (function 6) that incorporates the safety and security aspects into road network 
databases (emergency responders’ safety and of rescue vehicles), for further ERR assessments in the 
case of floods.  
 
 




The PR function is, therefore, configured after the definition of the FD thresholds for the case study 
area and the ERS of research, which are characterizing the respective flooded road segments with 
safe drivability levels for ER purposes as: 
▪ effortlessly drivable with the maximum safe drivable FFS for values of FD class 1 - zero 
exposure (FD = 0 m) 
▪ drivable - with low-impaired FFS for values of the FD class 2: FD [0.01, 0.3) m 
▪ drivable with additional delays – with the minimum FFS for values of FD class 3: 
FD [0.3, 0.5) m 
▪ not drivable (blocked) for values of the FD class 4: FD ≥ 0.5 m. 
This fuzzification process of classified FD information aims to simplify the results’ interpretation, 
supporting the decision-making and potential end-users. 
Additionally, regarding the technical specifics, the GIS-Toolkit is built with the software of ArcMap 
version 10.6.1 and the use of the tool ‘Model Builder’. The Model Builder allows for semi-automation 
and full automation of procedures in ArcMap and ArcGIS Pro. It also provides the opportunity for 
easy configuration of the model, respectively, with the vehicle capacities of each ERS, the ERPS and 
the flood-type. The workflow described above (Figure 15) is modelled in the Model Builder with 





According to ESRI, the models are workflows, which order sequences of geoprocessing tools and 
feed the output of one tool into other tools as an input, and the tools’ layout and variables are 
combined in a model diagram.  
The modelling of the GIS-Toolkit is conducted with the programming language Python, with a 
combination of programming language Visual Basic (VB). The main goal of the GIS-Toolkit is to 
provide updated ER road network vector data (lines) with information on the FDj (extracted from 
raster flood models) and the flood-impacted ERPS, on the scale of the road segment, in the database, 
after application of the three hypotheses (see function 6). The hypotheses for the calculation of flood-
impacted ERPS are programmed using the VB language (Figure 16). For the application of the 
methodology (Figure 15), it is used a scale of 1 m for city-scale detailed flood-impact information, 
which is necessary for high resolution and accuracy. 
Furthermore, the normalisation provided from this segmentation allows for large-scale intraurban 
flood impact-based assessments. The GIS-Toolkit (Figure 16) uses the flood models of raster form 
(manual input) as input aiming to combine static flood models with traffic flow values of an ER road 
network (manual input). The procedure aims to a large-scale, detailed, and, as comprehensive as 
possible, overview of the impacts of each flood scenario selected to the transport network 
characteristics and finally to the ERR. In Figure 16, the inputs are in dark blue, in light blue are the 
coding processes, in yellow are the standard procedures, and in green are the intermediate data and 
outcomes. 
As discussed earlier, the toolkit provides the opportunity for exposure and vulnerability assessments 
of the ER road network. It is a standalone GIS-Toolkit, integrating into the road network database 
information on the FD per road segment (FDj), a direct high-resolution exposure assessment (direct 
flood impact). Thus, it can also be used ‘divided’ since the first part of the toolkit allows for high-
resolution urban flood exposure assessments of different scales with different types of vector line data 
(railway network and public transport, i.e. bus-line network, and tramline network). Therefore, it 
enables the robustness assessment of transportation networks, which do not include the temporal 














4.3.1 Advantages and limitations  
The GIS-Toolkit is created in the ModelBuilder, and it automates the calculation processes presented 
in the previous section, creating geodatabases for different flood scenarios. The automation of the 
calculation processes makes the GIS-Toolkit ideal for transfer and use from different end-users, such 
as emergency responders (fire brigades, hospitals), civil protection officials, urban planners, traffic 
planners and researchers working in various scientific fields. It is easily configurable, and thus it can 
be applied for different case studies, i.e. other cities, different scales, such as entire road links, 
different lengths of road segments than that of the 1m, suggested in this thesis, on a national scale 
and for different line vector types, i.e. railway network, public transport networks.  
Through the GIS-Toolkit, is given the opportunity to the users to isolate specific calculation processes 
and limit to, for, e.g., the exposure assessment of transport networks (line vectors) to floods (rasters). 
The GIS-Toolkit can add information to polylines from rasters through the automated process of the 
exposure assessment to floods. The flood depth information of the rasters is added to the line vectors 
in detail for the specified from the user unit scale. Even if ArcGIS Pro 2.3.2 provides a tool for using 
raster data as input, it must be of correct cell size greater than zero, and it should also be an integer 
raster dataset. These prerequisites limit the application of this specific tool, and it is not useful for 
applying the methodology suggested in this thesis since it is essential to have information on the FD 
with a decimal resolution for comparable real-life results.  
There are attempts from different scientists to solve the issue by the provision of GIS methodological 
approaches. For example, in [280], the zonal statistics approach in GIS is used, and it is intended for 
emergency response preparedness to floods. They proceeded with the classification of each road 
segment according to flood depth using the maximum water depth; in zonal statistics, this is translated 
as selecting the highest value of all cells in the value raster, which belong to the same zone the output 
cell. The zonal tools allow performing analyses where the output results from computations 
performed on all the cells that belong to each input zone, defined by raster or feature datasets. In 
[280], the road segment is the zone definition dataset, which is the road from one intersection to 
another (node-to-node road link). Therefore, the classification of the road network and the 
information provided to emergency responders are aggregated to the entire road link, excluding 
detailed knowledge on the exposure of the different road segments of a whole road or else road link.  
Since no tool exists in ArcMap and ArcGIS Pro to automatically extract raster information to 
polylines in spatial resolution of 1 m, with decimal precision, the GIS-Toolkit suggests a 
methodological approach for the integration of information from a raster to a polyline, in high 
resolution, for risk assessments of the road network and of ER route planning after flood events. In 
this way, the synthesis of highly detailed information for the FD of the road network is achieved 
according to the specified unit scale, avoiding data aggregation loss. The GIS-Toolkit, on the other 
hand, is providing exact and precise information with decimal precision, also allowing the emergency 
responders to know the FD of different road segments of an entire road. This information gives the 
emergency responders the advantage of including the flooded road segments (up to 0.5 m FD) in the 
route planning, with information on the exact travel time needed. 
Furthermore, with the detailed and high-resolution results on the exposure of the road segments (1m 
scale of analysis), emergency responders can decide on potential sites of placement of the emergency 
boats in case of highly flooded roads, assisting a timely, effective response, and also on the exclusion 
of specific road segments from the emergency route planning. In this way, the impact of the stressor 
of floods is absorbed in the emergency system, enabling its potential transformation through 




routing paths etc.), towards its resilience through the enhancement of the active redundancy. Another 
high-resolution tool called FLIAT [361] exists and is built for flood impacts on a socio-economic 
level, applied in GIS, which returns a road network converted to the same unstructured mesh form of 
the flood model, dividing the road network into unregulated segments. 
The final result is not an integrated road network such as the road networks resulting from applying 
the GIS-Toolkit suggested in this thesis, which can be understandable and accessible for various end-
users. The GIS-Toolkit also provides information for the FFS before and after each of the selected 
flood scenarios on a road segment scale. It, therefore, enables further calculations of the travel times 
before and after a flood event occurs and analyses on the FFS change (vulnerability indicator) and 
TTR change (risk indicator) of the road network, depicting potential futures of the emergency 
response performance of the selected ERS under flooded conditions of different types (riverine or 
flash floods). Flood risk identification on this large-scale can assist in further identifying potential 
cascading impacts and interdependencies between various CI, which is information that can also be 
utilised to enhance the safety of the population (also through self-protection enhancement) and many 
more analyses (see Table 2). 
While applying the GIS-Toolkit on line vector data and raster data, the occurring limitations result 
from the size of the input data and the intermediate data, which are produced (point data along the 
line vectors, extraction of segments using the point data), making the GIS-Toolkit time costly in its 
application. The first part of the GIS-Toolkit (see Figure 16) is where most computation effort occurs. 
The calculation process does not return all segments with the same length of precisely one meter, but 
the lengths vary from 0.99996 – 1 meter. The issue can be overcome by recalculating the segment 
length in the road network database, setting the road segment length to one meter, simplifying the 
calculations, and flood-focused impact-based assessments.  
Another limitation of the GIS-Toolkit is that exposure analyses may return Null information in the 
road network databases regarding FDj for the road segments that are not affected by the floods (e.g., 
for application with riverine floods). These limitations can be overcome with calculations in the field 
by replacing the null information with the value zero (see Appendix C). Concluding with a summary 
of the advantages and limitations presented for the GIS-Toolkit: 
▪ the GIS-Toolkit is easily transferable from end-user to end-user because it provides the 
results in the form of ArcGIS geodatabases4 which are a collection of geographic datasets of 
various types held in a standard file system folder 
▪ it allows automation of processes 
▪ it is easily configurable, i.e., it can also be transferred from a larger scale to a smaller one 
(from a city-level to a national and country level), and it can also be used with different input 
data, i.e., different polylines (railway network, public transport) and raster data (heatmaps, 
snow coverage maps) for different detailed analyses where decimal precision is essential, i.e., 
flood depth and snow depth 
▪ it adds to the redundancies and resources of an urban ER system by providing spatial 
assessment tools easily configured respectively to the needs of each end-user 
▪ it is time-consuming when the analyses are conducted on a large scale and produces some 
errors, i.e. unintegrated unit scale of road segment length, which both are limitations that can 
be overcome with quick and straightforward in-field calculations. 
 
 




4.4 Aggregation & Simplification of Information with Classification & 
Fuzzification Methods 
After the semi-automation of the flood impacts on FFSj, according to safe driving mobility based on 
the rescue vehicle capacity, the assessments of the FFSj change and the UFTTRj for aggregation of 
information to the entire network follows geovisualisation techniques. In this way, second-order flood 
impacts are visualised and can provide a first overview of the extent of delays expected in the ER 
provision.  
The flood-impacted FFSj (occurring from the implementation of function 5 - PR function) 
consequently affects the serviceability performance depicted from flood-impacted travel times and 
the UFTTRj,  
The UFTTR is one of the sub-indicators of the RITAI for risk-based resilience assessments of the 
road network and reflects on the ability for ER provision, intended for adaptive ER route planning to 
each selected flood scenario, and connectivity and accessibility assessments of the urban ER system 
under flooded conditions. A sub-indicator is used to operationalise the ER road network 
resourcefulness for timely ER, measuring the flood-impacted TTR after each selected flood scenario. 
The quantification processes of the FFSj changes and the UFTTRj are taking place in the ArcGIS 
environment and particularly in the updated ER road network geodatabases. Changes of the FFS 
(function 7), on a road segment-scale, are observed after the impact of the flood events: 
 
FFSj change =  ERPSj(BF) − ERPSj(AF)                (7) 
 
where ERPSj(BF) is the empirical road-type dependent route planning speed that the respective ERS 
is using for ER route planning before any urban flood event and ERPSj(AF) are the flood-impacted 
road-type dependent ERPS occurring after measurement of the impact of the FDj to the ERPSj(BF). 
Additionally, the UFTTRj (function 8) of the road segments for ER route planning is calculated as 
follows: 
UFTTRj =  TravelTimej(BF) − TravelTimej(AF)   (8) 
 
where the TravelTimej(BF) is the total travel time that it takes to a rescue vehicle to drive through 
each predefined road segment j before any urban flood events, and TravelTimej(AF) is the total travel 
time that it takes for a rescue vehicle to travel through each road segment j up to the FDj allowing for 
safe driving, after integration of the impact of the FDj to the ERPSj(BF). 
Classification of results from (function 7) and (function 8) occurs according to the safe driving 
mobility, which depends on the rescue vehicle’s capacities of the respective ERS. The reasons have 
been demonstrated throughout sections 6.2 and 6.3. The adaptation capacity of an urban ER road 
network reflects on the robustness of the urban ER system. It is assigned fuzzy variables regarding 
driveability (qualitative consideration of safe driving ability), which indicate the exposure of the ER 
road network to FDj.  
 Consequently, the transformation capacity is assigned variables concerning the transformation that a 




capacity. Finally, the TTRj is analogous to the impact of FDj and is assigned fuzzy variables depicting 
the UFTTRj levels (resourcefulness).  
The visual and numerical presentation of the results is in a classified form, where each class is 
assigned a fuzzy value (linguistic variable), following a simple fuzzification method. Fuzzification is 
the process of the conversion of a “crisp” input value to a fuzzy value corresponding to a fuzzy subset 
or a membership function [143, 362-364], that is, precise values onto linguistic variables [365]. In 
this thesis, each linguistic variable, used for the description of the impact of selected flood scenarios 
to the road network and the ERS under research, is defined by a qualitative term set (e.g. [high; rather 
high; low; not impacted] or [reliable; medium reliable; not reliable]) with a defined number of 
members (see Table 4). The fuzzification in this thesis aims to present the classified results of the 
different functions implemented in a complex urban system. The goal is to provide an understandable 
overview of the results for further analyses and implementation of the methodology. The results 
mainly aim for ER purposes, civil protection decision making, traffic and urban planning, and critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP) analyses in complex urban environments. Therefore, it is argued that 
the potential impacts of a hazard on complex urban environments need untangling with easily 
understandable inputs. These inputs regard the potential impacts of the hazard on their interdependent 
systems (nexus of different population groups affected, complex road networks, different 
interdependent CI), feeding information to down to top DRM and FRM methods (see section 2.1). 
 
Table 4: Sub-indicators classified - Impact of the flood depth (FD) on the road segments' status used for 
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≤ 0.3 m                                    Drivable as planned and Drivable with 
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Apart from the compartmentalisation/segmentation of the ER road network, for several reasons 
mentioned above, the urban ER model suggests the compartmentalisation of the case study area for 
further risk-based time-dependent accessibility assessments of the urban ER system, using the 





5. Operationalisation of the ERR to Floods for Cologne’s Fire Brigades 
5.1 Cologne: Case Study, Climatic Characteristics & Flood Scenarios 
For timely ER provision and quantification of a range of flood impacts, as stated in [272], it is 
essential to identify risk sources and obtain scenarios representing the risk situation. Hence, i) 
flooding, a typical example for Germany is selected as a risk scenario, and ii) the case study area 
selected is Cologne (Köln) since river floods and flash floods are frequent. Cologne’s choice as a 
study area is reasoned as follows.  
Similar to many European cities that expand on both sides of a river, Cologne expands on both sides 
of the river Rhine. In combination with the human settlement (alongside), this city planning narrowed 
down the natural riverbed considerably over recent decades and has increased the flood risk for the 
population and the geographically interdependent CI.  
It is discussed in [366] that due to the exposed location of Cologne at the River Rhine, the flood risk 
is prevailing, despite the extensive efforts in flood protection and in [367], it is further mentioned that 
Cologne is Europe‘s most flood-prone metropolis, with increasing frequent flood events. Cologne is 
also the fourth most populated city in Germany after Berlin, Hamburg, and Munich and the largest 
city of Germany's most populated federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). With over a 
million inhabitants (1.08 million), Cologne is the largest city on the Rhine river and the most populous 
city of the Rhine-Ruhr Metropolitan Region, Germany's largest and one of Europe's major 
metropolitan areas5. 
Riverine floods are measured with distributed gauges along the rivers all around Germany. Similarly, 
gauges are distributed at the river Rhine around the area of Cologne. Measurements of the gauges 
(1900 - 2002) around the Rhine catchment for Cologne and Bonn [368] have indicated significant 
upward flood trends in magnitude and frequency. It is further suggested in [367] that the gauge of 
Cologne is mainly dominated by winter floods and slowly rising water levels, which is typical for 
most gauges in the Rhine. For Cologne and the period 1951 - 2002, upward trends in the annual 
maximum flood in the Rhine and Weser basins are attributed to trends in the winter season. 
Comparing the yearly streamflow maxima with the seasonal streamflow maxima shows that the 
annual maximum streamflow is determined by floods occurring in the winter season, with the summer 
riverine floods being significantly smaller. In 2018 for the Rhine area and Cologne, the local flood 
control centre mentioned that in January, the riverine flood reached 9 m of flood depth (FD).  
On the other hand, the EWE occurrence increases significantly with a similar analogous increase of 
intensity [48], even on a regional scale. It is estimated that by the year 2050, the temperature of the 
coldest month in the city of Cologne will have increased by 2.6 degrees Celsius, and the 
temperature of the warmest month will have increased by 5.7 degrees Celsius (see Figure 17). An 
increase in temperatures leads to heavy precipitation and, therefore, heavy rainfalls, which can cause 
flash floods.  
Flash floods in urban environments are regional events (depending on different factors, such as 
geomorphology, land use), and due to the density of CI and the dependent population can have 
significant impacts leading to domino cascading effects from CI to CI (e.g. transportation, electricity, 
water distribution network) impacting the spatially related community. 
 
 








Figure 17: Estimated temperature increase of the coldest (above) and the warmest (below) month of German 
cities, including Cologne, by 2050 (in degrees Celsius) 6  
 
 
The increase in temperature and climate change have started to show their adverse effects in recent 
years. Cologne is the second city in Germany with the highest recorded number of rainy days, 
according to Eurostat (Urban Audit - see Figure 18.). The number of rainy days of German cities is 
presented in Figure 18, where Cologne (Köln) has 263, measured in 2004.  
 
6 Original source theme - Cities of the future: visualising climate change to inspire action. Source: PLOS ONE. Published   





Figure 18: German cities with the rainiest days where Cologne (Köln) is the second7 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the precipitation is higher in the summer months, increasing the risk of flash 
floods. For this reason, in the summer months of the year 2017, Cologne faced some severely heavy 
rainfalls resulting to flash floods, impairing the daily traffic flow of commuters using the road 
network and the public transport means, i.e. trams and buses. More specifically, on July 19 of the 
same year, the population’s commute was profoundly affected by the heavy rainfall on the road and 
rail infrastructure. Partially flooded roads (locality of the phenomenon) caused chaos in traffic 
and transportation in general, resulting in significant delays and even isolation of specific areas. 
The storm was by far the strongest in the last 72 years of intense rainfalls in Germany, with the 
massive rain event spatially restricted to the area of Cologne8 with the amount of precipitation up 
to 95 l/m².  
The German Meteorological Service (DWD – Deutsche Wetterdienst) declared July 2017 the rainiest 
month Germany has seen since measurements that began in 1881. Such extremes are strong evidence 
that climate change is affecting everyday life. The following year in 2018, Cologne was also affected 
by intense heavy rainfalls. As presented in Table 5, the higher temperatures are observed for the 
summer months of June, July and August and are related analogously with the higher observed 
precipitations up to 83 mm. For a year, the precipitation totals 774 mm and in February, the average 
rainfall is the lowest expected. Compared to June, with the highest rainfall, where the difference is 
31 mm. In February, the precipitation falls on average at 52 mm, and on the contrary, June is the 
rainiest month of the year with 83 mm of rainfall.  
 
7    Source Eurostat, Urban Audit - publication date 22.09.2008: Shortened version. Accessed 06.2019. Adapted from  
       https://www.statista.com/statistics. Accessed 06.2019 
8    Information on this particular heavy rainfall for Cologne in: www.dwd.de and https://www.wetterkontor.de/.   





Table 5: Temperatures (with a colour classification from yellow to dark orange) and precipitation (with a 
colour classification from light to dark blue for Cologne). 9 
 
 
According to all the information provided in the chapter regarding Cologne’s climate and 
population/city settlement alongside both Rhine river’s banks, Cologne is a case study area that best 
fits the application of the methodology proposed in the chapter thesis. 
 
 
5.2 Fire Brigade: ERS for Simulation and Operationalisation Purposes 
“If a model simulates those aspects of interest to the degree necessary for the study at hand, 
the simulation is valid” [369]  
 
In the report published by the German Federal Highway Research Institute (Bundesanstalt für 
Straßenwesen), it is stated that between the years of 2016 and 2017, rescue vehicles were deployed 
16.4 million times. For approximately 99% of these times, the dispatched rescue vehicle was ground-
based, while only less than 1% of the deployments were air-based (helicopter) [370]. Specifically, for 
the fire brigades, the ratio between the usages of ground-based vehicles to air-based ones might even 
be higher.  
In regards to all ERS (fire brigades and emergency medical services – EMS), according to [370],” 
out of the approximately 13.9 million requests for assistance from the ERS received by emergency 
control centres throughout Germany, around 6.6 million (47.5%) relate to patient transportation. 
Approximately 2.6 million of these patient transportation requests are classified as requests that can 
be planned.” This outcome from the performance analysis of the German ERS services indicates that 
the pre-planning phase, i.e. preparedness phase, is of high priority. Furthermore, the speed and the 
time of response for assistance were important factors in the performance analysis.  
 
9 Colour classified from low to higher values for the years 1982 - 2012. Adopted from https://de.climate-data.org.  




Notably, in [370], it is also stated, “…the key measurement criterion in this regard, is the assistance 
period, i.e. the time from receipt of the report by the responsible control centre until the rescue facility 
arrives at the scene of the emergency. The assistance period is calculated based on the first suitable 
rescue facility that arrives at the scene of the emergency”. The outcome indicates that the timely 
arrival of the closest rescue facility to the emergency place is another critical factor that needs to be 
integrated into performance assessments through the RITAI and network analytics for citywide 
performance/serviceability analysis. The study also revealed that for Germany, an average assistance 
period is 9.0 minutes, with 95% of the emergencies being responded with a suitable rescue facility 
arriving on the scene within 17.7 minutes. 
Additionally, the arrival time of doctors through ground-based transportation is 13.9 minutes on 
average, with 95% of the emergency doctors arriving within 30.5 minutes. The performance analysis 
on the response times nationwide for Germany revealed that the assistance period had deteriorated 
again compared to the performance analyses for the years 2004/2005 [370]. Therefore, speed changes 
of assistance, i.e. response times of the ERS, are an essential factor that must be integrated into 
performance and ERR assessments to disasters (floods), proving the correctness of direction of the 
methodological approach suggested. Moreover, the analyses revealed that approximately 56% of road 
traffic accidents are in built-up areas.  
These numbers outweigh road traffic accidents occurring outside built-up areas stating that if the road 
category breaks down the locations, we can see that the highest number of road traffic accident 
victims by far is recorded on municipal roads in built-up areas, with 66 road traffic accident victims 
[370]. Therefore, ERR assessments must include factors leading to the deterioration of such statistics.  
From the performance analysis conducted, the safe driving mobility of the emergency responders is 
excluded, and statistics regarding rescue vehicle-related accidents or fatalities. The RITAI aims to fill 
this gap considering the critical factors for serviceability assessments of the ERS (mentioned earlier 
in section 3) under flooded conditions. 
In Germany (see Figure 19), the fire brigades, according to the German Firefighters Association 
(Deutscher Feuerwehrverband), are measuring up to 42,000 (forty-two thousand), and they consist of 
the official fire brigades (Berufsfeuerwehren) and the voluntary fire brigades (Freiwillige 
Feuerwhren). The number of professional fire brigades (Berufsfeuerwehren) is 105 (one-hundred and 
five) national, with the members of the official fire brigades counting up to approximately 32,000 










Figure 19: Total number of all types of fire brigades (above), of members of professional fire brigades (middle) 
and professional fire brigades (below), in Germany from 2000 to 2016 10 
 
 
10 Source: PLOS ONE. Adapted from - https://www.statista.com/statisticsSource: PLOS ONE. Adapted from - 




The official fire brigades are chosen since they often provide basic medical assistance (Figure ) in 
case they are the first to arrive at the scene of the accident, and in case of floods, they are the first to 
respond for relief and rescue. Therefore, emergency rescue operations in a timely manner under any 
weather condition are relevant for ERR assessments. In Figure 19, the numbers reveal the high 
demand for deployments of the fire brigades. 
 
 
Figure 19: Total number of fire brigade deployments limited to the emergency rescue and patient transport in 
Germany from 2000 to 2016 11 
 
Specifically, for Cologne, the annual number of incidents that demand deployments were 
approximately between 200,000 and 242,000 for the years 
▪ 2016 (1.1.2016 - 31.12.2016) 
▪ 2017 (1.1.2017 - 31.12.2017)  
▪ 2018 (1.1.2018 - 1.1.2019)  
The incident numbers are official annual incident counts retrieved from the Cologne fire brigade 
during the collaboration of the author with fire brigade officials of the area in the project CIRmin12, 
for analyses purposes conducted in the working package (WP) III - “Critical Infrastructure Resilience 
Analysis”. More results from quantitative approaches can be found in [78]. 
Emergency responses co-occur with crises when also flood events occur, resulting in a compound of 
hazard and crises events. As mentioned in the previous section, in Cologne and for July of 2017, the 
strongest storm of the last seventy-two years occurred, causing partially flooded roads causing traffic 
chaos and transportation congestion, resulting in significant delays and isolation of specific areas. 
The fire brigades are the first responders who are called to act promptly during and after EWE events, 
despite the intense efforts that are verified by the vast amounts of the annual incidents of the fire 
brigade of Cologne, which are analogous to the high density of the urban population and various 
interdependent CI.  
 
11 Source: PLOS ONE. Adapted from - https://www.statista.com/statistics. Accessed 04.2020. 




Additionally, more than 430 emergency personnel worked to repair the damage [371], which means 
that a high number of vehicles were deployed (rescue, damage and repair, civil protection). In 
Cologne, the fire brigade counted about 50 (fifty) operations until the morning of the next day - 
20.7.2017.  
Consequently, these rescue operations took place under EWE conditions. Therefore, timely ER 
provision under any weather condition (heavy rain, heatwave, snow) in a time-effective manner 
between specific time thresholds is of relevance and ERR assessments of the Cologne fire brigade 
system, in combination with its climate characteristics, displaying the significant climate change 
impact, is the best fit for a practical application of the RITAI. 
 
 
5.3 RITAI’s Benchmarking for Cologne’s Fire Brigades 
“We often fail to realize how little we know about a thing until we attempt to simulate it on 
a computer” [372] 
 
For the decision of the maximum allowed FD for safe driving of the fire trucks of Cologne’s fire 
brigades, several guided interviews with fire brigade officials have taken place. The information 
retrieved in regards to safe driving through flooded roads, according to vehicle capacity, is that 
Cologne’s fire brigades are equipped with rescue vehicles of varying heights and therefore, driving 
under flooded conditions is possible for FD between 0.118 m and 0.750 m. This information regarding 
the variation of heights of the fire trucks is also mentioned in an official fire brigade document, 
“Operations of the fire brigade and the Rescue service in flooded areas”.  Nevertheless, fire trucks 
with maximum FD driving ability up to 0.750 m are not available in all the fire brigade departments. 
Therefore, according to information extracted from the interviews and in combination with literature 
results (see section 4.1), the maximum height of safe FD for ER route planning chosen for applying 
the methodology is 0.5 m. The safe driving ability of rescue vehicles of lower heights through flooded 
road networks is also covered through the set of the suggested thresholds. The RITAI is benchmarked 
according to the hypotheses and the choice of thresholds (in section 4.1) for large-scale robustness, 
passive redundancy and resourcefulness assessments.  
Proceeding to the benchmark of the RITAI for further connectivity and accessibility assessments, 
with network analyses in GIS, official information retrieved from the fire brigade of Cologne, 
indicates the time threshold of 8 (eight) minutes as critical. The German ERS (fire brigades, 
ambulances) have laws around the different German states, which dictate in which timeframe - 
starting with receiving the message of the incident - first emergency response units of sufficient 
qualifications and numbers must arrive at the place of the incident [370, 373, 374]. Internationally, 
various fire brigade departments in different case study areas have set different time thresholds for 
emergency response according to the needs of the area they serve (see section accessibility). The 
response threshold of 8 (eight) minutes is used more commonly and widely, similar to Cologne’s fire 
brigades, for emergency response, routing plans and service area analyses based on this time 
threshold. Therefore, the specific time threshold is also used in this methodology as a maximum 
allowance for benchmarking and classifying time-dependent accessibility assessments and later the 
ERR to riverine floods and flash floods of Cologne.  
Beyond this threshold of 8 (eight) minutes, the resilience of the urban ER system to floods is 




the fire brigades to access several city units of the case study area. Cologne’s fire brigades use the 
time threshold of 8 minutes, but they also generate service areas of 10 minutes (a maximum ER 
response time) indicative of the service of coverage (SOC) of the fire brigades under normal 
conditions, i.e. before flood events. The SOC of the Cologne fire brigade system has been analysed 
under extreme flood conditions in [226], and results indicated that the positioning of the fire brigade 
departments is sufficient for timely ER served in 8 min. before and after extreme flood conditions. 
However, is this true? In this article, [226], the 𝐹𝐷𝑗 was not taken into consideration for ER route 
planning and NA analyses (service areas extraction). The 𝐹𝐷𝑗 and its potential impact (second-order 
risk) on the travel time was integrated with a probabilistic form by using scale cost barriers (flood 
polygon of extreme scenario, flood probability occurrence >500 years), adding probable delays. NA 
was performed using the impedance factor 3.0 for flooded roads, which integrates into the system 
significant probable delays; the travel time will take three times longer than expected. This impedance 
(travel cost) factor was used in the article due to a lack of data regarding FD. It first served to identify 
the exposure extent of the people and CI (focused on fire brigade departments, hospitals and road 
network) to flood risk and suggested the possibility of integration of travel time delays in ER route 
planning calculations. The destinations of the NA were the hospitals located in the flooded area, and 
the starting points were Cologne’s fire brigades. In section 7.4, there is a demonstration of results, 
aiming to underline the significance of the FD information on a large scale for NA and ER route 
planning (as suggested in this thesis) to tackle issues arising from a flood-impacted ER road network 
and quantifications of efficiencies of urban ER systems. 
 
 
6.  Application of the RITAI in GIS for Cologne’s Fire Brigades 
 “If you do not know enough about a system, a good way to find out more is to try to 
simulate it” [369] 
 
The difficulty of describing and predicting the complex dynamic systems’ behaviour with analytical 
approaches, especially for the large scale emergency simulation, which is an application domain of 
interactions between humans and their proximate environment [375], is recognized in the scientific 
community. To address such issues, the application of the methodology takes place in a GIS 
environment. The usefulness of GIS in emergency response purposes has been presented thoroughly 
in sections 3 and 5. In general, the use of GIS to apply the methodology aims to provide: 
▪ the ability of different ERS to process large amounts of data and 
▪ visualise the results for the phase of preparedness. As previously argued, pre-route planning 
with the flood-impacted response times (accessibility) is essential for timely ER provision 
considering safe driving mobility. 
 
The goal of the GIS-based methodological approach presented in Figure 13 is the application of 
geoinformatics in GIS, with the GIS-based operationalisation methodological workflow presented in 
section 4.2, including the development of a tool for GIS-based flood impact assessments of the ER 
road network, fuzzification and geovisualisation, for further adaptive flood-impacted ER route 




▪ delays and blockages, different levels of safe driving mobility and transformation of traffic 
characteristics caused by different levels of FDj 
▪ several flood scenarios of riverine flood and flash flood using frequent and extreme models 
of the probability of occurrence, for near real-world simulations of ER response 
▪ simple operation and interoperability of primary data (official and open-source),  
▪ simple representations of the results through geovisualisation and fuzzification processes,  
▪ calculation time as short as possible, given the resolution of the analysis.  
 
The suggested GIS-based, scenario-based and place-based operationalisation methodology is related 
to the scientific community, emergency -, urban- and flood risk management, fire brigades and 
safety/rescue services applicable for different scales and various case studies and networks. Besides, 
it is suggested that for ER purposes, GIS are suitable tools because they provide tools for network 
analyses (NA) for connectivity and accessibility assessments of the urban ER system, applying the 
graph theory on an urban ER road network and enable:  
▪ the production of semi-automated and automated tools (such as the GIS-Toolkit), adding value 
to the redundancies, the resourcefulness and rapidity of the urban ER system under research.  
▪ the fast applications of methodologies, as suggested in this thesis, 
▪ enable the easy adjustment of routing plans (for strengthened preparedness and enhanced 
response times) to case-specific flood scenarios and  
▪ the transferability of the methodology for different case study areas and analyses scales, 
without significant adjustments.  
 
 
6.1 Data Sources, Handling and Transformation for Interoperability 
Data gathering started with the enrolment of the author as a project researcher and lead of the Working 
Package III in the CIRmin project, after the establishment of good relations with different 
stakeholders, including fire brigades and civil protection authorities from various case study areas 
within Cologne.  
The combination of spatial and non-spatial information can lead to a holistic overview of the 
vulnerability, exposure, risk, and finally, resilience emergency response assessments of Cologne's 
urban, complex and dense road network, primarily based on the road network exposed to specific 
risks. In this study, different data sources have been used to develop the database of the ER road 
network and spatial resilience assessments of the urban ER system to riverine floods and flash floods. 
Specifically, open-source (OS) geodata are utilised from available online databases such as 
OpenStreetMap, provided and maintained by the community of Geofabrik13 under the Open Data 
Commons Database License (OdbL) and the city of Cologne14.  
The OS data, combined with data from different stakeholders such as the Cologne fire brigade and 
the Water Management Planning Department, from the Cologne Municipal Sewerage Company, AöR 
(STEB Köln), allow a comprehensive build-up of databases. 
 Therefore, the methodology is applied with additional data and information that local stakeholders 
use. The data used, their source, their type and the transformation for interoperability reasons are 
 
13 https://www.geofabrik.de/en/ Accessed 03.2020 




presented in Table 6. For example, the walking paths were deleted from the road network database 
since they are not used for ER purposes. 
 
Table 6: Data used for this study, source of data, type of data and transformation for further use in an ArcGIS 
environment 




Point shapefile - vector 







Line shapefile - vector 




▪ Retrieval of speed 
information according to 
road type from Cologne’s 
fire brigades and insert in 
database 
▪ Speeds calculation for 
every road and inserted -
Free Flow Speed (FFS) 
▪ Integration of the flood 
depth information 
Adjustment of FFS according to 
flood depth using the function 5 
Flash flood data STEB Köln 
Raster of 2x2 m 
resolution 
▪ Provided in raster form 
Probability of occurrence of 20 
years (T20) and 100 years 
(T100 - extreme scenario) 
Riverine data STEB Köln 
Raster of 2x2 m 
resolution 
▪ Provided in raster form 
Probability of occurrence of 10 
years (HQ10) and 500 years 




Polygon shapefile - 
vector 
Creation of a shapefile - 




own Point shapefile - vector 
Transformation of the tessels to 






6.2 Flood Models for Scenario-Based Operationalisation of the ERR 
From the probabilistic zonation of the online flood map and for further ERR assessments, focusing 
on the centre and the broader area of Cologne, additional data are used based on their flood zonation 
maps derived from freely available LIDAR data and provided by the city of Cologne. The Flood 
Directive 2007/60/EC [56] suggests the inclusion of floods with the following probabilities for 
integration into flood hazard maps and FRM approaches: 
▪ Low probability  
- Riverine flood: extreme event scenarios- HQ500 scenario, which corresponds to a 
statistical flood recurrence interval of more than 500 years, 
- Flash flood: extreme event scenario - T100 scenario, which corresponds to statistical 
flash flood recurrence interval of 100 years 
▪ Medium probability  
- Riverine flood: HQ100 scenario, which corresponds to a statistical flood recurrence 
interval of 100 years 
- Flash flood: T50 scenario, which corresponds to statistical flash flood recurrence 
interval of 50 years 
▪ High probability  
- Riverine flood: HQ10 scenario - more often scenarios corresponding to statistical 
flash flood recurrence interval of 20 years 
- Flash flood: T20 scenario, which corresponds to statistical flash flood recurrence 
interval of 20 years. 
 
The flood scenarios of riverine and flash flooding events chosen for simulation and operationalisation 
purposes are of different intensities. The intensity of the different scenarios is defined via physical 
parameters, i.e., the spatial extent of the flooded area, flood depth, flood duration or flow velocity. 
The intensity is usually related to defined discharge value with an associated return period (e.g. HQ 
10 - 10-year flood, T20 - 20-year flash flood) [376]. A typical and more realistic scenario can be 
characterised as a flood with a high probability of recurrence [377] with few years of probability of 
return from 10 to 20 years); that is, the phenomenon is observed to occur more often. Low-probability 
floods (occurring in return periods of 100 to >500 years) are characterised as extreme due to the 
intensity of the phenomenon followed by higher water depths, longer flood durations and larger flood 
extents with increased severity of consequences to the population and various CI. A common 
misunderstanding is that a 100-year flood is more likely to occur only once in 100 years. There is a 
63.4% chance of one or more 100-year floods occurring in any 100 years [376]. For example, on 
the Danube River at Passau, Germany, the actual intervals between 100-year floods from 1501 to 
2013 vary from 37 to 192 years [377]. There is an abundance of research focusing on the conduction 
of probabilistic flood models on an international and regional level. Nevertheless, in this study, the 
subject will not be discussed in detail. The magnification to the aforementioned specific information 
provided serves as a justification for integrating the extreme scenarios into emergency rescue 
planning. 
The scenarios are selected for ER simulating purposes according to their intensity. Frequent riverine 
and flash flood scenarios are most probable and closer to present reality. On the other hand, extreme 
ones can reveal probable flood risks and their impacts, which can be unknown when simulated. 
Modelling the potential impacts of the future, specifically with the increasing climate change that 




timely emergency response, enhancing the ERR. Furthermore, emergency managers can deal with 
five to six scenarios [378, 379]. The focus on one natural hazard makes the process even more easily 
understandable since the scenario can be considered one scenario but of highly varying intensities, 
allowing for comparative analyses. Scenarios, then, can be used for coping with highly varying 
situations [380]. Visualizing the different flood scenarios enables further collaboration of the different 
decision-makers, even if they are geographically dispersed [381].  
The selected food scenarios result from flood models used for Cologne, based on digital terrain 
models with a 2 x 2-meter grid based on a laser scan overflight in 2010 and existing water levels of 
the German Federal Institute of Hydrology (BfG), as of 2012.  
The water levels are from different return periods of riverine floods and flash floods of Cologne. The 
visualised flood maps were produced on behalf of the district government of Cologne as part of the 
implementation of the European Flood Risk Management Directive in 2013 [56]. The flood data were 
provided from the Cologne Municipal Sewerage Company, AöR (STEB Köln), by Mr Stephan 
Monreal, responsible for GIS applications and Mr Ingo Schwedorf responsible for Water 
Management Planning. Every model contains inherent uncertainties from the methodology extracted 
based on various precipitation databases. In Figure 20, the raster models of the flash floods with a 
probability of recurrence of flood in 20 years (T20 - typical scenario) and 100 years (T100 - extreme 
scenario) are visualised in GIS with the author’s created colour palette. 
 
   
Figure 20: Raster of the flash flood T20 (frequent scenario - left) and the flash flood T100 (extreme scenario-
right) - see enlarged in APPENDIX A 
 
 
Due to the high-resolution FD information, a colour palette creation with colours that could depict 




is created. In Figure 21, to the left, the raster of the frequent flash flood scenario T20 is a probabilistic 
flood scenario with 20-years of flood occurrence probability. To the right, the raster is an extreme 
probabilistic flash flood scenario with 100-years of flood occurrence probability.  
The riverine flood scenarios are represented in GIS and ArcMap 10.6.1 (Figure 21) by two models in 
raster forms. These rasters display the FDs for areas without technical flood protection at HQ10 
(Cologne gauge: maximum FD 9.85 m level, frequent/regular event) with a 10-year flood occurrence 
probability and one of a more than 500-year flood occurrence probability (HQ500) with maximum 
FD 12.75 m (Cologne gauge: 12.75 m level, extreme event).  
 
    
Figure 21: Raster of the riverine flood HQ10 (frequent scenario - left) and the HQ500 (extreme scenario-right) 
- see enlarged in APPENDIX A 
 
 
To the left, the raster of the frequent riverine flood scenario H10 is a probabilistic flood scenario with 
10-years of flood occurrence probability. To the right, the raster is an extreme probabilistic riverine 
flood scenario with > 500-years of flood occurrence probability.  
 
6.3 GIS-based ERR Operationalisation Framework for Cologne’s Fire Brigades 
6.3.1 Update of the OSM road network with official road type-dependent  
ERPS 
For implementing the methodology in GIS, the software ArcMap 10.6.1 and ArcGIS Pro 2.2.3 are 
used. The road network of Cologne downloaded from OSM is of an incomplete database and, 
therefore, can be characterised by low quality. Speed information is missing for most of the roads. 




regarding the ERPS used by the fire brigade of Cologne. Additionally, the maximum allowed driving 
speeds (FFS) used from the fire brigades for ER route planning have been provided by Dr Martin 
Wesolowski, a planner at the central fire brigade office of fire protection, the Department of 
Emergency Services and Civil Protection. The ERPS used so far for route planning via Excel files 
are presented in Table 7. The Cologne fire brigade carries out the emergency response plans according 
to the methodology of [382] and based on corresponding "own experienced" planning speeds 
(empirical data retrieved after driving in a typical day, from the morning until the afternoon). 
 
Table 7: The road type-dependent ER route planning speeds (ERPS) of Cologne’s fire brigades, Source: 
Cologne Fire Brigade  
ER Route Planning 
Speeds (ERPS) 
Km/h 
Passage road (2-Lane) 50.4 
Passage road (1-Lane) 45.9 
In-city connection road 45.9 
Residential street 34.7 
Motorway 85.5 
Federal highway 66.1 
National road 62.9 
District road 67.5 
 
Cologne’s road network segmentation into segments of 1 m enables the detailed analysis of the FFS 
changes and thus vulnerability, travel time reliability and risk-based road network and urban ER 
system resilience assessments in terms of accessibility. Accessibility assessments occur in ArcMap 
and accurately with a developed GIS-Toolkit presented in section 4.3 (see Figure 15). After the 
segmentation of the road network, each segment is assigned with the respective road-type dependent 
speed considering the segment’s length by i) adding a numeric field in the database and ii) calculating 
the speed for each segment. The calculations’ results from function 4 (the impedance of the network 
analysis) are performed later.  
 
 
6.3.2 Compartmentalisation & Hexagonal Matrixes 
 
“Design is the conscious and intuitive effort to impose a meaningful order. […] Our delight 
in the order we find in frost flowers on a windowpane, in the hexagonal perfection of a 
honeycomb, in leaves, or the architecture of a rose reflects man's preoccupation with a 
pattern” [383] 
 
The compartmentalisation of the area into city units enables detailed situational analysis of the service 




ERR to riverine floods and flash floods of Cologne. Detailed situational analysis, i.e. serviceability 
assessments, is achieved by the separate accessibility assessments of the different city units.  
NA performed for accessibility assessments patterns the ER capacity and efficiency of Cologne’s ER 
urban complex system under flood conditions. This patterning resulting from the tessellation, with its 
strengths and weaknesses as a method, offers a holistic overview of the ERR after implementing the 
suggested methodology.  
More specifically, in a GIS environment, compartmentalisation of the case study area is translated 
into tessellation, resulting in tiles/tessels of user-defined shapes (hexagonal, circular, and rectangular) 
and sizes (city units). Tessellation prepares data representations by creating partitions using one or 
more geometric shapes to fit each other without any overlap or gap on each side [384]. 
A tessellation is divided into two types: regular tessellation and irregular tessellation, based on the 
variation of the shapes and sizes. A regular tessellation is a tessellation that uses a uniform shape and 
size of a geometry cell, such as triangles, squares, and hexagons, to present data. Tessellation for 
observational purposes has been often applied to modelling, simulating, and even studying 
ecosystems. The geometry with the same pattern is an efficient way of surveying, sampling, and 
experimenting [385]. Tessellation is also useful for thematic mapping as it can represent different 
types of information and data within units of equal size and shape in an orderly and patterned way.  
Additional data can be spatially aggregated into the layer and readily normalised by the existing 
attributes, enabling secure handling of datasets, interoperability and transfer of analyses to different 
case study areas and resolution. For the implementation of the methodology, the regular hexagonal 
tesselation is chosen since the assessments of the ERR are based on static data. The representation of 
ERR through the proper size of tiles, which assists ERS officials with a more fundamental 
understanding of the resulting map, is also essential. Using ArcGIS, this polygon layer of tiles is 
extracted using the ¨Generate Tessellation¨ tool, which creates a grid of hexagons overlapping the 
study area. The aggregation of information into hexagons is supported in different spatial analysis 
studies [149, 385]. Hexagons are polygons with the highest symmetry and are the most circular of all 
regular polygons that tile the plane [386]. The fact that the horizontal, vertical and diagonal diametric 
lines of the hexagon are of the same length give the advantage for a uniform and complete coverage 
of the study area without gaps. The size of each tessellation feature is calculated by specifying a value 
to represent the area for each tile in square units or by determining a distance value. The distance is 
calculated as in Figure 22, where d is the value of the distance parameter.  
The tiles are generated in a custom area, preserving a projected coordinate system using the specified 










Figure 22: Distance measurement in hexagons, where d is the value of the distance parameter with the 
geometric centre (centroid) to the right 
 
 
Furthermore, hexagons are appropriate for the display of ER related information on various levels 
since they have the following advantages: 
▪ Hexagons reduce the sampling bias due to edge effects of the grid shape related to the low ratio 
of the perimeter to the area of the shape of the hexagon. It is observed that square cells are 
distracting, as opposed to hexagons, to map readers and thus make the determination and 
identification of the spatial pattern of a phenomenon [387] difficult.  
On the other hand, a circle has the lowest ratio but cannot tessellate to form a continuous grid. 
Hexagons are the most circular-shaped polygons (Figure 23) that can be tessellated to create an 




Figure 23: Circularity of hexagons 
 
 
▪ The circularity of a hexagon grid allows it to represent curves in the patterns of the analysed 
data in a natural way than square grids, which is necessary for the visualisation of the emergency 
routing paths with exact directions (connectivity and movement paths). NA analyses conducted 
in a later stage are extracting routing paths following the road network. Therefore, their natural, 
close to reality representation is necessary, and hexagons assist this visual representation due 






“From the basic circle and the hexagonal arrangement of a group of tangential circles of 
the same radius surrounding it, the three primary shapes emerge the triangle, the hexagon, 
and the square. These three shapes are explored in detail to reveal their inherent structure, 
subdivision, proportional ratios and interrelatedness. From this last, we can be called the 
‘sociability’ of the polygons ” [149, 386, 388] 
 
▪ The more similar to a circle the polygons of equal areas are, the closer to the centroid the points 
near the border are (especially points near the vertices). Therefore, due to the circularity of the 
hexagon, any point inside the hexagon is closer to the centroid of the hexagon than any given 
point in an equal-area square or triangle would be; this is due to the more acute angles of the 
square and triangle versus the hexagon. This attribute characterises the hexagonal tessellation 
as ideal for an accurate representation of the city units of the selected case study area used as 
destinations in the conducted NA analyses and for all the features/attributes classified in each 
hexagon (city unit).  
▪ Hexagons tend to break up the lines allowing more precise and easy visibility of the curvature 
of the patterns in the data. This break-off of artificial linear patterns also diminishes any 
orientation bias that can be perceived in fishnet grids. They are also ideal for analyses on large 
areas because a hexagon grid suffers less distortion due to the earth's curvature than the shape 
of a fishnet grid. This attribute makes them an ideal fit for the applied methodology since the 
hexagonal tiles represent groups of road networks and access paths and times.  
▪ According to [386, 389], hexagons have higher representational accuracy, and their boundaries 
are shared with six (6) neighbours rather than with four (4), as it would happen with squares, is 
making the process of finding neighbours more straightforward, avoiding the connectivity 
inefficiency of the rectangular grid. The edges, or the length of contact of a hexagon, are the 
same on every side. The centroid of each neighbour is equidistant, and because the distance 
between the centroids is the same in all six directions with hexagons if a distance band is used 
to find neighbours, more neighbours will be included in the calculations for each feature. 
Through NA, these attributes can assist ERS to identify accessible neighbours to inaccessible 
areas in an attempt for a time-efficient ER. Accessing a specific centroid (city unit/place of 
action) near an inaccessible one is still adequate for efficient ER due to the equidistance. On 
the other hand, if no neighbouring centroids are accessible, after various reasons of the blocked 
road network, i.e. hazard occurrence, accidents, destruction, then the awareness for alternative 
measures to be taken (air- and water-based emergency response), rises. Therefore, this is 
another way to assess the criticality of the respective city units, assigning and transferring the 
criticality level to the included and grouped geographically interdependent CI in the individual 
hexagons. 
▪ Hexagonal representation of data has been widely used for big data in the form of points. Points 
are also geotagged tweets after Hurricane Sandy [390] due to their secure handling of cell/tile 
size, allowing more natural cartographic representation of the different amount of data and the 
discern of contours even if negating the “smoothness” of non-smooth data [390].  
 
Hexagons have also been used in different games, such as the first German multi-player boarding 




Kosmos), which became famous out of the borders of Germany named the Settlers of Catan16. The 
players in the game represent settlers, establishing colonies on the island of Catan, composed of 
hexagonal tiles (hexes) of different land types, by building settlements, cities, and roads to connect 
them as they settle on the island. More recently, the gaming crowdsourcing platform Cerberus [391], 
used by the Dutch company BlackShore, generates maps of hexes on satellite images representing 
different characteristics of the population with the help of different gamers. The founder of 
“BlackShore”, Hans van’t Woud, in personal communication with the author, mentioned that the data 
were represented at first in square grids, but they have finally selected the hexagonal representation. 
More precisely, he mentioned, “…because we rely on public input in a game, we use hexagons, which 
are more interesting and 'fun' to interact with as being the units of analysis”. Going to the geospatial 
part, we do project the hexagons on the surface, drawing the map.  
However, my customers sometimes need more precision, and we do the mathematical trick here to 
combine three groups playing, each working on a 50% horizontal or vertical shifted grid, allowing 
us to triangulate results. Triple the effort, six times the resolution.” 
Hence, due to their morphologic features, hexagons allow the depiction of results, in great detail, of 
different sub-groups of a community, which are geographically dependent and spatially bind. The 
triangulation of the hexagons has been patented by the US and the Netherlands [392].  
This attribute of hexagons can be valuable for detailed social vulnerability assessments, civil 
protection purposes, prioritisation of ER, CIP purposes (grouping of various geographically 
interdependent CI), interdependency analyses between different CI and the urban communities, as 
explained in section 1 and section 2.  
 
“It is incorrect […] to think that maps […] prove the reality of the zoom effect: when one 
shifts from a map on a scale of 1 cm to 1 km or one from 1 cm to 10 km - the latter does not 
contain the same information as the former: it contains other information that might (or 
might not) coincide with what appears in the former” [393] 
 
The characteristic of the manageable configurable size of tiles allows for a zoom-in and zoom-out 
effect to different scale levels, but data loss must be considered when attempting this scale stretching.  
The effect can assist, for example, comparison analyses by implementing the same methodology 
(gradation of information from a large scale to a smaller scale - local to regional), as well as for 
addressing the potential effect of the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem, as it is discussed in detail in 
[394]. Additionally, the hexagonal grids quantise the plane with a minor average error and provide 
high angular resolution. They are also preferred by statisticians involved with developing survey 
sample designs and geostatistical methods [395]. Accordingly, a hexagonal tessellation has the 
following properties [396]:  
▪ Optimisation of space  
▪ Normalisation of link direction,  
▪ Normalisation of distances,  
▪ Reduction of overlapping,  
▪ Infinite tessellation and  
 






Configuration and transfer to different scales might be misleading or lead to data loss due to mistakes 
regarding false indexing of tiles representing the content information. Therefore, assigning a linear 
code or index to each tessel/city unit is often helpful. In [397], it is mentioned that the most valuable 
indexes are the hierarchical prefix codes. In these indexes, the cell is considered a specific resolution 
in a multi-resolution structure, and each digit in the index corresponds to a location at a single 
resolution relative to a hierarchical parent’s index. Such indexing defines both a locality-preserving 
overall ordering of the pixels and a pyramid data structure, enabling efficient hierarchical algorithms 
[397]. The hierarchical prefix location codes naturally encode precision and direction and provide an 
algorithm for generalising features through address truncation [398]. The Node-Gosper space-filling 
curve based on the Gosper fractal proposed from [399] in [400, 401] is used on hexagonal grids and 
row encoding illustration of the target region. 
The thesis suggests that such indexing could assist ERS and civil protection end-users keep their 
service area in a coded form, simplifying delegation of ER actions (humanitarian response regarding 
logistics and service, resources location-allocation - see sections 3.1, 3.4 and 5). This characteristic 
of hexagonal grids is another critical advantage verifying that their choice to represent the results in 
ERR matrixes is an optimal fit. In the methodology, the indexing of the grid cells is taking place in a 
GIS environment, and the tiles (city units) are indexed by their feature identification number (FID) 
in the database, assigned after the extraction of the hexagonal tessellation layer. 
In this thesis and operationalisation purposes, each city unit is given the size of 0.25 km2. The smaller 
the size of the city unit, the higher the increase of the processing time of the application of the 
methodology. Nevertheless, for an urban complex area, such as Cologne, the chosen size is 
appropriate for balancing between calculation times of the different data handling processes and tools. 
The specific format will also provide detailed information regarding risk assessments and ERR for 
the area of Cologne. Hexagonal tiles represent these city units of the case study area, and these tiles 
are represented by their geometric centres or else centroids, extracted in ArcMap with the tool “Find 
Centroids”, which extracts the geometric centre of each hexagonal tile. Cologne’s tessellation to city 
units and extraction of centroids is presented in Figure 25. Each centroid has its FID, assisting further 
to identification and calculation processes. The tessellation (compartmentalisation) of the case study 
area creates a detailed matrix for a later presentation of the operationalisation of ERR to different 
flooding events in the form of matrixes (see section 6.3.4). Additionally, the centroids will serve as 
destinations for the NA conducted at a later scale (see section 6.3.3), before and after the chosen flood 
events, towards operationalising the ERR in Cologne. The representation of an area by its geometric 
centre assists the deterioration of calculation times, weighting processes towards prioritisation of 
emergency response and can facilitate focused analyses such as exposure, vulnerability, risk, 






Figure 24: Cologne’s tesselation in hexagonal city units of 0.25 km2 (left) and transformation of the hexagons 




6.3.3 Network Analysis  
Network Analysis (NA) in ArcGIS is performed with the Network Analyst tool in ArcGIS Pro after 
the build of the network in ArcMap (transformation of the road network to a graph), with the tool 
“Build of Network” from the Network Analyst’s tools. Network analyst enables network-based 
(distance and time) spatial analyses, including routing, travel directions, closest facility, and service 
area analysis. ArcGIS Network Analyst is composed of an easily configurable environment, enabling 
users to dynamically parameterise the model’s realistic network conditions with U-turn (1800 
degrees), one-way road restrictions, speed limits, traffic conditions at different times of the day and 
height restrictions.  
The ArcGIS Network Analyst allows modelling for solving common network problems, such as 
finding the best route across a city, finding the closest emergency fire truck or facility, identifying a 
service area around a location, servicing a set of orders with a fleet of vehicles, or choosing the best 
facilities to be open or closed. For the NA conducted in this study and finding the shortest paths, 
Dijkstra’s algorithm is used. Dijkstra's algorithm is a graph search algorithm, which solves the single-
source shortest path problem [402] for a specified graph with nonnegative edge path costs, producing 
the shortest-path tree between one node and every other (see Figure 4).  
Therefore, the road network is a weighted graph where each road link/segment can be weighted with 
different costs. In this study, through the suggested RITAI, the travel time costs will be calculated 
according to travel time calculations in minutes (Travel Time Impedance/Cost) before and after flood 
events, which are distance-based costs due to the relation between the FFS and the length of each 
road segment (function 9). Furthermore, normalisation of the procedure occurs with the 




ER, for example, Travel Time calculation based on the length of road segments (function 4 - 
translated in graph-based calculations).  
Travel Time Impedance =  





    (9)  
 
Therefore, network connectivity is assessed with ArcGIS 10.6.1 after converting and checking the 
road network topologies, of the different flood scenarios, into a non-directed graph for turn-by-turn 
analysis (rebuild of the ER flood risk informative road network datasets). The overall method is 
presented in Figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 25: Operationalisation methodology of ERR to floods with a GIS-based upscaling spatial assessment 
workflow - see enlarged in APPENDIX A 
 
 
The black arrow in Figure 25 indicates the aggregation of information throughout the implementation 
of the methodology in the GIS environment. The performed NA for each selected flood scenario is 
based on these resulting flood-impacted ER road networks.  
They are the basis for searching the closest city units to Cologne’s fire brigades and calculating their 
routing paths, before and after each selected flood scenario, towards ERR assessment (RITAI). The 
routing calculations mentioned above conducted in this thesis consider the fire brigades as the 
origin/starting points translated in the GIS environment as “Facilities” and as “Incidents” the 
centroids of each city unit (tile) to which the closest fire brigade should respond.  
Routing calculations are performed with the use of the tool “Closest Facility”17. The tool provides a 
configurable algorithm through an interface enabling the set of the travel mode parameters. In general, 
 




a travel mode is a collection of network dataset settings defining actions allowed on the network and 
how these can be performed. Such data settings can be the assignment of edge weights, i.e. restrictions 
and impedances on which the analysis is based, U-turn licencing (allowing the 1800 degrees of a turn 
of a vehicle to different cases, i.e. as dead-ends and intersections) and hierarchies (use of the longer 
roads instead of smaller ones) taking place. The travel mode is presented in Figure 26. Each travel 
mode before and after each flood scenario is configured for emergency response routing calculations 
and takes into consideration the following: 
▪ cost of the travel time taken for each fire brigade (facility) to travel each road segment till the 
destination point (incident) - avoiding routes passing through highly flooded road segments 
and choosing optimal routes for a timely enhanced response. 
▪ the U-turns under specific conditions - fire trucks cannot perform U-turns throughout the 
entire road network in the urban area of Cologne, which can result in traffic congestion of 
even accidents  
▪ the restriction of the one-way roads - avoidance of one-way streets for routing calculations 
can save a substantial amount of time.  
 
 
Figure 26: Configuration of the Closest Facility algorithm for emergency routing calculations. Facilities 
(left): Cologne’s fire brigades and Incidents (right): centroids of city units 
 
 
The results of the performed algorithm can also serve as a detailed indirect SOC analysis of the area 
of each fire department of Cologne due to the particularity and locality of the updated ER road 
network datasets, that is, digitised graphical networks (see section 7.4). Each fire brigade is provided 
with different routing paths, with exact drive time and length, to the closest locations before a flood 
event and under flood conditions. The routes extracted can indicate the flood-impacted serviceability 
of each fire brigade in Cologne, assessed with the different selected flood models.  
With the geovisualisation techniques of classification, this information provides aggregated 
information on Cologne's entire ER road network.  
Furthermore, the suggested methodology in the thesis aims to provide a holistic overview of the 
accessibility coverage of the case study area on a city scale, reflecting on the active redundancy of 
Cologne’s fire brigades and the rapidity of the response of each fire brigade and the resulting pre-




official fire brigade time thresholds of eight minutes. Additionally, since each route is the total 
response time from the closest fire brigade to the respective city unit (centroid), each centroid 
(incident) is weighted by it, serving as a basis for further comparative accessibility analyses (ERR 
assessments to floods), visualised in hexagonal ERR matrixes (see section 7.5).  
 
 
6.3.4 Emergency Response Resilience (ERR) to Floods for Cologne’s Fire    
    Brigades 
Following the suggested methodology, the scope provides ERR matrixes through the RITAI, the risk-
based and time-dependent indicator of accessibility towards ERR to riverine floods and flash floods. 
As previously discussed, each destination is weighted with the total time of response. In this thesis, 
and for each selected scenario, the destinations are weighted accordingly. The ERR of each city unit, 
represented from the destinations (incidents/centroids), is calculated with function 1, i.e. the NA is 
performed before and after a flood scenario, using the updated road networks, where each incident is 
assigned an individual ID (identity number), named IncidentID, assisting identification and 
calculation processes. As explained in Figure 26, before any flood scenario, the updated road network 
used is the one updated with the FFS of ER used by Cologne’s fire brigades and after each flood 
scenario, the NAs performed are based on the updated road networks with the new FFS impacted 
from the FD. The shortest paths are searched and found from the fire brigades to the respective closest 
city units, and each city unit (incident) is weighted with the total accessibility (response time) before 
flood (𝐴𝐵𝐹) and accessibility after flood (𝐴𝐴𝐹).  
ERR (function 1) is then calculated by subtracting from the total accessibility time, calculated after a 
flood scenario, the accessibility time calculated before any flood scenario for each city unit. As a last 
step, the risk-based time-dependent accessibility times (response times) are presented as classified in 
ERR hexagonal matrixes of the area of Cologne, forming classified beehives of city units created in 
ArcMap 10.6.1. The process of data handling and visualisation in matrixes followed in the GIS 
environment is presented in Figure 27.  
 
 
Figure 27: ERR hexagonal spatial matrixes - weighting of each city unit of Cologne with ERR to riverine 





By presenting the results of the RITAI, the ERS can assess their ER serviceability, dependent on their 
rescue vehicle capacity and the road network’s mobility capacity for safe driving under flooded 
conditions. For example, under specific flood conditions, some of the emergency rescue services can 
no longer be available, thus blocked, due to the spatially related unavailable road network (flooded 
with 𝐹𝐷𝑗 > 0.5 m) or their physical exposure to flood. Furthermore, the hexagonal matrixes provide 
aggregated information from the scale of the road segment to the city unit. Flood impacts on a road 
segment level are depicted on a city unit and city level through the hexagonal matrixes. The 
quantification of ERR is conducted, as presented in Figure 25, and the results from the calculations 
take place in each geodatabase.  
Each city unit (hexagon) is assigned with the calculation results from function 1 and is classified 
accordingly in different colours for a quicker derivation of situational assessments for ER purposes 
(preparedness, ER route planning, prioritization planning, location-allocation humanitarian assistance 
planning after different types of floods). The ERR is quantified and classified, as presented in Table 
8. ER for Cologne has a time threshold of 8 minutes, as mentioned in section 5.2. Since each ER 
minute is valuable, specifically in a complex urban environment such as Cologne, the classification 
considers the increase of accessibility in minutes, where each minute increase indicates the ERR 
deficiency. 
 









7. Results and Discussions 
This section consists of presentations and discussions of the results answering the RQs, which form 
the spine of the thesis. The following is a general overview of the main issues covered throughout the 
thesis, along with the respective RQs:  
 
RQ1 
How can urban emergency response resilience (ERR) to riverine floods and flash floods be 
conceptualised towards operationalisation using graph and CAS theory? 
RQ2 What is an urban ER system, and how does CAS theory identify its operational properties?          
RQ3 
How can the urban ERR of a fire brigade system, to riverine floods and flash floods, be 
operationalised, considering interdependent cascading and emerging risks on several scales, 
with GIS? 
RQ4 
How can spatial assessments be utilised to operationalise the robustness, redundancy, 
resourcefulness, and rapidity of ERR on several scales? 
Accessibility Time Increase 
(in minutes) 
Resilience level Colour of classification after BBK 
(risk matrix) as in [403] 
0 Highly Resilient  
>= 1 Resilient  
1 >= 2 Medium  




RQ5 How can large-scale exposure, vulnerability and risk be assessed with applied 
geoinformatics, GIS tools and graph theory? 
RQ6 How GIS and network science enable identifying system-wide connectivity on various 
scales and levels, enabling citywide accessibility performance analysis with accessibility 
patterns and ER route pre-planning? 
RQ7 How can GIS, graph theory, network science, fuzzification, geovisualisation and resilience 
matrixes accelerate the processes, raise awareness and form a basis for further collaboration 
between civil protection, CI operators and emergency managers? 
 
This thesis's main objective is to develop a concept to apply resilience for urban ERR to floods and, 
secondly, to apply it in a case study (Cologne) for a specific emergency rescue service (fire brigade 
system). The first part of the thesis is devoted to conceptual development and the discussions of the 
concept. The conceptual development and the discussions regarding the ERR concept, its definition 
and features, are examined in sections 2 and 3. They are also covered briefly below to highlight the 
main contributions of the several theories to the concept towards its operationalisation. Specifically, 
in section 1 of the thesis, there is an introduction of identified problems related to the issue risen from 
climate change, which increases the intensity and frequency of the EWE, causing an increase in the 
intensity and frequency of floods.  
Due to the increasing flood events, the section demonstrates the identified need, from the international 
DRR frameworks (i.e. SFDRR) for adaptive management, addressing risk explicitly, with a deepened 
understanding of their impacts on a range of scales, to inform the decision-making, for a strengthened 
preparedness for response. Emergency response in complex industrialised countries of high densities 
of population and clustering of interdependent critical infrastructures, such as Germany, is challenged 
by degradation occurring from the increased flood impacts.  
Therefore, to answer the first part of the RQ1, in regards to the conceptualisation and utilisation of 
graph and CAS theory, this thesis proposes that the concept of CAS, as applied to DRM/FRM 
approaches for the mitigation of the impacts to the population and the critical infrastructures, assist 
with their advancement, away from their silo-thinking character.  
The main strategic goal of emergency management, i.e. the timely ER provision for enhancing the 
population's safety, is advanced with integrative and adaptive management strategies applied with 
geoinformatics, aiming to identify and integrate the interdependencies between complex adaptive 
systems (CAS). Such systems are considered the urban ER systems, as presented in the next section. 
Therefore, it is suggested that such strategies should at first identify and address emergent risks 
occurring from a wide range of flood types and intensities spatially. Secondly, they should integrate 
safety aspects of the emergency responders, which are interdependent with the security aspects of the 
CI that they operate, the road network, and the rescue buildings and equipment, providing the means 
for resilience-based decision making aiming to enhance the safety of the population.  
In order to answer the RQ1 completely, the RQ2 needs to be answered. Section 2 demonstrates 
the conceptualisation of the ER system of an urban area, introduced as a SoS, using CAS and graph 
theory. It specifically demonstrates how graph theory assists with the untangling of the complexity 
of a SoS and how CAS theory assists with identifying its operational properties for integration in 
DRR towards its resilience. After identifying its operational properties, CAS theory enabled 




approaches. Additionally, CAS thinking in the conceptualisation of the urban ER system enables 
applying the model in the resilience concept and is suggested in the thesis that it is crucial for in-
depth resilience assessments, specifically in complex urban environments. 
Furthermore, combined CAS and graph theory are valuable in untangling the complexity of urban 
SoS with CAS properties (urban ER system) by identifying the road network as the higher in the 
systems’ hierarchy.  
Therefore, it is suggested in this thesis that it is reasonable to initiate resilience assessments from a 
road network level. The resilience concept to hazards such as floods, as applied to an urban ER 
system, is, therefore, as presented in section 2, characterised by the undisrupted timely ER provision 
and is conceptualised with a combination of graph theory and CAS thinking. The goal is to include 
the whole range of cascading risks in the resilience assessments, occurring in several levels and scales 
of the system, also the emerging risks to a technical and operational level, as well as to its 
environment, i.e. city, for a deepened understanding of the climate change impacts.  
For this reason, and for answering the second part of the RQ1 regarding the operationalisation, the 
ERR concept is introduced and defined, while the 4R resilience model (robustness, redundancy, 
resourcefulness, rapidity of response) is adopted for framing its features, operationally reflecting the 
flood impacts and their cascading risks to the entire urban ER system. It is suggested in section 2 that 
strengthened preparedness for ER, in the era of increased frequency of EWEs, is achieved with 
connectivity analysis of the urban ER road network, adaptive ER route plans and flood risk-based, 
place-based and time-dependent accessibility assessments. Furthermore, this thesis argues that the 
flood impacts can be further assessed with large-scale spatial assessments. The results depict the 
absorption and adaption for transformation capacities of the systems, reflected in the robustness and 
redundancy features of the overall SoS. The levels of these capacities affect the levels of risk 
regarding the degradation of the system's functionality reflected in the resourcefulness of the system 
for timely ER provision. Resourcefulness is, therefore, associated with the travel time reliability of 
the ER road network of an urban ER system, dependent on the absorption capacity levels of the system 
and its adaptation and transformation capacity towards reliability (undisrupted ER provision).  
After identification of the operational properties of the urban ER system, as presented above, its 
resilience properties/features to EWE-triggered events (floods) is linked with risk identifiers after 
definition and characterisation through its 4R properties, the RQ3, RQ4, RQ5, RQ6 and RQ7 are 
answered, through the operationalisation methodological framework. As suggested in this thesis, 
the identifiers of flood risk towards enhancing resilience can be assessed with applied geoinformatics 
in GIS (RQ3). 
In combination with the graph theory and network science, these flood risk identifiers can be utilised 
to operationalise the 4R features of ERR to riverine floods and flash floods, enabling the 
operationalisation of the concept applied to an urban ER system. In section 3, the multi-criteria 
indicator (resilient system), i.e. the risk-time-dependent accessibility indicator (RITAI), is 
conceptually introduced, reflecting on the rapidity of the response feature of ERR. The RITAI 
suggests the operationalisation of each of the 4R features of ERR, in different scales, with a 
combination of a top-down methodological approach and bottom-up scaling spatial assessments, 
conducted with GIS and assisted with CAS thinking, resulting in informative resilience matrixes. 
With the bottom-up scaling spatial assessment, the scenario-based resilience analysis suggested in 
this thesis (Figure 10) aims to provide insights into CAS engineering towards resilient ER. The goal 
is to enhance the safety of the population while also considering the safety of the emergency 




floods and flash floods. It is therefore demonstrated in the thesis that preparedness for response is 
strengthened and advanced with large-scale spatial exposure assessments reflecting on the robustness 
of the system (see section 3.1), after segmentation of the road network, on the road segment level 
(scale of first analyses) and to the entire road network and the entire urban ER system (see section 4). 
According to exposure levels, the safe driving mobility disruptions are assessed on the scale of 
analysis, considering changes in the FFS (see section 3.2 and section 4), reflected on the redundancy 
of the ER road network and on the travel time (see section 3.3), reflected on the resourcefulness of 
the ER road network. The latter is the flood risk identifier for degradation of the functionality of 
timely ER provision, as mentioned above.  
This risk, identified on a road segment level, affects the connectivity of the entire road network and 
the urban ER system (zoom-in and zoom-out ability of the methodological approach) and is integrated 
into further risk-based and time-dependent accessibility assessments reflected on the rapidity of 
response feature of ERR. The procedure enables the operationalisation of the ERR after untangling 
the complexity of the urban ER system while it considers its complex environment (city). 
Respectively, and when answering the RQ4, the RITAI (see Table 3 in section 4) is designed so to 
address the urban complexity and the impact that can have on the levels of ERR with the 
compartmentalisation of each under research case study area into city units, forming polygon (of 
choice) matrixes. Hence, the thesis proposes that CAS thinking is integrated into the resilience 
assessment process, with the segmentation of the CI networks and the systems, which form risk 
informative matrixes. These matrixes further enable the gradation of information provided from a 
local level (large-scale) to a regional (small-scale), giving a detailed overview of the impact of the 
stressor on the urban ER system. The RITAI is developed to assess the citywide ERR to floods based 
on the functionalities of the networks of the urban ER system. Specifically, the citywide ERR 
assessment combines changes in the system on a micro-scale and their impacts on a macro-level. 
After identification of the need for:  
▪ large-scale urban robustness assessments conducted with exposure assessments on a road 
segment scale, reflecting the safe drivability according to FD levels (section 3.1), 
▪ large-scale redundancy assessments conducted with FFS assessments on a road segment level 
reflecting the RNMC of the ER road network according to FD levels (section 3.2), 
▪ large-scale resourcefulness assessments conducted with travel time assessments, reflecting the 
UFTTR (i.e. risk) of the ER road network, according to FD levels (section 3.3) 
▪ city-scale rapidity of response assessments conducted with risk-based and time-dependent 
accessibility assessments, reflecting the citywide ER efficiency under flooded conditions 
(section 3.4)  
the RITAI is assessed with selected flood scenarios of two different types of floods (riverine and flash 
floods) and two different intensities (regular and extreme scenarios) in the case of Cologne and the 
fire brigade system (see section 5). A limitation of the suggested indicator is that it conveys the 
probabilistic uncertainties of the selected flood models (see Figure 20 and Figure 21). Therefore, the 
results will depend on the quality and resolution of the flood probabilistic models. Nevertheless, the 
RITAI, through the suggested methodology, in section 4 (see Figure 11), aims to provide the 
resources, adding redundancies for an integrative and adaptive ERR management for comparative 
evaluations of cross-system alternatives designed to enhance the ability of the urban ER system to:  
▪ plan for various intensities of flood events,  
▪ absorb the stress technically and operationally  
▪ transform so to recover rapidly 





Hence, the urban ER system is advanced by implementing the RITAI that results in those mentioned 
above. The RITAI is implemented utilising geoinformatics in an operationalisation methodological 
framework conceptualised in section 4, with a GIS-based methodological workflow. Further, the GIS-
based operationalisation approach provides additional resources and redundancies for enhanced ERR 
to riverine floods and flash floods, through 
▪ the fast applications of methodologies, 
▪ the easy adjustment of routing plans (for strengthened preparedness and enhanced response 
times) to case-specific flood scenarios and  
▪ the transferability of the methodology for different case study areas and analyses scales, 
without significant adjustments. 
 
The methodological workflow for quantitative assessment of ERR (Figure 13) aims to provide, for 
selected flood scenarios, risk-informed road network databases that will enable information 
aggregation from a road segment scale to the entire network. For this reason, and to answer the RQ5, 
in section 4.2, the GIS-based methodological framework and the developed GIS-Toolkit in section 
4.3 is introduced. The GIS-Toolkit, in a semi-automatic way, conducts exposure assessments of an 
urban ER system, integrating, after segmentation of the entire ER road network, to one-meter 
segments, the FD information retrieved from a raster file and integrated into a line vector shapefile. 
The development of a tool for GIS-based flood impact assessments of the ER road network for further 
adaptive flood-impacted ER route planning purposes is designed for  
▪ calculating the delays and blockages, the different levels of safe driving mobility  
▪ the transformation of traffic characteristics, caused by different levels of FDj  
▪ easy implementation using several flood scenarios of riverine flood and flash flood (frequent 
and extreme) models of the probability of occurrence, for near real-world simulations of ER 
response 
▪ simple operation and interoperability of primary data (official and open-source),  
▪ simple representations of the results through geovisualisation and fuzzification processes,  
▪ calculation time as short as possible, given the resolution of the analysis.  
 
For the implementation of the RITAI and operationalisation of the 4R features of ERR, the 
benchmarking of the indicator is proposed for near-real life simulations with GIS, in regards to 
accessibility assessments, considering the safety of the emergency responders through the security of 
the emergency vehicles, when operating under flooded conditions. According to FD and for further 
flood impact assessments on the traffic characteristic of the road network, the road-type dependent 
FFS of each road segment is recalculated, according to the RITAI and the PR function 5, reflecting 
the absorption capacity of the ER road network to the selected flood, revealing its robustness levels. 
For the assignment of each flood-impacted FFS, in the road segments, the Kj function 6 is suggested, 
which, after benchmarking, considers the safe driving of rescue vehicles up to 0.5 m, but with a 
reduction of speed to walking speed for flooded roads for FD between 0.3 m and 0.5 m.  
The Kj function, in the GIS-Toolkit programmed in VB language, assigns according to the FD, the 
adapted FFS, transforming each road segment, fostering the transformation of the entire ER road 
network and urban ER system towards enhanced rapidity of response (timely ER/accessibility). The 




large-scale TTR analysis. To identify the flood impact (changes in the FFS and the travel times), 
function 7 and function 8 are applied accordingly. Furthermore, when implemented, these functions 
allow for redundancy and resourcefulness assessments on a road segment level, which with 
geovisualisation techniques, are aggregated to the entire road network.  
The operationalisation methodological framework (Figure 25), according to the GIS-based 
methodological workflow (Figure 13), suggests the connectivity analysis of the selected fire brigade 
system for further accessibility assessments and citywide ERR operationalisation on the city unit 
scale (RQ6). These assessments result in risk-based time-dependent accessibility assessments of the 
Cologne fire brigade system, which is compartmentalised to city units of 0.25 km2, for a holistic 
overview of the fire brigade system ERR levels to each of the selected flood scenarios. As presented 
in section 6, graph theory and network science allow for connectivity network analysis amongst the 
various networks of a SoS. As presented in section 2.3, GIS provide the tools for such analyses, which 
are proven essential for a strengthened preparedness phase towards ERR to floods. GIS are ideal for 
the operational/response phase, specifically for service analyses (network analyses) in the face of a 
flood. Service analyses, conducted with NA, result in flood-impacted service ranges of the emergency 
response for each of the fire brigade stations, with identification of the fastest routing paths, i.e. 
identification of the least-cost paths (in regards to distance or time), to the incident area (city unit), 
based on flood-risk informed road networks (section 4.2 - Figure 15). 
These networks serve as the basis for searching and finding the closest city units to Cologne’s fire 
brigades and calculating their routing paths, before and after (input) each selected flood scenario, 
towards citywide ERR assessments (RITAI). Rebuild of the ER road network is performed after 
implementation of the “Network Builder”, which is rebuilding each ER road network database, 
providing connections through the road network between the fire brigade stations and the centroids 
of each city unit, according to the travel time impedance (see function 4 - risk reflected on the ER 
road network’s TTR). Moreover, the routing calculations as mentioned earlier conducted in this thesis 
consider the fire brigades as the origin/starting points, translated in the GIS environment as 
“Facilities” and the centroids of each city unit (Figure 25) as “Incident”, to which the closest fire 
brigade should respond. 
As mentioned in section 6.3.1, routing calculations are performed with the use of the tool “Closest 
Facility”, which offers the configuration of the travel mode used, simulating the travel of a rescue 
vehicle (fire truck) with the following restrictions: 
▪ avoiding routes passing through highly flooded road segments by choosing optimal routes for 
a timely enhanced response,  
▪ restricting the U-turns throughout the entire road network in the urban area of Cologne 
avoiding the probability to cause traffic chaos or even accidents - due to the size of the fire 
trucks in an urban area, U-turns might also not be possible in most of the cases,  
▪ avoiding the one-way streets for routing calculations saving a substantial amount of time 
(consideration of travel time impedance).  
Thereby, each centroid is weighted with accessibility/response times. The path resulting from the 
weighted graphs of the ER road networks (flood-risk informative databases with information on 
flood-impacted travel times) leads to the weighted ERR hexagonal matrixes, as described in section 
6.3.4. Resilience-based informative matrixes regarding the citywide flood-impacted ER efficiency of 
the Cologne fire brigade system result after implementing function 1 (see section 4) to each hexagonal 




Moreover, when answering the RQ7, the thesis suggests aggregation of information methods for 
advanced analyses with geovisualisation techniques suggested in the GIS-based methodological 
framework. The goal is the deepened understanding of the flood impacts at a range of flood types and 
intensities and the escalation of the intensities to identify global/overall interactions among the several 
sub-systems. These escalations of floods from regular to extreme, which are under-researched Grey 
Rhino scenarios, need further addressing, and for this reason, in this thesis, they are addressed with 
flood impact curves and statistics. In case of compound and/or escalating flood events, the flood 
impact curves provide information regarding the ER road network’s robustness, redundancy, and 
resourcefulness “stretched” to its maximum, therefore testing its flexibility. These techniques in a 
GIS environment represent complex information regarding each cell of the spatial matrix (city unit) 
of the compartmentalised case study area. Therefore, the complex information becomes effortless and 
manageable for a more fundamental understanding and overview of cascading risks that could occur 
on a local and regional level. 
The information enables the large-scale resilience/vulnerability/reliability assessments for integrative 
emergency management and decision-making of different end-users, as suggested from the RITAI, 
enhancing the redundancy and resourcefulness of the urban ER system towards consequent 
enhancement of resilience. End-users can be emergency rescue planners, traffic planners, urban 
planners, and energy providers (e.g., electricity, water, gas). The simplification of information, which 
was discussed throughout the thesis and specifically and further throughout this section, is critical for 
the several officials since they must deal with emergencies, which need a proper preparation phase 
through situational analysis of complex environments and a time-efficient response for enhanced 
recovery times. This need is also identified through the qualitative assessment with interviews 
conducted with European scientists and emergency response, and civil protection officials (see 
section 7.4.1). 
As mentioned earlier, the main objective of this thesis is to develop a concept to apply resilience for 
urban ERR and, secondly, to apply it in an urban case study (Cologne) for a specific emergency rescue 
service (fire brigade system). The development and discussion of the concept are treated in sections 
2 and 3 and are outlined in the text above, recalling the contributions of the theories throughout the 
following sections.  
Therefore, it follows the logical concept as displayed in Figure 28; addressing the components of the 
ERR; that is, robustness in section 7.1, redundancy in section 7.2, resourcefulness in section 7.3 and 
rapidity of response in section 7.4, summarising the classified outcomes in ERR spatial matrixes as 
presented in section 7.5. The results from the GIS-based upscaling (bottom-up) operationalisation 
methodology are discussed in detail in the following sections.  
The results are a detailed presentation of each methodological step and present the aggregation of 
information from a large scale to a smaller scale, identifying the risk in a SoS with CAS properties 
demands (see section 2). The multi-scale and multi-level identification of flood risks in a SoS with 
CAS properties such as the suggested urban ER system results from applying suggested 
geovisualisation techniques and the flood impact curves (upscaling method); a deepened 





Figure 28: The Emergency Response Resilience (ERR) concept in abstraction with related sections (S) and 
research questions (RQ) 
 
 
7.1 Robustness Under Flood Conditions 
The operationalisation of the suggested ERR (Figure 10 and Figure 11) (also presented in previous 
sections) is conducted with the GIS-Toolkit (Figure 14), and the first step is spatial exposure 
assessments of the ER road network to the different flood scenarios selected for Cologne. Exposure 
of the ER road network to the floods reflects the robustness of the ER road network, serving as the 
basis for the next operationalisation steps (see Table 9).  
 
Table 9: Large-scale robustness operationalisation for the ERR of Cologne’s fire brigade system, to floods 

















exposure to the 
hazard  




▪ Exposure assessment of the entire ER 
road network and ERS buildings through 
FD information (per scale of analysis - 1m 
road segments) 
▪ Definition of critical thresholds 
(critical FD) 
▪ Geovisualisation of information, 
after classification, on 
the entire road network 
▪ Flood intensity impact curves of 
the whole network and analysis 
after fuzzification regarding the safe 





The GIS-Toolkit enables the high-resolution exposure assessments of the ER road network and the 
ERS buildings. In this way, the exposure of the urban ER system is spatially analysed on a large scale 
after each of the selected flood scenarios. Therefore, the large-scale spatial extent of the flood 
scenarios is modelled with the assignment of FDj values (on the scale of analysis) in the road network 
database after each selected flood scenario and after normalisation of the ER road network 
(segmentation of the ER road network to one-meter segments). The exposure assessment of the urban 
ER system to floods is enriched with flood impact curves reflected on the robustness levels, indicative 
of its absorption capacity in case of compound riverine and flash flood events. The results from the 
operationalisation methodology of the urban ER system’s robustness to floods focuses on the 
normalised large-scale assessments of the ER road network due to the identified hierarchy, which 
places it first, and the need for a bottom-up scaling approach for a deepened understanding of the 




Figure 29: GIS-based upscaling operationalisation process of the robustness of Cologne’s fire brigade system, 
dependent on the absorption capacity of the ER road network  
 
 
The results from the exposure assessment of the road network to the riverine floods of HQ10 and 
HQ500 are geovisualised and presented in maps after classification according to the identified critical 
FD for safe driving mobility (see Figure 30). The incorporated information on FDj in the ER road 
network databases enables the classification for visualisation and aggregation of information from a 
road segment level to the level of the entire road network. These classifications enable further 
analyses from a CIP lens of the citywide ERR to enhance the population's safety. The maps are created 
in ArcMap10.6.1 and provide a detailed and high-resolution understanding of the robustness of the 
ER road network for ER purposes (route planning and timely ER provision) and the ERS system of 





   
Figure 30: Geolocated exposure of the ER road network to the HQ10 (left) and the HQ500 (right) with 
classified FD considering the safe driving mobility of the fire trucks (see enlarged in APPENDIX B) 
 
 
The flood depth levels per road segments (FDj) are classified considering the safety of the population 
(timely ER provision with a potential extension of connectivity) and the safe driving mobility under 
flooded waters of the emergency responders, according to rescue vehicle capacity, integrating the 
safety lens perspective into the ERR assessment. When aiming to answer the RQ7, the road segments' 
classification indicates the spatial exposure of the urban ER road network, in kilometres, with 
information on the total value of exposed road segments. Additionally, the road segments exposed to 
0 m of FD are characterised as robust to the respective riverine flood. They are categorised to FD 
class 1. That is, the exposure to 0 meters of FD has a positive effect on the robustness of the ER road 
network and the fire brigades due to their tight interdependency (physical and geographical). After 
fuzzification, according to Table 4, the flood impact analysis follows. Robust ER road segments are 
assigned the fuzzy variable drivable as planned for a more straightforward interpretation of the 
results since the analysis is conducted with official ERPS from the fire brigade of Cologne, used for 
ER route planning. The ER road segments exposed to [0.01, 0.3) m, according to the methodology, 
are assigned to the FD class 2 and allow for safe driving of the rescue vehicles with expected 
insignificant delays to the ER provision. Therefore they are assigned the fuzzy variable drivable. The 
expansion of the absorption capacity of the urban ER system of the fire brigades is achieved with the 
consideration of the ER road segments, exposed to the FD class 3 of [0.3, 0.5) m, as medium drivable. 
Medium drivable characterise the ER road segments that remain drivable, but they are expected to 
cause significant delays if used for ER provision purposes. This expansion of the absorption capacity 






Furthermore, the ER road segments exposed to FD≥ 0.5 m (0.5 m to FDmaximum m) are considered 
blocked/not robust since they block the ER provision and ara assigned to the FD class 4. The total 
amount of the road segments is indicative of the levels of the robustness of different levels of the 
entire road network, which is expected to analogously affect the robustness of the fire brigade system, 
causing a deep low in the different flood impact curves. The flood impact curves for each of the 
riverine flood intensities (HQ10 and HQ500) depicts the absorption capacity of the entire ER road 
network of Cologne for timely ER. Specifically, in Figure 31, there are flood impact curves on the 
safe drivability levels of the ER road network. Safe drivability information is classified per FD class, 
according to the benchmarking process of the RITAI, which considers the safe drivability of the fire 
trucks under flood conditions, while it also considers the safety of the population with timely ER. 
Safe drivability and aggregated exposure assessments from a road segment to a road network level 






Figure 31: Safe drivability levels of the ER road network per FD exposure class in case of a HQ10 (above) and 
a HQ500 (below) 
 
Each probabilistic model of the riverine flood (in GIS - raster data) has a different maximum FD. For 
the riverine flood of HQ10 (regular scenario), the ER road network is exposed to FDmaximum, up to 
6.65 meters and for the riverine flood of HQ500 (extreme scenario), 9.92 meters. The intensities of 
the two selected riverine floods are reflected in their maximum value of FD that represents two 
different flood states that the urban ER system needs to absorb.  
In Figure 32, the length of the road segments is summarised in kilometres, with calculations made 
with summarisation tools of ArcMap in each flood risk-informed road network database resulting 





























HQ10-impacted safe drivability of the ER road network of 
Cologne - direct flood impacts





























HQ500-impacted safe drivability of the ER road network of 
Cologne - direct flood impacts




The percentage increase of exposure indicates the absorption capacity of the ER road network, 
analogously affecting the robustness of the urban ER system in case of compound events, which is 
not an unusual scenario in this era of increasing frequency and intensity of exposure EWE. The 
absorption capacity is calculated (%increase/decrease = Increase/Decrease ÷ Original Number × 100) 
as follows: 
▪ road segments exposed to zero FD for the HQ10 are of 4370 km length and for the HQ500 of 
3247 km length - 26% decrease of exposure from the HQ10 to the HQ500  
▪ road segments exposed to FD up to 0.3 m are for the HQ10 of 4 km length and the HQ500 of 
78.45 km. - 1813% increase of exposure  
▪ road segments exposed to FD ranging from 0.3 m to 0.5 m are for the HQ10 of 4 km length, 
and the HQ500 of 57 km length - 1419% increase of exposure 
▪ road segments exposed to FD ranging from 0.5 m to FDmaximum m are for the HQ10 of 35 
km length and the HQ500 of 1031 km length – 2873.5% increase of exposure or else 996 km. 
 
Riverine flood exposure of the road network of Cologne from regular to extreme scenarios is 
analysed. The difference between the exposed road segments to the extreme riverine flood scenario 
HQ500 and the regular riverine flood scenario HQ10 is a direct indicator of the road network's 
locational vulnerability to riverine floods on a 1 m segment scale.  
In a risk-based operationalisation approach of the ERR, robustness to the riverine flood stressor of 
the researched interdependent systems (road network and ER) is considered the exposure of the 
systems. Simply, robustness, as defined in the ERR concept, does not consider the time variable. 
Therefore, Figure 32 provides insights on the increase and decrease of the number of the exposed 
road segments to the selected regular and extreme riverine floods, aggregated to the ER road network 
length (in km). The increase and decrease of the exposed road segments analyzed in the different 
exposure classes are expected to negatively affect the road network's resilience for timely ER since 
they indicate a less robust system to riverine flooding. For example, a decrease of exposure to zero 




Figure 32: Loss of robustness levels for safe driving of the ER road network in km, according to FD exposure 





































Riverine flood-impacted robustness in case of escalating riverine 
floods 




At a road segment level, exposure assessments are also conducted for Cologne with selected flash 
flood scenarios for different return periods, indicative of the regular (20-year return period - T20) and 
the extreme scenario (100-year return period - T100). The visualised results in ArcMap 10.6.1 are 
presented in Figure 33. The rasters of the different probabilistic scenarios of flash floods for Cologne 
(see Figure 20), as expected due to the type of the phenomenon, provide information on the FD for 
the entire extent of Cologne.  
The classification procedure followed is the same as the one used for riverine floods, with the FD's 
maxima to differ between the two flash flood scenarios. For the T20 (regular flash flood scenario), 
the FDmaximum is expected to be 6.219 meters, and for the T100 (extreme flash flood scenario), 6.45 
meters. The FDmaximum does not differ much between the two scenarios, which indicates that the near 
same (in type and amount) road segments are exposed to these flash flood scenarios. It is expected 
that the extreme flash flood scenario T100 would affect more road segments, and therefore the 
robustness of the road network is expected to be lower than after exposure to the regular flash flood 
scenario T20. Further, the visual interpretation of the results verifies the assumption that more road 
segments are exposed to flood depth (FD) of more than 0.5 meters. 
 
 
    
Figure 33: Geolocated exposure of the ER road network to the T20 (left) and the T100 (right) with classified 
FD considering the safe driving mobility of the fire trucks (see enlarged in APPENDIX B) 
  
 
For a numeric verification and provision of information regarding the different lengths of the ER road 
network of Cologne, exposed to the different flash flood scenarios, calculations took place in ArcMap 
10.6.1, and the recorded numbers are presented in an Excel graph in Figure 34. The length of the road 




summarisation tools of ArcMap in the flood-risk informed ER road network database that resulted 
from the GIS-Toolkit, for the selected flash flood scenarios of Cologne.  
Each set FD class has been chosen considering the safety of the population and the emergency 
responders for operations in the course of EWE.  
 
The road segments exposed are classified and summarised as follows: 
▪ for the T20 and the T100, road segments exposed to zero FD are of 15.5 km length - 0% 
increase/decrease of exposure from the T20 to the T100 
▪ road segments exposed to FD up to 0.3 m are for the T20 4285 km length and the T100 4225 
length. - 1% decrease of exposure  
▪ road segments exposed to FD ranging from 0.3 m to 0.5 m are for the T20 of 76 km length 
and the T100 of 114 km length – 49% increase of exposure 
▪ road segments exposed to FD ranging from 0.5 m to FDmaximum m are for the T20 of 35 km 





Figure 34: Safe drivability levels of the ER road network per FD exposure class in case of a T20  
(above) and a T100 (below) 
 
The robustness of the high in the hierarchy system ER road network to flash floods is operationalised 
with results from comparing the exposure levels between the number of the exposed road segments 




























T20 impacted safe drivability of the ER road network of Cologne
































T100 impacted safe drivability of the ER road network of Cologne




flood scenarios of Cologne, the following graph presents the impact (negative or positive) that the 
exposure to different flash flood FDs has on the system of the ER road network.  
This flood impact is reflected in the robustness of the ER road network to the selected, regular and 
extreme flash flood scenarios. The percentage calculation of the ER road network's robustness to flash 
floods indicates its absorption capacity in case of compound events. As has been demonstrated 
throughout the entire text, the scenario of escalating and compound events are not a Black Swan but 
rather Grey Rhinos, which need more attention from the scientific community and the practitioners, 
particularly in city-scale studies. The Grey Rhino scenario of the flash flood impacts on the ER road 
network of Cologne indicates the percentage trend of the exposure (absorption capacity) of the road 
network from the regular (T20) to the extreme (T100) flash flood scenario (Figure 35). 
 
 
Figure 35: Loss of robustness levels for safe driving of the ER road network in km according to FD exposure 
class, in case of escalating riverine floods from a T20 to a T100 
 
 
7.1.1 Discussions of the Robustness  
Flood impacts of various intensities and probabilities of occurrence need to be analysed on the 
different levels of an urban ER system. In the era of increasing frequency and intensity of EWE, DRM 
approaches need advancement. DRM approaches in the case of urban complex adaptive SoS, as 
demonstrated in section 1, are advanced with the conceptualisation of the ERR concept, since there 
is a need for strengthened preparedness for response, as mentioned in the SFDRR [31], explicitly 
focusing on cascading risks, EWE- triggered, from the tight interconnectedness and interdependence 
of interface CI, applied to fire brigade systems. Answering RQ3, the suggested operationalisation 
methodology of the ERR with GIS focuses on the Cologne fire brigade system with a combined top-
down and bottom-up scaling approach (see Figure 10). As demonstrated in section 3.1.1, in-depth 
impact analyses of various hazards on the transport network initiate large-scale intraurban exposure 
assessments, essential for intraurban high-resolution ERR spatial assessments, as suggested in this 
thesis. The official fire brigade system in Germany, as presented in section 5.2, is chosen due to its 
high annual demand for deployments, which need to be time-effective under any weather condition. 
Cologne is categorised as one of the rainiest cities in Germany (see Figure 18), making the necessity 
for in-depth flood impact analysis even higher.  
EWE's high impact on the transport system of Cologne (see section 4.4) enhances the need for 
additional action taken from the fire brigade system towards the safety of the population. It is argued 


































Flash flood-impacted robustness of the ER road network of Cologne  




characteristics of the city, that they are about to develop, increase the need for strengthened 
preparedness. In regards to RQ2, considering the complexity of the fire brigade system in an urban 
area and the need for preparedness for timely and undisrupted ER, the urban ER system is viewed as 
a SoS with CAS properties, which will need constant feedback loops from disruptions occurring in 
different levels of its interdependent systems. Graph theory with network science enables the high-
resolution flood impact analyses essential in city scales enabling spatial resilience assessments on 
different levels. They facilitate untangling the complexity of an urban ER system with CAS properties 
(see Figure 3), assisting with identifying the hierarchy between the urban road network and its 
interdependent CI systems (RQ3). The urban road network can be viewed as a weighted graph with 
quantifiable attributes, such as distance, length and time. Such compartmentalisation of the urban 
road network to its components (nodes and edges) advances flood impact analyses by providing the 
opportunity for node-to-node in-depth assessments (RQ4). The focus on the components of the urban 
road network, which with additional information provided from the Cologne fire brigade regarding 
the ERPS used for ER route planning, transforms the ER system and advances the DRR 
methodologies with high-resolution (large-scale) flood impact assessments (RQ4). With the 
application of GIS spatial analyses, suggested from the composite risk-based time-dependent 
indicator RITAI (Figure 10), the flood impacts on the Cologne fire brigade system are analysed on 
many levels (RQ5). In the urban ER system with CAS properties, the ER road network is higher in 
the hierarchy, serving the lower in the hierarchy interdependent CI (RQ3, RQ4). With a need to escape 
the siloing in the current DRM approaches, the ERR concept also proposes the integration of flood 
impacts to the environment of the fire brigade system, that is, the safety of the population, exposed 
to various flood types and intensities, as well as the safety of the emergency responders, of the rescue 
vehicles and the ERS buildings (RQ3).  
The exposure depends on the likelihood and intensity of the selected hazards. As discussed throughout 
the text, the intensity is a discrepancy from the frequent events [10]. The higher the discrepancy, the 
higher the intensity of a hazard, which is identified as extreme. The four different selected flood 
scenarios are chosen because there is a need to focus on the impact estimation, shifting away from 
determining the probability of occurrence [212]. In this way, the analysis on many scales, which is 
essential in resilience assessments of CAS, such as the urban ER system, is enabled to assess exposure 
across a range of riverine flood and flash flood intensities and likelihoods (RQ4). When answering 
the RQ5, the exposure assessments in this thesis are conducted with spatial analyses of high resolution 
applied with geoinformatics and GIS tools, such as the developed GIS-Toolkit (see Figure 16). With 
the GIS-Toolkit, the high-resolution compartmentalisation of the ER road network of Cologne to its 
nodes and links is enabled. Its nodes and links are integrated into the primary ER road network 
creating the scale of analysis (1 m road segment) and defining the local road area of the road network, 
for further large-scale spatial resilience assessments.  
The spatial analyses for ER purposes are the situational analyses conducted at the first step of an 
emergency management cycle for time-effective ER, mainly in the preparedness phase. Situational 
analyses are indicative of the damage extent of hazardous events.  
Therefore, in this thesis, the exposure assessments are the basis for further resilience analyses through 
impact assessments of the selected flood scenarios to the ER road network and the ER efficiency in 
the urban complex environment of Cologne (RQ3, RQ4, RQ5). Considering the safety of the 
population, that is, timely ER provision and the security of the emergency responders operating under 
flooded conditions, the RITAI suggested the classification of the FD (see section 4.1) according to 




assessments indicate vulnerability or robustness; thus, they indicate the potential loss of nodes and 
links (infrastructure), which can negatively affect the ERR after the impact of specific flood scenarios.  
Therefore, the first measure of the flood impacts on the transport network is the proportional loss of 
the total length of road segments that have been exposed to a range of FD. As suggested in this thesis 
(see section 3.1), the robustness of ERR is operationalised through the exposure assessments, 
resulting in values on the potentially affected road segments with FD information (direct flood 
damage), which can be valuable for ER purposes but also for civil protection authorities, humanitarian 
response, traffic and urban planners, CIP strategies and insurance and investment planning (RQ5, 
RQ7).  
Furthermore, continuing to answer the RQ5, in regards to flooding, it has been scientifically proven 
that the exact location, i.e. geolocation, of people and assets matters significantly for the accurate 
evaluation of the associated risks [12]. Therefore, direct damages geographically located, i.e. 
proportional losses in infrastructure, which in this thesis is the total length (in kilometres) of roads 
that have been affected, are the first measure of the impact of flooding on the transportation network 
(RQ4, RQ5).  
However, the main focus of the applied methodology is the quantification of the impact of the flood 
on the road network on a large scale and the driving ability of rescue vehicles to operationalise ERR 
in complex urban environments. Answering the RQ3 and RQ4, in order to tackle the urban complexity 
of the city of Cologne, the normalisation of the ER road network aims to provide detailed information 
in regards to the robustness of the road network to flooded situations (different types and recurrence 
times) for timely ER, towards operationalisation of ERR. Aiming to address issues arising from the 
complexity and to answer the RQ7, calculations conducted in GIS revealed that high-resolution 
exposure assessments to riverine floods of different intensities and probabilities of occurrence with 
the classification of the road segments according to the assigned FD values (visualised in maps) result 
in not only a geolocated (local) in-depth robustness assessment of the road network but also in an 
overview of the whole transportation infrastructure system. 
As defined in this thesis, robustness, from a resilience CAS engineering perspective, is considered 
the level of exposure of the road network to different riverine and flash flood depths, which 
jeopardises the critical functionality of the ER road network (timely ER provision) and the safety of 
the emergency responders, in case of deployment. Answering the RQ5, large-scale robustness 
assessments via exposure assessments of the road network to different FDs of the selected riverine 
scenarios enable an exploration and identification of the robustness of the system of ER follows, 
towards operationalisation of the ERR, considering safe drivability and potential ER time delays. 
Riverine floods are extended around a river, with the extent to be dependent on the phenomenon's 
intensity. The flood's potential coverage determines the road network's exposure to riverine floods 
and the direct damage to the infrastructure.  
Additionally, exposure assessments of the fire departments to floods could also be valuable for an 
urban fire brigade system to increase the ER system's robustness to these potential hazards. Apart 
from the service area coverage (SOC) of each fire department, the undisrupted cooperation of the fire 
departments’ collective forces (RQ3, RQ4) is crucial for the assurance of timely ER. For example, 
different types of rescue vehicles are located in different departments and may not be available for 
ER purposes due to high flood exposure of the geographically dependent road network.  
However, as presented in the results in section 7.1 and from a visual interpretation of the results in 
Figure 30, it is evident that the regular riverine flood of HQ10 is likely to affect few road segments 




affect the geographical interdependent road segments, to a greater extent, due to higher intensity, that 
is, the more extensive coverage area of the probabilistic flood zonation (RQ5, RQ7).  
The results of calculations conducted in the geodatabases of the created road networks for ER 
purposes revealed that there is a 26% decrease of exposure of the road to zero flood depths (robust); 
that is, an additional 1124 km of the road network are exposed to higher FD values (less robust). 
Exposure to zero FD is a positive factor for increasing the ERR curve, indicating the high absorption 
capacity of specific road segments to the under research flood type and intensity. Accordingly, an 
1813% increase of exposure of the road network to FDs between 0.01 m to 0.3 m from the regular 
(HQ10) to the extreme scenario (HQ500) of riverine floods is observed. This amount of exposed road 
network affects the robustness level of the road network negatively and the amount of exposed road 
network for FDs between 0.3 m to 0.5 m, where there is an increase of exposure of 1419%. 
Furthermore, more road segments are flooded with water levels higher than 0.5 m (996 km of road). 
The decreasing trend of the road network’s robustness vs the increasing trend of the exposure of the 
road network between the two selected riverine scenarios (Graph 2) is expected due to the different 
intensities. (RQ7). Correctly, in calculations conducted in the flood-risk informed ER road network 
databases, it is observed that there are: 
▪ +30% more exposed road network to FD between the 0.01 m - 0.3 m, which are still allowing 
safe drivability of the rescue vehicles, according to the thresholds chosen in the thesis,  
▪ +23% more exposed road network to FD between the 0.3 m - 0.5 m, which are allowing 
delayed safe drivability of the rescue vehicles and  
▪ +47% more blocked road network due to exposure to FD higher than 0.5 m. 
 
The classification suggested from the RITAI aims to expand the FD thresholds while consequently 
aiming to enhance the redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity of the response of the fire brigade 
system. As stated in section 3.1, it is proved that roads may be closed even if not inundated due to the 
status of the neighbouring road links [285]. Moreover, it is argued that large-scale spatial exposure 
assessments with GIS and geovisualisation techniques provide such information in a numeric and 
visual form (maps). Analyzing the impacts of hydrometeorological phenomena in major urban centres 
becomes highly essential, specifically within the projected increase in the mean precipitation intensity 
and the probability of extreme rainfall across most of Europe [286]. Therefore, the methodology 
proposes using a range of flash flood models of different intensities for a more holistic overview of 
their impacts on the urban road network of Cologne for ER purposes. The exposure assessments are 
also conducted with the regular and extreme flash flood scenarios in a GIS environment since the 
impact of flash floods on the road network and the ER in the city environment needs analysis.  
The resulting road networks from the GIS-Toolkit provide information per 1 m road segment 
regarding the selected FD levels towards safe drivability of the rescue vehicles of Cologne and 
operationalisation of the ERR (RQ 7). As presented in section 3.1, flash floods are not a common 
hazard scenario for impact analysis on the transportation network for emergency preparedness due to 
the highly detailed information needed and lack of tools for high-resolution extraction of information 
regarding the exposure, specifically for intraurban roads.  
Moreover, this is due to the massive demand for understanding flood risks occurring from intraurban 
road network disruptions or losses [179], leading to connectivity and accessibility impairment or even 
loss, enhancing the risk for the population's lives. The methodology in this thesis aims to overcome 
the limitations identified so far, filling the identified gap for an in-depth understanding of the potential 




systems with large-scale identifications, with untangling techniques and applied theories considering 
the complexity of the issue and the system researched (RQ3, RQ5). 
Consequently, the suggested application of the GIS-Toolkit (RQ4), using as input data the flood 
models of regular flash floods of a 20-year probability of occurrence and the extreme flash floods 
with a return probability of 100 years, returned results that verify the fact that the flash flood damage 
on the infrastructure of the road network depends on its infrastructural morphology, further dependent 
on the geomorphology of Cologne. The normalised large-scale exposure assessment enabled with the 
application of the GIS-Toolkit can enhance the identification of critical areas intraurban roads while 
enabling further analyses of the robustness of the ER road network of Cologne, used from the fire 
brigades. Additionally, the high-resolution geolocated results can raise awareness for future actions 
that need to be taken to improve the infrastructure (pavement of the roads) or prioritise response 
through alternative pre-planned routes. With the scenario of flash floods, in particular, the GIS-
Toolkit has proven to be a valuable tool in the situational analysis, even if applied with static flash 
flood models, since it can reveal geolocated damage on the complex intraurban transport network of 
Cologne with information on FD and extent (Figure 36). Furthermore, this information provides a 
basis for other risk-based approaches, i.e. quantification of the indirect impacts on the road network's 
characteristics (FFS change-section 3.2, UFTTR- section 3.3, ER accessibility according to the 
connectivity of the ER road network after floods - section 5). 
 
 
Figure 36: Geolocated FD levels per 1 m road segment indicate the intensity of the T20  (light to dark blue and 
red the blocked road segments) and its direct impact on Cologne’s intraurban ER road network 
 
Regarding this matter, the results spatially showed that the unaffected road segments from the flash 
floods of both intensities, hence robust, remain the same (15.5 km). According to the models used, 
spatial analyses proved that even though intense rainfalls can be unexpected, due to the increasing 
climate change, the occurrence of a flash flood regarding location could be predictable, with 
uncertainties carried from the flash flood (and riverine flood) models themselves. With the geolocated 
exposure of the road network to the two selected flash flood scenarios, it is observed (Figure 33) that 




floods with the road segments exposed to the extreme ones present a geographical locality. That is, 
road segments exposed to FDs between 0.3 m - 0.5 m in a regular (T20) flash flood scenario are more 
likely to be blocked (exposed to > 0.5 m) on an extreme scenario (T100), and this is also dependent 
on the status of the exposure of the neighbouring road segments. Moreover, the spatial analyses 
revealed that even though the maxima FDs for the two flash flood models are not varying much 
(FDmaximum for the T20 is 6.219 m and for the T100 is 6.45 m), there is a decrease of exposure to flood 
depths between 0.01 m - 0.3 m and an increase of exposure to higher FDs (see Figure 34). This verifies 
the increasing trend of exposure (and thus impact) of the selected intensities of flash floods and, 
therefore, the decreasing trend of the robustness of the road network (system of analysis).  
From the flood impact curves for each of the selected flood scenarios, the absorption capacity of the 
ER road network, considering not only the direct impact (timely ER provision) but also the safety of 
the emergency responders and their assets, in case of deployments under extreme weather conditions, 
is identified. The comparison analyses also provide a general overview of the levels of the absorption 
capacity, i.e. the robustness of the ER road network to floods, in case of compound effects.  
As demonstrated throughout the entire text, the scenario of compound events is not a Black Swan, 
but rather Grey Rhinos, which need more attention from the scientific community and the 
practitioners, particularly in city-scale studies.  
These Grey Rhino scenarios are considered to strengthen the preparedness for response, specifically 
under EWE-triggered flood conditions. In Figure 32 and Figure 34, the riverine and flash flood impact 
trends from the regular scenarios to the extreme ones, for each flood type, on Cologne's entire ER 
road network are presented. The two flash flood models (see Figure 33) do not vary much in intensity 
(FD maximum), but their escalation could potentially impact highly the ER provision (Figure 35 - 
56% not robust road segments), increasing the need for inclusion of extreme scenarios in preparedness 
response plans and training.  
Furthermore, the medium drivable road network, that is, ER road network of low absorption capacity, 
still drivable but with expected delays in the ER provision, for the riverine floods is 23% and for flash 
floods 43%. The results indicate the high direct impact of the flash floods in an intraurban road 
network and, more specifically, in an urban ER road network, vital for timely ER provision. The 
reasons are that the different type of floods, e.g. flash floods caused by EWE, have a greater extent 
than a riverine flood limited to a radius (even if high in case of extreme events) around the river basin. 
Additionally, the results reveal that the Grey Rhino scenario of escalating flash floods must be 
considered for further actions towards reconstructing the road network or enhancing preparedness for 
the areas where their probability of occurrence is high.  
The proposed operationalisation methodology, with applied geoinformatics and GIS-Tools, provides 
the opportunity to the emergency managers, the civil protection officials and the CI operators to utilise 
detailed information on the geolocation of floods (riverine or flash floods) in a complex urban 
environment, with high-resolution information regarding their intensity (FD) and extent (impact on 
the road network). Such information can be used for further establishment of live surveillance of early 
warning systems and flood information [176, 292, 404-406], which could be integrated into 
emergency plans, economic flash flood risk assessments [298] and socio-economic assessments [9, 
38, 293], emergency responders [279, 280] civil protection authorities [407], and urban resilience 
strategies from a CIP perspective [234, 287, 295, 407-415]. Specifically for complex urban 
environments, localised knowledge for the FD of the road segments, on a large scale, enhances the 
chances for an increase of time-effective ER, through i) the prioritisation of the ER via network 




the exact flood extent for the transfer and positioning of heavy rescuing equipment such as emergency 
boats.  
Additionally, as it will be analysed and displayed in the subsequent sections, exposure 
assessments/robustness analyses to specific flood scenarios serve as the basis for measurements of 
redundancy through the road network's mobility capacity, road network reliability and finally, the 
efficiency of ER to floods, towards operationalisation of the ERR for Cologne.  
 
 
7.2 Redundancy Under Flood Conditions 
This section will present the results of the vulnerability assessments of the ER road network of 
Cologne to the different selected scenarios of floods, for ER purposes, in order to answer the research 
questions RQ3, RQ4, RQ5 and RQ7, while applying the assessment steps, suggested from the RITAI 
(Table 10). 
Table 10 demonstrates the suggested methodology for identifying the adaptation and transformation 
capacity of the ER road network system with large-scale vulnerability assessments towards 
operationalisation of the passive redundancy of the system, as explained in section 3.2 (RQ3). 
Identification of the passive redundancy is the basis for further indirect flood impact identification, 
depicted on the risk for delayed or blocked RNMC, consequently revealing potential risks for 
degradation of the fire brigade system’s response capacity. From a transport resilience perspective, 
which overlays metrics and definitions from the vulnerability concept, RNMC for ER purposes is 
considered the indicator of redundancy towards operationalisation of ER in the case study area. In the 
ERR concept and for a road segment level, redundancy characterises those road segments which have 
absorbed the stressor of the floods and have been transformed to a level that they can provide timely 
ER (not impacted or low impacted). The results indicate the impact of the FD on the RNMC, as 
defined in section 3.2. 
Additionally, the impact is quantified, providing an overview of the redundancy of the Cologne fire 
brigade system. The RNMC is dependent on the ERS capacity in rescue vehicles able to drive through 
flooded waters (various heights), e.g. the fire brigades in Cologne are equipped with high-wheeled 
trucks able to drive through 0.75 m (see section 4.4). On a second level, the fire brigade system 
capacity is impacted due to the neighbouring and tight interdependent relation of the fire brigade 
stations with the ER road network. That is, the conduction of calculations and assignment of the 
associated flood impacts on the traffic characteristic of FFS is associated with speed reductions of the 
respective road segments used for ER provision; thus, vulnerable road segments impacting the 
response capacity of the fire brigade system across the entire city of Cologne.  
The second level’s flow-based impact measurement (active redundancy) of the fire brigade system is 








Table 10: Large-scale redundancy operationalisation for the ERR of Cologne’s fire brigade system, to floods 
 
 
The impact of the FDj on the FFS of the ER road network is the vulnerability indicator of the road 
network used for ER route planning for ER provision. The FFS after each flood scenario depicts the 
adaptation of the system’s capacity for timely ER provision after absorption of the direct impact and 
transformation for the enhancement of the ERR curve. Flood impact measurements, conducted with 
applied geoinformatics and GIS tools (RQ4), on the traffic characteristic of the FFS for operational 
ER route planning, aim to provide spatially geolocated vulnerable ER road segments (RQ5) and 
statistical analyses (separately and in combination) for a strengthened preparedness for response, also 
in case of escalating flood events (RQ7). Hence, the application of function 7 (FFSj change) provides 
detailed information on the redundancy of each road segment, indicative of the level of the resilience 
of the road network for timely ER provision. The results are a product of the GIS-Toolkit (section 
4.3) and are gathered in the geodatabases of each updated flood-risk informed road network database. 
For the update of the ER road network after each selected flood scenario, function 5 (PR) is 
implemented in ArcMap 10.6.1, calculating the flood-impacted FFS per road segment, which are later 
transformed according to function 6, reassigning the adjusted FFS (Kj), resulting to geolocated 
redundancy levels. The bottom-up scaling approach for the operationalisation procedure of the 
redundancy with GIS, geovisualisation techniques and flood impact curves are presented in Figure 
37. 
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Figure 37: GIS-based upscaling operationalisation process of the robustness of Cologne’s fire brigade system, 
dependent on the absorption capacity of the ER road network analogous to the FD exposure 
 
 
With an aim to answer the RQ7 and for visualisation and analyses purposes, FFSj change is classified 
into four classes, from zero change to the maximum, which is the maximum ERPS of each updated 
road network according to the impact each flood scenario has on the FFS of the ER road network of 
Cologne. The ERPS classification indicates the road networks’ redundancy level for ER purposes 
after each selected flood scenario. The first class (zero change) represents the unaffected road 
segments (not impacted - from floods), and the last one represents the profoundly impacted road 
segments. Each class is indicative of the level of impact and is visualised with different colours and 
assigned with a different linguistic variable. Where the FFS is  
▪ not impacted (highly redundant ER road segments) FFS is presented with the grey colour,  
▪ the low impacted FFS (redundant ER road segments) is represented by the green colour, 
▪ the rather high impacted FFS (medium redundant ER road segments) with orange and  
▪ the high impacted FFS with red (highest impact of the FDj to the FFS-blocked mobility).   
 
The visualisation of the different levels of the FFSj change provides detailed information on the RNMC, 
which analogously affects the ER capacity of the ERS; if the ERS stations are situated in proximal 
areas to profoundly affected FFSj (or else ERPS). Specifically, for the riverine floods of HQ10 and 
HQ500, the visualised results are in Figure 38. The classification results depict the impact level on 
traffic mobility under flood conditions (potential transport disruptions). Specifically, the results 
reveal the maximum FFSj change of each riverine flood scenario, which is another indicator for the 
extent of this indirect flood impact to the system’s mobility capacity that reflects the adaptation and 
transformation capacity of the ER road network and the response capacity of the fire brigade system. 
Therefore, the maps created after each flood scenario are the visualisations of the transformed road 




Specifically, the road-type dependent FFS's transformation per road segment indicates the 
redundancy of the system for ER route planning and timely ER. The methodology returns results, not 
only for the local vulnerability of the road network, which is analysed and visualised, indicating 
potential critical road segments for timely ER but also for the risk factor that is integrated through the 
transformation into the road network system (delayed or incapacitated ER) for further risk-based 
assessments towards operationalisation of the ERR. 
 
   
  
Figure 38: Geolocated vulnerability (classified FFSchange in km/h) of the road network to a HQ10 (left) and a 
HQ500 (right) for timely ER provision in Cologne (see enlarged in APPENDIX B) 
 
 
To answer RQ5 and numerical analysis, the classified results are summarised in the geodatabase and 
transferred in Excel files where graphs are created. In Figure 39, the sub-indicator of the road network 
mobility capacity (RNMC) is assessed per FD class for each riverine scenario, and the levels of the 
redundancy of the ER road network are classified. In this way, the free flow speed (FFS) changes 
according to the flood depth (FD) impact indicate the endogenous redundancy of the road transport 
system. Aggregation of information from a road segment to the road network is achieved by 
calculating the road network length in km that is flood-impacted on its traffic characteristics, i.e. the 







Figure 39: RNMC levels of the ER road network per FD class (classified FFSchange in km/h) in case of a HQ10 
(above) and a HQ500 (below), reflecting its endogenous redundancy  
 
 
The road network mobility capacity (RNMC) that is unaffected/not impacted by the riverine floods 
is identified in the case of the HQ10 for 4320.10 km and the HQ500 for 3198 km; a decrease of 26% 
of unaffected ER road network length from the HQ10 to the HQ500. The unaffected/not impacted 
road network, according to the fuzzification suggested in Table 4, is characterised as drivable, and 
no transformation takes place for ER purposes; therefore, it keeps the ER road-type dependent speed 
attributes before the floods (ERPS of Cologne’s fire brigades) and is characterised, as highly 
redundant for timely ER provision (zero FFSchange). 
 
The low impact of the riverine floods to the FFS of the road network ranging from 0-20 km/h in the 
case of the HQ10 is identified for 1 km, and the HQ500 from 0-25 km/h for 24 km, with an increase 
of 4% of more road segments with FFSj change.  
Low-impacted road segments are still drivable with expected delays (low impedance) since the 
transformations after the absorption of the impact of the FDs is at a low level and not expected to 
affect the times of ER with significant delays higher than 1 minute; therefore, these road segments 
are characterised as redundant for timely ER provision. The rather high FFSj change is observed for 
the HQ10 and 2.38 km of the road network and the HQ500 for 1036 km, with 43% road network FFSj 
change. Rather high impacted mobility of the road network means that the absorption of the FD has led 
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HQ500-impacted RNMC (FFS change in km/h ) according to FD




That is, the drivability of the rescue vehicles through these road segments is still possible but with the 
minimum FFS (walking speed 2.0748 km/h according to PR) and therefore, these road segments are 
characterised as medium redundant (FFSchange 25 km/h - 52 km/h). The higher impacted FFSj change 
is identified for the HQ10 for 12.23 km road length and the HQ500 for 77 km road length with a 
significant increase (as expected from the increasing trend of exposure analysed in the previous 
section) of 530% of more road segments with the highest FFSj change. These road segments are 
characterised as blocked, hindering the ER; therefore, they are not redundant for ER purposes. 
 
Moving further for the redundancy operationalisation of the road networks after the selected low- and 
high-intensity riverine floods, the percentage change of FFS for ER provision (percentage increase 
and decrease) is presented in Figure 40, resulting from the impact of the riverine floods of Cologne 
on the RNMC, reflected on the redundancy levels. The results and the relation between the sub-




Figure 40: Percentage redundancy levels, according to the RNMC levels per FD class, for timely ER in case 
of escalating riverine floods from a HQ10 to a HQ500 
 
 
Proceeding with the implementation of the methodology to the regular scenario of flash floods T20 
and the extreme scenario of flash floods T100, the results are presented in Figure 41. The scenarios of 
flash floods are flood models (rasters) providing information on FD for the entire case study, due to 
the phenomenon of flash floods, which results from intense rainfall, expected to affect the entire road 
network’s FFS and thus its mobility capacity for safe and timely ER provision in different levels. 
With GIS, the visualisation of the results with the classification of the different levels of the impact 
of the FD to the FFS in four classes in the geodatabase of each occurring flash flood road network in 
ArcMap 10.6.1 is possible.  
 
The results are visualisations of the transformed road segments for timely ER, indicating the potential 
criticality of road segments for network disruptions decreasing the performance of ER (RQ7). The 
not impacted FFSj that is FFSj change equal to zero is presented with a grey colour, with green colour 
is the FFSj change of low level, and orange and red are the two different classes, representing the FFSj 
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Figure 41: Geolocated vulnerability (classified FFSchange in km/h) of the road network to a T20 (left) and a 
T100 (right) for delayed or incapacitated ER provision in Cologne (see enlarged in APPENDIX B) 
 
 
For an overall overview of the RNMC levels of the entire road network, the changes in the FFS per 
road segment are summarised in the geodatabase of each flash flood risk-informative road network, 
with the GIS-Toolkit. The results are transferred into Microsoft Excel to produce graphs and 
information aggregation from a road segment level to a road network level. Specifically, the graphs 
provide additional information for a clearer understanding of the indirect impact of the FD of various 
intensities of flash floods on the FFS of the road network, on a large-scale (network level), towards 
safe driving of rescue vehicles (RNMC for ER). As mentioned in section 3.2, the vulnerability of the 
road network to flood disruptions in its traffic characteristics is assessed with the geolocated flood-
impacted FFS. In Figure 42, there are representations of the FFSj change and the level of the RNMC for 
ER purposes in the case of each selected flash flood scenario. The two flash flood scenarios have the 
same maxima of impacted FFS (approx.85 km/h), which indicates that the two flash flood scenarios, 
even though they are of two different intensities (regular and extreme), can both have the same impact 






Figure 42: RNMC levels of the ER road network, in km, per FD class (classified FFSchange in km/h) in case of 
a T20 and a T100, reflecting its redundancy for timely ER (above),  and  % redundancy in case of escalating 
floods from a T20 to a T100 (below) 
 
 
In Figure 42, the length of the road segments is summarised in kilometres, with summarization tools 
of ArcMap 10.6.1 in the geodatabases of each updated road network after exposure to each of the 
selected flash flood scenarios. According to the fuzzification suggested in Table 4, the FFSj change is 
classified and summarised.  
Specifically, drivable road segments, that is, road segments with no FFS impact (unaffected-not 
impacted) in case of the T20 are of 3690 km length and the T100 of 3499 km length, with an observed 
5% decrease in the high redundancy.  
Still drivable but expected to affect the ER with insignificant delays are the low-impacted road 
segments up to 25 km/h, 498 km length for the T20 and 582 km length for the T100;17% redundancy 
increase.  
Rather high impacted FFS is identified for road segments in case of the T20 in 234 km of road and 
the T100 in 331 km of road length that is 41.66% more road segments, which are transformed and 
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This transformation further adapts the FFS in ranges between 25 km/h and 55 km/hare medium 
redundant.  
High impact on FFS is identified in the case of the T20 for 25 km of road and the T100 for 35 km, 
that is a 36 % increase of road segments with the highest FFSj change (55-85 km/h) for road segments 
which are blocked and therefore, characterised as not redundant.  
 
 
7.2.1 Discussions of the Redundancy  
The road networks are becoming increasingly vulnerable to various unforeseen scenarios such as 
EWE-triggered disasters and other emergencies, which cause disruptions that affect directly several 
aspects of the road network, i.e. traffic flow and network connectivity (see Figure 7). Recovering 
from such disruptions becomes more complex over time due to changing demands in the network 
flows on a large scale, which can directly affect the connectivity of the entire network (see section 
3.2). For an answer to the RQ3, the suggested RITAI indicator (Figure 11), from a safety and security 
engineering perspective towards ERR to adverse weather events (floods) and as applied to the 
Cologne fire brigade system, combines methods used in the transport network resilience and CI 
protection domains, for the assessment and operationalisation of their impacts to the ER road network, 
utilising the traffic and graph theory together with the network science. In particular, speed (section 
3.2) and travel time (section 3.3) are the traffic properties considered. Other traffic properties, such 
as traffic volume, traffic demand, and congestions, are usually not considered in ER planning since it 
is expected that the drivers will assist free-flow driving of the rescue vehicles in case of emergencies 
(result from interviewing fire brigade officials). Answering the RQ4 and from a system engineering 
perspective (network design), the suggested methodology introduces the RNMC as a metric for the 
redundancy of the road segments and the road network for timely ER under flooded conditions (see 
definition in section 3.2). The suggested measure of the sub-indicator of the road network’s 
redundancy in case of floods, measured on a road segment level, indicates the adaptation and 
transformation capacity of the road segments, after absorption of the direct flood impact, towards 
timely ER. To answer RQ5, the FFS changes in the ER road network are calculated and assigned to 
each predefined road segment in the geodatabases of each updated ER road network in case of each 
understudy flood scenario - transformed road network for ER purposes under flooded conditions. As 
displayed in Figure 37, GIS applications allow for detailed calculations and visualisations of the 
change of the FFS (Figure 38 - riverine floods, Figure 41 - flash floods), and indirect damage of floods 
to the network for: 
▪ the identification of the critical (more vulnerable) segments of the road for ER delivery 
through calculations conducted on predefined road segments,  
▪ the quantification of the RNMC for timely ER provision 
▪ the large-scale visualisations providing geolocated road network mobility capacity for ER 
planning and 
▪ the quantification of the road segment redundancy in the case of floods allows for further 
analyses towards the operationalisation of the urban ERR.  
When answering the RQ4 and from an indirect impact assessment perspective, the methodology 
proposes redundancy operationalisation via vulnerability assessments of the ER road network by 
measuring the impact of different flood scenarios of different types and intensities in the urban 
complex environment Cologne. The application of the methodology results in the quantification of 




HQ500 (extreme), revealing the redundancy trend occurring from the calculated changes in RNMC 
between the two impacted ER road networks. The trend reveals the various levels of the ER road 
network’s redundancies for timely ER under different intensities of riverine floods.  
Therefore, as shown in Figure 42, there is a 4% decrease of high redundancy between the two selected 
scenarios for the riverine floods. That is, 4% less of the road network of Cologne that will allow 
timely ER with undisrupted driving mobility in case of riverine floods. The rather high redundancy 
levels are increased by 1%, which means an increase in the RNMC, but with expected low-impact 
delays in the ER. 
Furthermore, a 7% increase in the low redundant road network length is observed, which still allows 
for safe mobility of the rescue vehicles under flooded conditions, but it is expected to add high delays 
in the ER provision. Lastly, an 88% increase of the length (in kilometres) of the not redundant ER 
road network after the occurrence of the riverine floods is 88% more of the road that does not allow 
safe driving mobility under flooded conditions. A blocked and not redundant road ER road network 
is the ER road network not reliable for participation in the ER route planning in case of deployments 
in the face of floods.  
For the scenario of the flash floods (Figure 44), the quantification of the redundancy of the ER road 
network to flash floods per road segment revealed that between the two selected scenarios of regular 
(T20) and extreme (T100), there is a 5% decrease of high redundant road segments for ER route 
planning and timely ER. On the other hand, there is a 17% increase of the rather high redundant road 
segments; that is, there is an increase to the road segments that will still allow for undisrupted and 
mobile stable and safe driving under flash flood conditions but with the addition of minimum delays 
(< 1 minute). Furthermore, there is a 42% increase of low redundant road segments, which still allow 
safe driving mobility after transformation to walking paths (see Table 4), but on the other hand, they 
are adding significant delays to the ER delivery. Finally, there is a 36% increase of blocked ER road 
network, which is not redundant for timely ER under flash flood conditions. 
A non-linear analogous relation between the RNMC (vulnerability) changes, the redundancy 
of the road network, and the FD (exposure) is observed. The higher the urban RNMC under 
flooded conditions, the higher the redundancy of the urban ER road network for timely ER under 
flooded conditions, as presented in Figure 42 and Figure 44. Identification of redundant roads 
segments to floods would be helpful in the reduction of travel costs and also serve as a guide for 
prioritization of measures to be taken during and in the case of floods (e.g. choice of redundant road 
segments for provision of timely ER, timely transfer of equipment such as rescue boats for evacuation 
purposes and medical ER provision to vulnerable groups of the population). As previously mentioned, 
in the design of the technical systems, such as the design of ER road networks for timely ER towards 
operationalisation of the ERR in the urban complex city of Cologne, the quantification of the 
redundancy can serve as a reliability indicator [320].  
According to this notion, in the next session, reliability quantifications will occur, considering the 
quantifications of the redundancy metric, the RNMC. Since the ER road networks in case of floods 
are designed for timely ER, the quantification factor of the reliability will be travel, calculating the 
travel costs of each road segment to the ER. When answering the RQ7, geovisualisation techniques 
with the statistical analytics for each flood scenario and compound events resulting in maps of high-
resolution information and flood impact curves strengthen the preparedness for response and enhance 
the resilience of the urban ER system. For this reason, the updated risk-informed ER road network 
databases can not only provide a deepened understanding of the indirect flood impacts on the traffic 




through redundant and reliable road segments for timely ER provision. In this way, critical areas that 
need further attention from the civil protection authorities are revealed, and awareness of the 
population is enhanced, boosting community resilience. 
 
 
7.3 Resourcefulness Under Flood Conditions 
This section aims to answer the RQ questions RQ3, RQ4, RQ5, RQ7, with a presentation of the results 
of the urban flood travel-time reliability (UFTTR) assessments of the ER road network of Cologne to 
the different selected scenarios of floods, for timely ER, towards operationalisation of the ERR of the 
fire brigade system. With the selected stressor of floods to the fire brigade system and large-scale 
exposure and vulnerability assessments on the traffic characteristic of FFS, the goal is also to identify 
their impact on the travel time of the ER road network (mobility characteristic). More specifically, 
the RITAI indicator (Figure 11) suggests a further large-scale identification of the ER road network’s 
adaptability levels, through local vulnerability assessments, based on the identification of the flood 
impacts on the mobility characteristic of the travel time, dependent on the network redundancy 
(adaptation and transformation) assessments, presented in section 7.2. Impacts on the travel time 
reflect the resourcefulness levels of the ER road network, depicted on the levels of risk for delayed 
or blocked ER provision (see section 3.3). Table 11 is a part of the RITAI indicator (Table 3), 
presenting the ERR features, sub-indicators, metrics, and expected outcomes from the suggested 
operationalisation process with GIS (Figure 13).  
 




Answering the RQ3, in the ERR concept, which incorporates CAS thinking in the resilience 
assessment, the study under research is the ER road network, which is segmented into 1 m segments 
(normalisation), as suggested from the RITAI indicator (see section 4.1) and the operationalisation 
methodology in GIS (Figure 13). Therefore, satisfactory functionality of the road segment, i.e. the 
timely provision of ER under flooded conditions, is analogous to the reliability of the road segment 
itself regarding the undisrupted travel throughout the segment. More specifically, undisrupted travel 
occurs when there is no travel time impedance under the stressor of floods (see section 4.1).  

















time reflecting on 
the travel time 
reliability (TTR) 
of the road 
segments 
▪ Calculation of impacted travel- 
time (per scale of analysis) 
▪ Comparison analysis of TTR  
(per scale of analysis) 
▪ Geovisualisation of information on 
the entire road network(maps) 
▪ Flood intensity impact curves of 
the whole network and analysis 
after fuzzification regarding the 
road network’s safe driving 




Travel time impedances, i.e. additional travel time costs (function 9) due to perturbations of floods, 
are assigned to each road segment in the road network segments after consideration of the flood-
impacted FFS (see section 3.2). So to answer the RQ4, the timely ER is achieved with ER delivery 
within defined time thresholds from each ERS and therefore, it is argued that travel time reliable road 
segments enhance the resourcefulness of the ER road network by providing the means/resources for 
alternatives (active redundancy) towards rapidity of response (timely ER - accessibility). 
It is further argued that the TTR of the road segments determines the resourcefulness levels of the ER 
road networks impacted by the selected floods (for the definition of resourceful road segments, see 
section 3.3). The resourcefulness of a road network is quantified with the metric of the TTR, taking 
into consideration the redundancy of the ER road network for timely ER, adding the risk factor in the 
analyses. In the ERR concept, the reliability of an ER road network can be defined as the probability 
that a road segment will provide timely ER under flooded conditions, according to the redundancy 
(see section 3.3). Redundancy quantifications carry the factor of vulnerability in the context of 
degradation of serviceability of the road segment for timely ER due to a decrease of the RNMC (see 
section 3.2). Additionally, and to answer the RQ5, the methodology also suggests the UFTTR, as 
defined in section 3.3, as a sub-indicator providing results on a network level (zoom-out effect from 
a large-scale). The UFTTR is indicative of the travel-time reliability of the road segments and 
resourcefulness of the ER road network for the provision of timely ER, integrating the risk factor in 
the analyses, towards operationalisation of the ERR of the fire brigade system, under the stressor of 
floods. 
The measurements result after implementing function 8, where the travel time of each road segment 
is calculated by subtracting the TravelTimej (AF) from the TravelTimej (BF). So, to answer the RQ7, the 
calculations take place in the road network databases, resulting in updated road segments with flood-
impacted travel times, for further risk-based time-dependent accessibility assessments towards ERR 
operationalisation in the next section. For the presentation of results, when TravelTimej (AF) is higher 
or equal to TravelTimej (BF), the resulting values are lower than zero and equal to zero accordingly; 
therefore, fuzzification is essential. The distinction between zero, as the indicative value of non-
reliable road segments and reliable ones is needed. For example, after the negative impact of the 
selected floods on the FFSj for some road segments, the FFSj AF and the UFTTR are equal to zero. 
Where the negative impact of the high FDs to the FFSj, has transformed the road segments to non-
drivable/blocked/not redundant, there is no value for calculations for the TTRj AF (analogous relation 
between redundancy and reliability of the road network), indicative of the resourcefulness of the road 
network in case of floods. 
The value of zero can also indicate the high travel time reliability of the road network segments 
for the selected flood scenarios. Therefore, to avoid confusion, and for further analysis purposes, zero 









Table 12: Urban Flood Travel Time Reliability per road segment (UFTTRj) fuzzification enabling decision-
making - Adapted according to Table 4. 
 
 
After adding a new field for integrating values of the UFTTR and the classification in three classes 
followed with ArcMap’s classification tools, the calculations took place in the updated road network 
databases, considering the FDj. The visualised results for the urban flood travel time reliability per 
road segment (UFTTRj) of Cologne for each flood scenario are presented in Figure 43. 
 
For a numerical comparison of the Urban Flood Travel Time Reliability per road segment (UFTTRj) 
considering the two riverine flood scenarios of HQ10 and HQ500 and the two flash flood scenarios, 
fuzzification is conducted. Specifically, the linguistic variables not reliable (red colour), medium 
reliable (yellow colour), reliable (green colour) are assigned for the three numerical classes, 
delimited according to the FDj as presented in Table 12. For example, medium reliable are 
characterised road segments that are still drivable, but their FFS is transformed to walking speed 
(medium redundant), and therefore, their TTR is hindered to the reliability of a walking path; still 
drivable but expected to add significant drive time impedance (an increase of travel cost). Walking 
paths are usually not selected for ER route planning, but under flood situations, the drivability through 
flooded road networks may be essential for the accessibility of the population or different CI 
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Figure 43: Geolocated classified UFTTRj of Cologne’s ER road network in case of a HQ10 (upper left), a 
HQ500 (upper right), a T20 (bottom left) and a T100 (bottom right) (see enlarged in APPENDIX B) 
 
 
With the provision of the information through databases and maps, the respective ERS can include 






Nevertheless, the visualised results also provide a tool for quick identification of the degradation of 
serviceability of the ER road transport system (critical ER road segments) for timely ER provision, 
which allows for prioritisation of the ER delivery through alternate route paths.  
The use of GIS and the configuration of the GIS-Toolkit (Figure 15) enables the integration of traffic 
characteristics to different (configurable) scales, in combination with the flood impact information 
on the RNMC for timely ER (Figure 14). The UFTTRj is calculated in the geodatabase of each flood-
risk informed updated road network for each flood scenario. The results are transferred to Microsoft 
Excel for the production of Figure 44. The aim is to provide additional information for an overview 
of the impact of the FD of the riverine and flash floods on the FFS of the road network and the 
UFTTRj (free-flow-based TTR measurement of each road segment). Figure 44 presents a comparison 
of the UFTTRj after the potential occurrence of each selected riverine and flash flood scenario, 





Figure 44: Aggregated flood-impacted UFTTR levels for the ER road network in km per FD class in the case 
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In Figure 44, the length of the road segments is summarised in kilometres, with summarization tools 
from ArcMap 10.6.1 in the flood risk-informative ER road network databases for each of the selected 
flood scenarios. The results reflect the resourcefulness of the ER road network for travel time reliable 
ER routes for timely ER provision. 
The aggregated information on the flood-impacted intraurban UFTTR is classified and summarised 
as follows: 
 
▪ Reliable road network length in kilometres for ER purposes, with no travel time impact in case 
of the riverine flood scenarios HQ10 and HQ500, is identified with a decrease of 24%. Between 
the flash flood scenario of T20 and the flash flood of T100, there is a 2% decrease in reliable 
road network length. As defined in this thesis, a reliable road network is the road network that 
a high number of its components (i.e. road segments) will provide the means for ER under 
flooded conditions depending on the RNMC (passive redundancy) levels. For this reason, the 
ER road network is also characterised as resourceful since, due to its high redundancy, it will 
provide more resources to the fire brigade of the system in regards to alternatives for 
timely ER (enhanced rapidity of response). 
▪ Medium reliable road network length between the riverine flood scenarios HQ10 and HQ500 
is identified with a significant increase of 395%. As expected, in the extreme flood of HQ500, 
more of the road network (summed in km) is transformed into walking paths, adding 
significant travel costs to the ER delivery. For the flash flood scenarios, the medium reliable 
road length is increased by 14% between T20 and T100 (extreme flash flood scenarios). The 
medium resourceful ER road network is the road network that still allows for safe drivability 
but enhances the travel costs (high impedance in the response operations). It is argued that 
medium redundant and medium resourceful road segments, i.e. road network, even though it is 
enhancing the response time and degrading the serviceability of the fire brigade system, it 
extends its response capacity, accepting that the system is working under sub-optimal 
conditions and ‘in the edge of risk’. This addition of redundancy and resourcefulness is valuable 
for emergency rescue operations since it expands the ERR curve, leaving space for 
improvement towards high levels of ERR.  
▪ Not reliable road network length that is blocked and not drivable is identified with an enormous 
increase of 3999% between the two riverine flood scenarios. This increase of not reliable road 
length is expected, since, in the case of the regular scenario of HQ10, the exposure of the road 
network to high FDs is very low, increasing the results of the subtraction and thus the percentage 
of the increase of the value of the road length in kilometres. In the case of flash floods, the 
increase of the not reliable/blocked road network for timely ER is 67%. These road network 







Figure 45: Percentage levels of flash flood-impacted (outer doughnut) and riverine flood-impacted (inner 




In Figure 45, the percentage levels of resourcefulness according to UFTTR in case of escalation of 
the selected riverine and flash floods of different intensities are displayed. That is, the ER road 
network databases are updated on a large scale, with information on the levels of risk for delayed or 




7.3.1 Discussions of the Resourcefulness  
As presented in section 3.3, from a network perspective, it is argued that vulnerability is a factor for 
the susceptibility of a network or a system’s element for failures, i.e. considerable deviations from 
their normal functioning state [322], on several levels. The vulnerability can also be considered the 
probability of susceptibility for non-serviceability [146, 323, 324] or the probability of incidents 
causing disruptions [327]. As applied to the Cologne fire brigade system in the ERR concept, non-
serviceability occurs from rescue operations with unreliable and not resourceful ER road 
networks/segments. As presented in section 3.3, reliability is a commonly used term and a “desired 
function to an acceptable level of performance for some given period” [141]. In the ERR concept, 
the desired function is the undisrupted critical functionality of an ER road network, and a desirable 
state is the ER provision and undisrupted serviceability aiming to a timely ER. So to answer the RQ3, 
an ill-functioning road segment will appoint costs on the emergency rescue deployments in terms of 
loss of time, higher costs of fuel consumption (in case of rerouting due to road failures), or other costs 
as a result of delays and diversions.  
Identifying ill-functioning or non-functioning ER road segments, with the suggested methodology in 
GIS, and answering the RQ4, leads to vulnerability assessments of the ER road network under the 
stressor of floods, bringing the risk for degraded or blocked ER provision to the forefront. As 
presented in section 3.2 and 3.3, in the ERR concept, vulnerability is also considered as a two-
component concept, in which probability and consequences are the two main attributes, where the 
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serviceability (time reliable road networks - resourcefulness levels). In section 3.3, the reliable road 
network is defined, considering the literature around the vulnerability of networks and specifically, 
road networks, where the reliability of an ER road network refers to the functionality levels (i.e. 
undisrupted travel time) of its components (road segments), under flood conditions. The combinatory 
node between the term vulnerability and reliability of networks has been suggested from [322]. 
Reliability is referred to as non-vulnerability (when framed regarding the operability) and, therefore,  
as reciprocal of the robustness [328, 329]. In the ERR concept, this notion is verified by analysing 
the results (section 7.1, section 7.2, section 7.3). The results from the exposure assessments depicting 
the robustness levels of the road segments (Figure 33 and Figure 36) are analogous and directly 
comparable with the results of the resourcefulness levels according to the UFTTR, which depends on 
the redundancy levels (RNMC).  
From a visual interpretation, it is observed that the road segments, which are characterised as highly 
robust for safe driving with undisrupted mobility (drivable), are those, which are characterised as 
reliable, providing the means for timely ER. The characterised road segments are deemed reliable 
and have unaffected/not impacted FFS from the impact of floods and high RNMC levels, which 
means redundant road segments for timely ER delivery. In the ERR concept (section 2.1), the 
satisfactory functionality of the road segment, that is, the provision of ER delivery under flooded 
conditions, is analogous to the reliability of the road segment itself. This relation can also be verified 
from other studies oriented to the quantification of disaster resilience. As already proven 
scientifically, in [222], resourcefulness and redundancy are strongly interrelated in ways that could 
create more redundancies, which did not exist previously to the occurrence of the stressor to the 
system. For example, if the fire brigade system needs to operate under flood conditions, for achieving 
its primary strategic goal, timely ER towards the safety of the population needs to operate with 
resourceful road segments that provide the resources in regards to reliability for undisrupted 
(decreased travel time) or, at least, higher travel time (still operable roads).  
When answering the RQ4, the operationalisation methodology of the ERR (Figure 13) to floods of 
the Cologne fire brigade system suggests the utilisation of the graph theory and the network science 
with applied geoinformatics (section 4). With the developed GIS-Toolkit (Figure 14 and Figure 15), 
the suggested methodology provides high-resolution large-scale robustness, redundancy, and 
resourcefulness assessments of the fire brigade system's ER road network and results in flood-risk 
informed road network databases for each of the selected flood scenarios. The redundancies added 
from GIS databases are valuable for the enhancement of the rapidity of response feature, but on the 
other hand, the strong dependence of the use of technology from emergency managers is rendering it 
as critical [227] for the emergency response delivery; if technology fails or is not secure (hacked). To 
overcome this and to answer the RQ7, through the suggested methodology, the redundancies added 
can be critical in case of terrorist attacks or blackouts, which can enhance the resourcefulness of the 
fire brigade system with the provision of created maps, enhancing their geospatial preparedness, with 
flood-risk informative maps, towards timely ER provision (see section 3.3). Answering the RQ5, the 
timely ER (reflected on the rapidity feature of ERR) is achieved with ER delivery within defined time 
thresholds from each ERS and is dependent on the status of the ER road network (robustness) and its 
impact on the FFS (redundancy).  
Additionally, as stated in section 3.2, the quantification of the redundancy can serve as a reliability 
indicator when designing a system [320], and therefore, the flood-impacted travel time reliability is 
calculated according to the flood-impacted FFS. As the RITAI indicator suggests (see section 4.1), 
taking from the transport network science, where TTR is vital for assessing the performance of an ER 




introduced in emergency management, mainly emphasising on human factors. However, in this 
thesis, it is argued that the resourcefulness of the fire brigade system can be identified on many 
different scales and levels of the SoS (i.e. urban ER system). To answer the RQ5, the RITAI suggested 
for implementation in a GIS environment for the enhancement of the ERR to floods, enables 
automated calculations of the flood-impacted TTR, through the simple configuration of the GIS-
Toolkit (Figure 14), implementing function 6 and function 7, for every selected flood scenario, per 
road segment, in maps (Figure 40 and Figure 41). The UFTTR is calculated with function 8 and 
reveals the geolocated resourcefulness levels of each road segment for timely ER and allows for 
aggregation of the information for the entire ER road network. Answering the RQ3, together with the 
visualisations of the quantified robustness and redundancy (sections 8.2 and 8.3), the maps of UFTTR 
provide the basis for risk-based performance assessments of the serviceability of the ER road network 
of Cologne under flooded conditions, as presented in this section, towards mitigation of the potential 
cascading and emerging risks, identified in section 1. This identification of the cascading risks is 
enabled with large-scale spatial assessments of the ER road network of the Cologne fire brigade 
system, which is tightly interfaced and interdependent and could enhance its vulnerability. Towards 
enhancement of its ERR to floods and mitigation of cascading risks occurring under the stressor of 
floods, consideration and integration of indirect flood impact interdependent features such as the 
traffic and mobility characteristics of a road network is a necessity.  
Robustness, redundancy and resourcefulness of the ER road network, as spatially analysed in a semi-
automatic way (GIS-Toolkit) for the selected flood scenarios, are the interdependent ERR features 
that affect the rapidity of response. Therefore, their assessment as a whole (interdependent resilience 
features – see Figure 11) through the RITAI is suggested. The robustness levels affect the redundancy 
levels and resourcefulness levels (in a non-linear way). Accurately, the resourcefulness levels of the 
road segments for timely ER are derived from measurements of the UFTTR per road segment and are 
dependent on measurements of the flood-impacted FFS (redundancy - section 7.2). 
Stressing the ER road network system with compound escalating flood events, the high 
resourcefulness of the road segments for timely ER is decreased (between the regular HQ10 and the 
HQ500) by 1% due to the high intensity and extent of the HQ500. In the case of the flash floods (T20 
and T100) stressor to the ER road network, the high resourcefulness of the road segments for timely 
ER is also decreased by 2%. Medium resourcefulness according to the levels of UFTTR, as 
discussed, characterises the road segments, which are adding high travel costs to the ER (impedance) 
but are still drivable (depending on the ER capacity on vehicle equipment, see section 2.1). The 
medium resourcefulness increases by 9% for the riverine floods, which means that 9% more of the 
ER road network is flood-impacted, but to a level that still allows safe drivability (even if slow - 
walking speed). The medium resourceful road segments are increased by 17% for the case of flash 
floods, with 17% more impaired kilometres of the ER road network, adding high travel costs in the 
ER provision. In the ERR concept, as blocked are characterised the road segments that are not 
resourceful due to the impact of high FD (higher than 0.5 m - not robust/not drivable). These road 
segments are not redundant for providing timely ER, and it is suggested that these road segments 
should not participate in ER route planning [26, 240, 246, 416]. The increase of UFTTR, that is, the 
decrease of the travel time from node to node for each road segment, is high for both flood types. It 
is expected that the riverine floods, in case they escalate from regular to extreme, will highly impact 
the travel times of the ER road network by 90% more and 81% more in case of flash flood events 
escalating from the T20 to the T100 (extreme scenario). This means that the calculated flood impacts 




are the so-called Grey Rhino scenarios, which, it is argued, should raise awareness for further actions 
taken from all the participating agents in the urban ER system (see Table 2). 
When answering the RQ7, as implemented in previous analyses, fuzzification for discussing the 
results is necessary. Notably, because fuzzification makes the measurements of the sub-indicators of 
ERR succinct, it is intended indicatively for: 
i) praxis-oriented purposes  
▪ implementation of the methodology for timely ER planning with prioritisation of the route 
planning with robust, redundant and resourceful road segments under several flooded 
conditions 
▪ identification of critical areas on a road segment level for positioning of real-time awareness 
sensors monitoring the intensities of the flash flood levels, for timely evacuations and 
location-allocation (logistics) of ER equipment etc. [81, 133, 167, 174, 181, 188, 239, 269, 
296, 404, 417] 
▪ CIP - transport networks’ protection and specifically the road network by identifying critical 
road segments of potential quicker pavement degradation and other geographically 
interdependent CI to avoid cascading effects [79, 140] resource planning (electrical grids) and 
more 
▪ traffic control management regulations according to flood intensities [89, 303, 308, 309, 318, 
331, 418-422] for mitigation of accidents 
▪ bridge protection to floods towards timely ER provision and ERR, enhancing the reliability 
of the transport infrastructure integrated or adapted to resilience-based designs such as [423], 
as well as bridge cables, integrated into research frameworks such as [424], for the 
enhancement of the safety of the population, through the undisrupted provision of resources. 
ii) for the scientific community and further possibilities for enrichment/improvement 
▪ possibilities for further update of the methodology with additional traffic characteristics/risk 
identifiers, such as traffic density and traffic demand, with additional weather impact factors 
such as visibility and scanning of raindrop density, road slipperiness, and winter maintenance 
frequency [89, 174, 250, 302, 303, 308, 419, 421, 422] 
▪ use of the methodology with different stressors to the system such as unintended disruptions 
through accidents (traffic domain) [89, 421],  
▪ provision of weighing factors for further criticality, flood risk and climate change impact 
assessments on a large-scale of various interdependent CI [155, 179, 235, 408, 409, 425-429] 
▪ provision of weighing factors for further local vulnerability and risk assessments 
(neighbourhood, community and network level) integrated with various approaches [195, 254, 
298, 408, 412, 415, 427, 429-437] 
▪ combined with other models [123, 249] 
▪ combined with resilience indexes and assessment tools [149, 201, 230, 235, 293, 360, 401, 
438, 439]. 
From the quantification measurements of the different features of the ERR towards 
operationalisation of the ERR to riverine floods and flash floods of different intensities, it is 
proven that geolocated information on the FD and its impact on the RNMC is essential. In the 
previous sections, through operationalisations of the different sub-indicators of the ERR, it is 




▪ the higher the level of exposure of the ER road network (FD levels) to floods, the lower the 
level of the robustness for timely ER 
▪ the higher the robustness level, the higher the RNMC in the case of floods - the lower the level 
of exposure - 
▪ the higher the level of the RNMC, the higher the redundancy of the ER road network for 
timely ER towards ERR.  
Absorption of the impact of the floods from the ER road network system, with analogous system 
transformation according to adaptation capacity, is expected to provide timely ER, analogous to the 
risk level. This notion will be examined in the next section, where the RITAI indicator is 
operationalised on a city unit level, considering the risk of degraded or blocked ER provision of a 
road segment, for connectivity analysis through the rebuild of the ER road network for each selected 
flood scenario (aggregation of information – see Figure 13).  
 
 
7.4 Rapidity of Response Under Flood Conditions/Connectivity & Accessibility 
This section intends to answer the main RQ3, RQ6 and RQ7 by quantifying the leading indicator of 
ERR, the RITAI (see section 4) in GIS, with the methodological suggested workflow in Figure 25. 
Answering the RQ3, the flood-risk informed ER road network databases on a large-scale (road 
segment level), with large-scale assessments of the robustness, the redundancy and the 
resourcefulness in a GIS environment, reveal potential CI losses on a road segment level. These 
updated road network databases are rebuilt in a GIS environment with the Network Analyst tool as 
suggested in section 6 for further network analyses regarding the connectivity of the ER road network 
(NA road network) and the entire Cologne fire brigade system. The rebuilding of the ER road network 
with information on the flood risk, in regards to flood-impacted travel times according to the various 
defined FD classes, is, concretely, the redesign of the entire fire brigade system (see Figure 4) after 
configuration (see Figure 26) with the ‘Closest Facility’ algorithm. The resulting rebuilt ER road 
network databases, with flood risk information for each flood scenario, are designed to provide 
information in regards to the connectivity of the ER road network, omitting the small road segments 
(smaller than one-meter length) and the ones that are considered unreliable, according to travel time 
(see section 4.1). In this way, the fire brigade stations are connected with the city units flood-impacted 
to a level that ER provision is available. Therefore, answering the RQ7, identified losses on a road 
network level under the stressor of floods are depicted on the participation of the city units in the 
network analysis after network analyses conducted in GIS, providing an aggregation of information 
in regards to flood risks reflected in the rapidity of the response feature of ERR. As suggested from 
the RITAI (Table 3), the rapidity of the response feature of the ERR is assessed with connectivity and 
accessibility assessments, with aggregated information from a road network level to a city unit level.  
The suggested methodology (Figure 15) enables flood-risk information feedback loops between the 
different systems of the fire brigade system, with a zoom-in and zoom-out effect, which is needed to 
enhance the ERR to floods in complex urban environments. ER efficiency operationalisation under 
flooded situations, towards operationalisation of the ERR to riverine floods and flash floods, with the 
RITAI, also considers the risk of delayed ER. The risk is analogous to the impact of the selected 
floods on the RNMC and the UFTTR (see section 4.1). The operationalisation procedure of the RITAI 
with GIS (Figure 25) starts with network analytics on the ER road network before the occurrence of 
a flood event. In this way, the identification of the connectivity of the ER road network and the fire 




RQ6, time is the primary risk identifier of degradation or impairment of the ER provision, i.e. the 
time needed to travel/drive through each road segment. In this way, the redesign of the ER road 
network databases is a reassignment of travel times to each road segment of the entire road network 
of Cologne, is weighted by its impedance cost (travel time), from node to node (road as a weighted 
graph – Figure 4). In the case of ‘normal days’ of ER provision, before any flood occurrence, the 
ERPS used from Cologne’s fire brigades for ER route planning are used to calculate the travel times 
with function 9. The redesigned/updated ER road network database uses these travel times as weights 
for connectivity analysis of the entire fire brigade system (Figure 3), forming the NA networks. After 
the rebuild of the NA network (before a flood scenario), the citywide connectivity analysis of the 
entire Cologne fire brigade system with the ‘Closest Facility’ algorithm is enabled. As mentioned in 
section 5, each city unit of Cologne serves as a destination, which is transformed to its point of 
representation, the centroids (see Figure 24) for NA performed for each flood-risk updated ER road 
network database. As discussed in section 6, the algorithm is configured to use the ‘Time Impedance’ 
as a travel cost to identify the ‘Closest Incident’ (city unit) instead of the distance impedance. For the 
ER efficiency operationalisation of the fire brigade system, towards operationalisation of the ERR to 
floods, the “closest” city units to fire brigade stations are the city units that can be reached within 
specific time thresholds (see section 4.1 and 6.3). The Network Analyst tool, using the Closest Facility 
algorithm, assigns a unique ID number, named “IncidentID”, after the build of each NA road network 
(see Figure 46). With GIS visualisation techniques, the IncidentID of the city units is displayed in the 
form of labels. Each city unit is a hexagonal sub-location of Cologne, forming the city's beehive, 






Figure 46: Hexagonal spatial matrix of city units of Cologne of 0.25km² serving as the destinations for the 
ER’s simulation with network analysis 
 
 
The hexagonal city units, covering the entire Cologne area, are 1677 in number. The enumeration and 
labelling of the centroids serving as incident points (destinations) for the NA are random and are 
conducted from the ‘Tessellation tool’ of ArcMap 10.6.1. For structured enumeration for ER and civil 
protection purposes, the different methods presented in section 6.3.2 are suggested. Before the 
occurrence of a flood, the connectivity analysis of the NA network revealed that 96 city units out of 
1677 are not participating in the NA (Figure 47); therefore, the participating areas in the NA analyses 
are 1581 in number. These 96 areas will not participate in further accessibility analyses, indicating 
the ER efficiency in regular days (before any flood occurrence). After verification with a land-use 
map of Cologne, including water bodies and land use, the non-participating areas have been identified 
as areas of either water bodies (river area, lakes) or parks, which do not include any road segments. 






Figure 47: Not participating areas in the NA (blue dots) for connectivity and accessibility assessments. 
Cologne’s fire brigades are the red rhombi, and the city units are represented by their centroids (black dots) 
 
 
Since not all the city units/incidents are participating in the NA after the rebuild of the ER road 
networks, the visualisation of the participating ones provides complementary results to these from the 
exposure assessments on a local area level. To answer RQ7, the visualised participating city units in 
the NA can serve as a first situational analysis regarding the exposure and accessibility of the case 
study area under flooded conditions. The results are also i) depictive of the impact of the FD on the 
RNMC and UFTTR for ER purposes and ii) assisting the efficiency assessment (timely ER provision) 
of the fire brigade system under flooded conditions, leading to ERR assessments. After the rebuild of 
the flood-risk informed NA networks for each selected flood scenario, the connectivity analysis of 
the fire brigade system under flooded conditions is enabled. That is, the weighted road segments with 
highly impacted travel times (not reliable) that will not participate further in the accessibility 
assessments and therefore, the city units (incident/centroids), that were identified from the ‘Çlosest 
Facility’ algorithm as not reachable, are excluded, indicating highly flood-impacted areas.  
Therefore, identifying the extent of each flood is enabled with the aggregation of information from a 
road segment level to a city unit, providing a deepened understanding of the whole range of flood 
impacts (direct and indirect). The neighbouring road segments failing to provide ER (participate in 
the accessibility assessments) due to their high weight (highly impacted travel times) on a road 
segment level. This first exclusion of the participating centroids provides a primary situational 
analysis valuable for the fire brigade system, raising awareness for critical areas that need further 
action towards enhancing ERR. The visualisation of the participating incidents (city units) in each 
NA implemented with updated NA networks in each selected flood scenario is presented in Figure 
48. The information provided in such forms (spatial hexagonal encoded maps) enhance the 




   
  
Figure 48: Hexagonal connectivity-informative spatial matrixes with encoded accessible city units of Cologne 
from the fire brigade stations, in case of the HQ10 (upper left), the HQ500 (upper right), the T20 (bottom-left) 





As presented in section 7.3, emergency operations' primary concern and focus are the logistics of 
operations (resource allocation – staff and rescue equipment) and the road status regarding 
connectivity and accessibility. Therefore, the suggested methodology is applied to the fire brigade 
system of a complex urban area for operationalising the ERR to floods, with the risk-based and time-
dependent accessibility indicator, the RITAI (section 4.1). Accessibility in the ERR concept is defined 
in section 7.3 and considers the risk of delayed or blocked ER provision in deployments under flooded 
conditions.  
Accessibility in the ERR concept is defined as the time of response of the fire brigades to the nearest 
city units that can be reached in case of floods in a timely manner (within defined response time 
thresholds. RITAI is, therefore, calculated with the abstraction of the flood-impacted accessibility 
time from the accessibility time that a fire brigade needs to respond/reach/access the closest city units. 
It considers the impact of the flood on the road-type dependent FFS and, therefore, the travel time 
(reliability) of the ER road network segments (TTR) so to provide the final accessibility time (function 
2). In GIS (see Figure 25), the risk-based indicator of the accessibility is measured through route-
directed accessibility assessments, calculated in minutes from each of the fire brigade system to the 
nearest centroids before and in case of each of the selected flood scenarios (function 1). Accessibility 
assessments for the nearest locations through network analytics, which enable the calculations of the 
shortest route paths from the fire brigade stations, indicate the fire brigades’ ER efficiency under 
flooded situations.  
Therefore, it is argued that the fire brigades’ ER efficiency (resiliency) to floods is dependent on the 
RNMC (redundancy) and the UFTTR reliability (resourcefulness) of the ER road network under 
flooded conditions. The implementation of the methodology suggests the absorption of the stressor 
(floods) to the selected ER system, with large-scale exposure assessments and the assignment of FD 
per road segment. The absorption capacity of each road segment is benchmarked as suggested in 
sections 6.2 and 6.3, according to each urban ER system’s equipment capacity in rescue vehicles, for 
driving through flooded waters considering the safety of the emergency responders, their assets, but 
also the safety of the population, through the extension of the adaptation capacity through 
transformation. It is argued that ER efficiency assessments should consider the travel time delays that 
occur from the flood-impacted travel times assigned to the road network on the scale of analysis so 
that the route planning could be time-efficient. Time efficiency is further benchmarked according to 
each ERS response time thresholds. It is argued that response efficiency is enhanced by enriching the 
resourcefulness component of the ERR with suggestions on the fastest routes provided for each of 
the fire brigades, taking into consideration the offered ER RNMC for timely ER route planning. For 
an overview of the efficiency of the ER under different flood scenarios in a complex urban 
environment towards the operationalisation of ERR, network analyses are conducted on a 
compartmentalised case study area (Cologne) into the hexagonal city units. 
The fastest routes are identified with directed route calculations (from facilities to closest 
centroids/city units), planned through resourceful and medium resourceful (travel time reliable and 
medium travel time reliable) road segments for ER provision, thus aiming to enhance the rapidity of 





       
Figure 49: Risk-based time-dependent fastest accessibility routes of Cologne’s fire brigades to the nearest city 
units in case of the HQ10 (left) and the HQ500 (right) (see enlarged in APPENDIX B) 
 
 
The NA results for each flood scenario, i.e. flood-impacted accessibility assessments, differ due to 
the degradation of serviceability of the road network affected by each of the selected flood scenarios. 
According to the flood intensities, the degradation of service depicts the flood-impact levels on the 
redundancy and resourcefulness of the ER road network. The accessibility times, before and after the 
occurrence of the selected flood scenarios, are calculated with the configured ‘Closest Facility’ tool 
in ArcGIS Pro 2.3.2. The accessibility times are assigned to each centroid, and they serve as the 
weighting factor for further ERR assessments. The accessibility patterns (Figure 50) conducted in 
ArcMap add to the redundancy and resourcefulness of the fire brigade system for the enhancement 
of the ERR to floods. The plotted measurements are the results of the accessibility time, in minutes, 
of the city units of Cologne from the nearest fire brigades in case of the riverine floods of HQ10 and 
HQ500, as well as of the potential blocked areas (absence from NA results/not participating in NA) 
where ER cannot be provided. The place and the colour of the dots that follow the classification 
colouring scheme (green, orange, red) indicate the accessibility time of each sub-location from the 








Figure 50: Accessibility patterns above and below the eight-minute response time threshold in case of  
the HQ10 (above) and the HQ500 (below) with the number of accessible sub-locations of Cologne 
 
 
Apart from the riverine floods, the methodology also suggests implementing the two selected flash 
flood scenarios for the urban area of Cologne, aiming to provide insights and raise awareness about 
the reliability of the road network in case of each flash flood scenario. Thereby, information regarding 
the ER provision affecting the overall ER efficiency of the fire brigade system under flash flood 
situations is provided. The NA conducted with ArcGIS Pro 2.3.2 and the Network Analyst tool uses 
the updated ER road networks (built-in ArcMap 10.6.1 for NA) after the regular and extreme flash 





   
Figure 51: Risk-based time-dependent fastest accessibility routes of Cologne’s fire brigades to the nearest city 
units in case of the T20 (left) and the T100 (right) (see enlarged in APPENDIX B) 
 
 
After the accessibility routing calculations implemented for the regular and extreme flash flood 
scenario in Cologne, the accessibility patterns (Figure 52), created in ArcMap 10.6.1, are raising 
awareness in regards to the effects of the flash floods to the ER delivery and, in general, the efficiency 














Figure 52: Accessibility patterns above and below the eight-minute response time threshold in case of the 
HQ10 (above) and the HQ500 (below) with number of accessible sub-locations of Cologne 
 
 
7.4.1 Discussion of the Rapidity of Response 
Answering the RQ7, the accessibility patterns (Figure 50 and Figure 52) of Cologne’s fire brigades 
provide a first overview of the ER efficiency for the selected flood scenarios with observations 
regarding the density of the coloured dots. They also provide additional resources to the fire brigade 
system towards enhancement of the rapidity of response. The coloured time-weighted dots are 
representing the accessible city units, with information on their accessibility time. Their colour 
indicates the assigned risk-based accessibility time (weighted local areas with risk information 
regarding ER accessibility after the occurrence of floods). The density and deviation from the time 
threshold of 8 minutes indicate the ER road network efficiency. For example:  
▪ the density of the dots is indicative of the density of the accessible city units from the fire 
brigades,  
▪ the further they are above the threshold (negative impact to the rapidity of response and ERR), 
the higher their time of accessibility from the closest fire brigades,  
▪ the further they are under the threshold (positive impact to the rapidity of response and ERR), 
the quicker they are accessible from the nearest fire brigades.  
 
Additionally, through the accessibility patterns, the identification of the flood intensities of the 
different selected flood scenarios is enabled for the entire area of Cologne. Furthermore, to answer 




identification of the snowball indirect flood impacts of the selected riverine and flash flood scenarios 
in several scales and levels. The large-scale risk assessments dependent on exposure and vulnerability 
assessments on a road segment level, conducted with the GIS-Toolkit (see Figure 14), provide large-
scale risk information reflected on the levels of robustness, redundancy and resourcefulness of the 
ER road network for timely ER provision, considering the safety of the emergency responders, as 
well as the security of the rescue vehicles. Geovisualisation techniques combined with fuzzification 
enabled the classification of the impacts according to the FD classes, which benchmark the 
operationalisation assessments. The benchmarking of the assessments is additionally enabled with 
geovisualisation, which provides geolocated large-scale information, displaying critical areas of the 
ER road network and aggregates the information to the entire ER road network with a comprehensive 
overview of the entire city of Cologne, enabling further accessibility assessments of the ER road 
network, reflected on the entire fire brigade system. The accessibility assessments are, later on, 
conducted using network analytics and the flood-risk updated road databases resulting from the GIS-
Toolkit, which are reconstructed after configuration (see section 6). The fastest routes of the fire 
brigades to the closest (in time) city units provide additional risk information, reflected on the rapidity 
of the response of each fire brigade station and the entire fire brigade system. 
Geovisualisation techniques enable the classification process, for a more straightforward 
interpretation of the results, regarding levels of ER provision. From a visual interpretation from the 
results in  Figure 50 and Figure 51, the right side of Cologne (east), as a reader sees the maps, seems 
to suffer more from the degradation of the fire brigade ER provision. Even with the regular riverine 
and flash flood scenarios, H10 and T20 respectively, this side of Cologne seems to have a road 
network that has reduced absorptive capacity of the flood impacts, with decreased adaptation and 
transformation capacity.  
Therefore, these visualisations of such flood impact information raise awareness for further actions 
to be taken, either for improving the road network (CIP) or enhanced preparedness for response and 
joint forces between the fire brigade stations of the entire city with training for such flooded situations. 
In the training process, it is argued that the flood-impact curves conducted for each selected flood 
type, considering the scenario of escalating flood events, can add to the redundancy of all three agents 
of an urban ER system (see Table 2), fostering further collaboration, towards a strengthened 
preparedness for response. For example, it is argued that in case that the storages of rescue equipment 
of the fire brigade system are located on the right side of Cologne, without any backup location, there 
is an increased need to relocate the equipment to more than one storage unit for the enhancement of 
the ERR, in the face of floods. Furthermore, the visualised maps can enhance the resourcefulness of 
the fire brigade system with added redundancies such as the printed maps, specifically in case of 
black-outs, which can also be EWE-triggered.  
The accessibility maps, resulting from the suggested methodology, offer detailed route pre-planning, 
considering potential disruptions to the ER road network in several flood scenarios. On the other 
hand, flood-impacted route plans convey the uncertainties of the flood models used, which could lead 
to biases, but on the other hand, they are raising awareness for the accessibility to city units that may 
cluster other CI i.e., hospitals, nursing homes and schools. In section 7.4, it is mentioned that 
emergency response route planning [242, 279, 336] is of vital importance. In the case of the ERS of 
Germany (section 6.3), as mentioned in the performance analysis for 2016-2017, many of the 
deployments could be pre-planned [370]. Pre-planning means that there was enough time between 
the time of response and the initiation of the response. EWE-triggered route pre-planning might seem 
far from reality in the case of floods since the assessments do not integrate any other traffic 




raising awareness and training purposes since it can cover various flood types and intensities while 
also providing information for potential escalations. 
Additionally, the route-planners, traffic planners and urban planners can be informed in regards to 
geolocated and visualised large-scale information on the TTR, which provide a detailed overview of 
the possible level of degradation of the road network and the ER efficiency in regards to timely 
accessibility in predefined response times, considering direct and indirect flood impacts. As 
demonstrated in section 7.4, the response times [335] of several ERS, such as the fire brigades and 
the medical services, are crucial for emergency response planning, specifically regarding 
accessibility. So to answer RQ6 and as mentioned in section 7.4, emergency managers are using 
accessibility in general as a risk-identifier of the response efficiency.  
Response efficiency is used for the evaluation of the performance of the ER of several ERS in terms 
of timely ER provision, in the predisaster phase but also during and after various disaster/crises for 
planning, shelter of the vulnerable population, evacuation and location optimization for emergency 
humanitarian logistics [188, 342-346]. As Weibull [347] stated in 1980, “the accessibility refers to 
the properties of the configuration of opportunities for spatial interaction”. As it is presented in the 
thesis, through the application of the methodology, the accessibility route pre-plans provide these 
configurable opportunities for spatial interaction between the systems of the fire brigade system, with 
CAS properties (in Figure 3), for a strengthened preparedness of response and enhancement of the 
ERR floods. It can be argued that the measurements of the accessibility are indicative of the high 
spatial dependency on the status of the road network (physical and geographical interdependency) 
with the serviceability level that is under research, as critical functionality of the ER road network, 
revealing the high interdependence. So to answer the RQ3, the mentioned interdependencies are 
considered with the suggested methodology and the developed ERR indicator, the RITAI.  
Moreover, in regards to the location of ERS for ERR under the impact of floods, visual interpretations 
of the results of the exposure assessments to riverine floods (Figure 30) indicated that some of the 
fire brigade stations are located around highly flooded road segments - indirect exposure assessment 
of the geographically interdependent CI. This observation could raise awareness towards the 
robustness of the fire brigade system itself (answering the RQ7) through department positioning 
analysis. Exposure of the fire brigades in Cologne, hospitals and refugee shelters and ER efficiency 
assessments have been already conducted via static exposures, but only with the use of the extent (no 
FD information) of the extreme flood scenario HQ500 [226, 234]. Specifically, they have been 
conducted in the context of civil protection, emergency response routing and service area analyses, 
including additional delays (impact) from driving through the flooded road network, towards 
vulnerability and resilience assessments of the ERS (fire brigades and hospitals). In [226], potential 
delays due to the absence of the actual information on FD levels were calculated by weighting the 
flooded road network with a delaying factor of 3.0 (triple tie increase of drive time) used for 
emergency routing analysis. The road network used at that time was an OS dataset of low-quality 
with missing information on the speeds of many roads around Cologne. The results provided potential 
alternate routing paths to be followed after an extreme flood occurrence for ER purposes, such as 
evacuations of the flooded hospitals and refugee shelters. In 2019 and for work conducted for the 
final workshop of the project CIRmin the methodology was applied with the same extreme flood 
scenario (HQ500) and for the same goal: accessibility assessments of the fire brigades to impacted 
flooded hospitals enriched with potential delays occurring from driving through flooded road 







Figure 53: Fire brigade ER risk-based time-dependent accessibility assessments in case of the extreme riverine 
flood HQ500 18 
 
 
18 Information on:  
▪ the FD levels and their impact on the accessibility considering the flood impact on the RNMC according to the 
safe driving capacity of the fire truck through flooded road segments, 
▪ the exposure of the fire brigades to the extreme riverine flood,  
▪ the exposure of the hospitals and  
▪ the ER efficiency (timely ER delivery) of the fire brigade system. Fastest accessibility routes through travel time 
reliable and medium travel time reliable road segments.  
      In: https://kirmin.web.th-koeln.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Poster_Risikoanalyse-der-Bev%C3%B6lkerung-und-Infrastruktur-am-Szenario- 




The results, as shown in Figure 53, differ extensively from the ones in [226]. The reasons are that 
detailed information of the impact of the FD levels of a HQ500 on the speeds and the update of the 
ER road network with empirical data on the speeds used for ER route planning from the Cologne fire 
brigade(pre-flood state) are essential for near reality accessibility assessments under potential floods. 
Officials from the Cologne fire brigade(external partners of the project and participants in the final 
workshop of the project CIRmin) expressed that i) they, of course, are aware of the results provided 
from the GIS analyses, but ii) on the other hand, they do recognize the value of GIS and its potentials 
in emergency management.  
In discussions with civil protection officials, it was verified that GIS maps are easily interpretable 
compact visualisations of sophisticated analyses for praxis-oriented purposes.  
In this section, to answer RQ6 in efforts to tackle the urban complexity of Cologne, considerations 
are made regarding the dynamic relations between the different concepts of the transport network 
(network topology), the traffic (speeds) and the given dynamic characteristics of complex networks. 
In [104], it is argued that it is helpful to analyse the related type of stable/unstable evolution and the 
leading conditions to the system's resilience in the presence of shock or perturbations. In [165], this 
theory is acknowledged for improved climate extremes impact modelling and their transport 
implications. The conceptualisation and the implementation of the methodology suggested in this 
thesis are formed around this theory, focusing on the untangling of the complexity of the urban ER 
system initiating the analyses on compartments of its interdependent CI, with particular focus on the 
road network (for reasons mentioned above). Towards this notion, the accessibility measurements are 
provided for the city units of the case study area, occuring from the process described in section 3.2.3, 
depicting citywide accessibility assessments for each selected flood scenario and reflecting the 
rapidity of response capacity of the fire brigade system in case of floods. 
These outcomes indicate that the methodology also provides results of the centrality of the road 
segments; tested performance for timely ER considering safe driving through flooded waters. 
Centrality measures are used generally to measure the degree of importance of specific nodes/links 
in a street network [334] and aim to quantify a node's capacity to be influenced by or to influence 
other system elements under its connection topology [349-352]. For example, the measure of 
betweenness centrality has been used in strategies to reduce the impacts of EWE to the infrastructure 
networks [287], indicating critical road network links potentially profoundly impacted from floods in 
regards to safe driving through flooded waters. In general, network analyses conducted with GIS have 
been proven effective for centrality measurements in network concept generation methods [353]. 
When applied to scenarios of local flooding, centrality measurements indicate flood-impacted areas, 
which are not physically or geographically interdependent [159], as also has been identified through 
the application of the methodology (see Figure 48). Such information can raise awareness for further 
adaptive management of cities towards integrative and adaptive disaster-risk mitigation actions. 
In the next section, the evaluation of the changes in the ER accessibility measurements for the selected 
flood scenarios represented in hexagonal matrixes takes place. These changes represent the impact of 
the selected flood scenarios on the ER road network, taking into account vulnerability assessments 
regarding reductions of the ER FFS through flooded waters and accessibility. 
It is argued, in the thesis that the resilience informative resulting matrixes that enhance the 
redundancies and resourcefulness of the Cologne fire brigade enhance the rapidity of response and 
enable resilience-based decision making, which includes interdependent resilience information in 




that the interpretation of such measures, combined with outcomes from complex methodological 
analyses presented in the thesis, becomes easier when classified in matrixes.  
 
 
7.5 Emergency Response Resilience (ERR) to Floods for Cologne’s Fire Brigades 
The quantification of ERR is conducted, as presented in Figure 27. The results from the calculations 
take place in each flood-risk informative road network database. Each city unit (hexagon) is assigned 
with the calculation results from function 1 and is accordingly classified in different colours for a 
quicker derivation of situational assessments for ER purposes (preparedness, ER route planning, 
prioritization planning, location-allocation planning of humanitarian assistance in case of different 
types of floods). The ERR is quantified and classified as presented in Figure 54. 
ER for Cologne has a time threshold of 8 minutes, as mentioned in section 5.2. Since each ER minute 
is valuable, specifically in a complex urban environment such as Cologne, the classification considers 
the increase of accessibility in minutes, where each minute increase indicates the ERR deficiency. 
The results in Figure 54 portray the ERR hexagonal matrixes in the selected regular and extreme 
scenarios of flash floods and riverine floods (Figure 20 and Figure 21). The hexagonal matrixes are 
classified according to the ERR level of the city units (hexagons) regarding the risk-based 
accessibility from the fire brigades under floods; the quantifying factor suggested in the thesis. The 
calculations conducted for each of the selected flood scenarios revealed different maxima of increase 
of the accessibility, which can also be an additional indicator of the impact of each of the flood 
scenarios on the ER efficiency. As blocked areas are described as areas inaccessible from any fire 











Figure 54: Hexagonal ERR-informative spatial matrixes with ERR levels per city unit of Cologne in case of 
the HQ10 (upper left), the HQ500 (upper right), the T20 (bottom left) and the T100 (bottom right) (see enlarged 






The ERR to the selected riverine floods and flash floods is summarised and analysed in Figure 55. 
After implementing function 1 in GIS, the total accessible city units with qualitative classifying 
variables are calculated for each class. Figure 55 summarises the potential fire brigade response 
efficiency in the selected riverine and flood scenarios. Potential is used as a word since, as stated 
earlier in the thesis, the calculations convey the uncertainties from the calculations of the selected 




Figure 55: ERR levels of Cologne to the riverine floods HQ10 and HQ500, and the flash floods T20 and T100, 
with a qualitative classification of the ERR according to FD impacts to the accessibility times of each city unit 
 
 
Individually, for each selected scenario, the percentage of ERR levels is presented in the following 
Figure 56. They individually reflect the percentage of ERR levels, in case of each selected scenario, 
i.e. percentage of flood-impacted accessibility time changes, providing a citywide overview of the 
ERR as applied to the Cologne fire brigade system (aggregation of information). The results serve as 
a cumulative overview of the percentage efficiency of the fire brigade response system of Cologne, 
according to the resilience capacities of the ER road network to the selected flood scenarios. 
Specifically, they present the percentage response efficiency levels of the Cologne fire brigade 
system, in case of floods, that is, the percentage of the accessibility time change of the city units from 
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Figure 56: Percentage ERR levels for the riverine floods and flash floods of Cologne’s fire brigade system 
(HQ500, the HQ10, the T20 and the T100) 
 
 
7.5.1 Discussion of the ERR to Floods for Cologne’s Fire Brigades 
So to answer the RQ6, the compartmentalisation of the area with GIS tools into city units enables 
detailed situational analysis of the service area coverage (SOC) of Cologne’s fire brigades through 
NA, building on the ERR to riverine floods and flash floods of Cologne. Detailed situational analysis 
is achieved by the separate accessibility assessments of the different city units. NA performed for 
accessibility assessments (see section 6.3.3), patterns the ER efficiency and structure of the urban 
complex system of Cologne. In combination with compartmentalisation, this patterning results in a 
holistic overview of the ERR with its strengths and weaknesses after implementing the methodology 
(see section 6.3.2).   
In a GIS environment, the compartmentalisation of the case study area is a tessellation, resulting in 
hexagonal tessels/tiles, which are the city units, as suggested from the methodology in this thesis. As 
previously stated, tessellation is a process of preparing various data representations by creating 
partitions using one or more geometric shapes fitting each other without any overlap and gap on each 
side [384]. Nevertheless, this was not optional with the use of the ‘Tessellation’ tool in GIS. As 
observed in Figure 54, there are some missing areas; an error of the GIS tool used from the ArcMap 
10.6.1 - library version.  
The tessel (city unit) size is determined according to the scenario of analysis. Specifically, for the 
application of the methodology, for Cologne, a tile size of 0.25 km² is chosen. It is selected after 
considering the calculation times and the detailed analyses. For example, even though it would 
minimize the calculation costs (which are high due to the large-scale analysis), a larger size is not 
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After initial tests, larger tessels, up to 0.50 km², could also be ideal for implementing the methodology 
for other urban case study areas close to the size of Cologne, avoiding loss of information and biases. 
Even larger tessels than the 0.50 km², on a city scale, are not recommended. 
 Nevertheless, configurations of the methodology and easy adaptability to different scenarios and 
case studies of various scales is an advantage. The disadvantage is the high calculations costs (see 
section 4.2.1) stemming from the large-scale analysis on a road network level (1 m road segment). 
The results of the quantification of ERR to floods for Cologne are presented in Figure 54 with the 
different levels of ERR represented by the colouring scheme suggested, following the regulations of 
[403] for communication of risk and resilience, via matrixes. The advantages of the hexagons (section 
3.2.3) and their ability for a uniform and complete coverage of the study area without gaps are 
considered, as they are fit for consistent communication of results of the methodology. In this way, 
decision-makers can proceed to collaborative training activities towards strengthened preparedness 
for response and adapt their management agendas accordingly to enhance urban resilience [440]. 
Explicitly, in this methodology, the areas are represented by their centroids, which are nodes of 
hexagons added to the analysis system and serve as incident areas for the NA conducted. The 
suggested RITAI weights these nodes with quantified ERR, and the ERR matrixes (see Figure 24) 




Figure 57: City units of different ERR levels and accessibility routes. In the red circle is a city unit with high 
ERR (green hexagon) 
 
Taking a closer look at the ER road network’s efficiency (see Figure 57) overlaid with the ER 
efficiency (i.e., ERR levels) reveals critical areas regarding the risk of untimely accessibility or 
inaccessibility. The results depend highly on the correctness of data, their resolution, the scale of 
analysis and benchmarking of the indicator (RITAI). For example, for further improvement of the 
methodology, the city units with high ERR and high accessibility, neighbouring more than one 
blocked city unit, could be weighted differently regarding ERR levels if the area has a high population 




These results could serve as additional weighting factors for a more comprehensive ERR analysis 
towards prioritised route planning for timely ER under flooded conditions.  
The representation of different types of information (population, schools, hospitals) for further 
analyses is possible due to the high representational accuracy of the hexagons [386, 389].  
 
Their boundaries are shared with six (6) neighbours rather than four (4), as would happen with 
squares. This attribute makes finding neighbours more straightforward, avoiding the connectivity 
inefficiency of the rectangular grid providing valuable information for further analysis, as mentioned 
earlier. The circularity of the hexagons gives the advantage for further impact analysis and weighting 
opportunities towards prioritisation of ER in case of floods, as presented in this thesis. They also 
reduce the sampling bias due to edge effects of the grid shape, which is related to the low perimeter-
to-area ratio of the shape, providing the opportunity for a realistic integrated representation of 
aggregated information of various analyses suggested in previous sections. This characteristic also 
allows for the representation of curves in the patterns of the emergency route paths with exact 
directions (connectivity and movement paths); therefore, the hexagonal matrixes are best fit for 
analyses, including ER accessibility assessments. 
Furthermore, any point inside a hexagon is closer to its centroid than any given point in an equal-area 
square or triangle; therefore, they are best fit for comparing polygons with equal areas. This attribute 
enables further improvement on the accessibility assessments, considering the closest and timely 
accessible point in a hexagon as a destination and not the centroid as suggested in the methodology. 
This idea can also be supported further due to the notion that: when more similar to a circle, the 
polygon, the closer to the centroid the points near the border are, and the comparison is then avoiding 
biases. Hexagons are also ideal for analyses on large areas because a hexagon grid suffers less 
distortion than the shape of a fishnet grid due to the curvature of the earth (risk matrixes used 
extensively in risk analysis).  
Despite the occurring resulting errors from the GIS tools used, in general, the visualisations of 
complex information carried from the RITAI is sufficient for interpretation of the level of ERR in 
case of each selected flood scenario, according to the response time classification of choice.  
The thesis also argued that the hexagonal matrixes are the best fit for representing risk information 
for ER, civil protection, and CIP purposes. For this purpose, future work could focus on the 
enrichment of the RITAI with the integration of information on different weighting factors such as: 
▪ accessibility assessments under different potential hazards and benchmarked according to CI 
and systems’ capacities integrated into various resilience indexes [230, 293, 439], 
▪ real-world route representations updated from live flood and rainfall early warning systems, 
which provide actual FD using methodologies and tools as in [176, 288, 441] and [442] who 
also addresses the scale and resolution issue in urban flood modelling,  
▪ traffic light density - as an additional delay factor of the ER, as also suggested from the author 
of the thesis in [79, 226] in case of compound events 
▪ information on the density of the population after [147] enhancing the criticality level of the 
neighbouring road network and the city unit, towards prioritisation of response (see Figure 
58),  
▪ vulnerable groups of the population - also enabled through the triangulation capability of the 
hexagons, which enables their representation towards prioritisation of ER (see section 6.3.2)  
▪ different groups of the population of one city unit - also enabled through the triangulation 
capability of the hexagons (see section 6.3.2) for further risk assessments. 
▪ density of the various CI (Figure 58) which could serve as lighthouses [267], enhancing the 




hospitals, nursing homes, refugee shelters. The indicator can be integrated with GIS-based 
assessments for ER purposes, such as in [341, 345, 346]. 
 
For this purpose, they must guarantee the information, communication and supply needs of the 
population for a long time after a crisis occurs, if necessary. Therefore, accessibility to buildings that 
can serve as potential lighthouses must be undisrupted and timely under any weather conditions. The 
density of such buildings (Figure 58) plays an essential role in enhancing the criticality of the area 
(tessels, as suggested in this thesis), providing awareness for focused civil protection actions to be 
taken towards urban flood resiliency at a local scale. The example is proposed for further investigation 
of emergency logistics' prioritisation and incorporation in urban resilience concepts. Furthermore, 
population density has been suggested already as an important factor affecting the vulnerability of a 
road network on large scales [145] negatively. In Figure 58, the population density is aggregated from 
1 km2 to 0.5 km2, displaying the zoom-in and zoom-out possibilities of a hexagonal matrix on a city-
scale, valuable for civil protection, CIP and emergency management purposes. Considering the 
population's safety, time-effective ER services must be incorporated as a risk factor in DRM/FRM 
approaches in urban areas, as suggested in this thesis. This is essential due to the dependence of lives 
on external rescue.  
For the prioritization of emergency response purposes, the population's dependency levels can be 
qualitatively assessed and localised via GIS maps. More specifically, attempts for the assessment of 
the disaster/crisis preparedness of different groups of the population (elderly, young, migrants) in 
case of a long-lasting blackout and their dependency levels in regards to external rescue and 
information (social media, internet, radio, television), has been conducted in the frames of the project 
CIRmin [78, 226]. Unfortunately, they were not statistically significant to be used in the suggested 
operationalisation methodology, as weighting factors of the city units, towards prioritisation of 
rescue. Regarding logistics on resources, fuel consumption and population needs - the elderly, 
handicapped, migrants and the young generation have different needs and capacities. Nevertheless, it 
is argued throughout the thesis that the population density, geolocalised in the city units forming 
urban population beehives, can enhance the rapidity of the response of an urban ER system and 
strengthen the preparedness phase with advanced preparation, for fast resilience-based decision 
making, in regards to timely ER provision in case of riverine floods and flash floods, considering: 
▪ relocation of ERS buildings,  
▪ flood resilient lighthouses,  
▪ community resilience through the enhancement of self-preparedness and flood insurance 
strategies 
▪ CI resilience through the strengthening of the CIP against floods 
▪ post-flood traffic regulations 
▪ prioritisation resource plans 
▪ scenario-based ER route pre-planning and printed maps 






Figure 58: Hexagonal spatial matrix of Cologne’s population density with hexagonal spatial units  
of 0.25 km2 (left) and hexagonal spatial matrix of the density of different CI (potential lighthouses) and shelters 
with hexagonal spatial units of 0.5 km2 (right) – intentional lower resolution maps 
 
 
7.5.2 The intent of integration of the ERR Concept: Semi-structured         
   Interviews & Qualitative analysis 
 
In Madrid, Spain and specifically at the Spanish Civil Protection School (ENPC), the EU project 
ANYWHERE (6 - 7 March 2019) organised a hands-on training activity on new tools to support real-
time response during weather-induced emergencies - platform A4EU. In such platforms, 
“meteorological data are translated to risk impact maps” for emergency response purposes in case of 
weather-induced events. The platforms are used for early warnings for energy providers, traffic 
planners, emergency managers etc. and can be used as self-protection tools (flood-prone campsites - 
impact on roads). They have been applied to several European case studies and have used hazard 
information and risk information (from sensors or forecasting models) integrated with vulnerability 
maps resulting in dynamic impact maps.  
However, the impact of different intensities of floods has been assessed on a building/area and road 
cell (rectangular buffer) scale and none of the case studies presented have used road safe mobility 
capacity as a factor for further consideration. Therefore, the author, motivated by the risk scenario-
based methodology implemented in this thesis, conducted semi-structured interviews with various 
European stakeholders, researchers, emergency response and civil protection officials participating 





▪ Q1: Are you familiar with the concept of resilience?  
▪ Q2: What could be ERR for you? How would you define ERR in simple words according to 
your background knowledge? 
▪ Q3: Is the information on road network status after a risk occurs essential for timely, effective 
emergency response and why? 
▪ Q4: Is flood depth information and drive time delays needed for timely-effective emergency 
response purposes? If yes, how would you integrate such information into emergency response 
plans? 
▪ Q5: Would you integrate into emergency response plans drive time delays resulting from  
driving through flooded road networks? 
▪ Q6: How would you read the following map?  
 
▪ Q7: How could information provided in this form (pattern/matrix) assist emergency planners 
/stakeholders/you? 
 
The semi-structured interviews aimed to gain some insights from the experts (practitioners and 
scientists from different EU countries) according to their knowledge background, in regards to: 
▪ the level of familiarity with the subject of resilience - indicative of the level of understanding 
of the following questions (answer to Q1) 
▪ the level of ERR definition capability, according to their knowledge background - indicative of 
the efficiency of communication of the thesis’ subject (answer to Q2) 
▪ the need for integration of drive-time delays caused by floods (for civil protection and 
emergency response purposes) from a practitioners’ perspective, but also from different 
officials/scientists (familiar with the impact of weather-induced emergencies) - indicative of the 
usability of the methodology suggested and intent for further consideration in emergency/civil-
protection/ CIP /evacuation planning and training (answers to Q3, Q4, Q5). 
▪ the level of interpretation and understanding of colour-classified risk-based resilience matrixes, 
with little information provided (image of ERR hexagonal matrix) - indicative of the easy 
interpretability of such matrixes (answer to Q6) 
▪ the level of intent for potential integration of the methodology to different planning for civil 
protection and emergency response activities and different platforms, such as the A4EU 
presented in this training activity (answer to Q7).  
The results from the interviews are presented in a Table in Appendix C. 
In general, the participants in the interview are familiar with the concept of resilience. According to 
their knowledge/experience background, they have also defined ERR successfully, close to the given 




transformation, and continuation of the perturbations occurring due to EWEs or natural hazards of 
different intensities. Furthermore, the need for FD information (physical damage/loss of a flood) and 
its impact on the ERR is verified. The information on the actual FD, via real-time monitoring systems 
or flood preparedness maps, is recognised as an essential factor for the situational awareness of the 
ERS, traffic control management after flood occurrence, and criticality assessment of city areas. The 
participants also underlined the usefulness and the need of information in regards to FD impacted 
drive time and its integration in layers of data and maps for: 
▪ emergency/civil protection response,  
▪ safety of the population 
▪ evacuation processes 
▪ city-based criticality assessments 
▪ accessibility of the population and geographically interdependent CI 
▪ safe driving mobility of emergency vehicles 
▪ emergency route planning 
▪ shelter positioning 
▪ reducing the risk of weather- and flood-caused fatalities  
▪ identification of safety zones for the population (gather points) 
▪ pre-location planning of teams involved in the emergency response 
▪ impact analysis of the floods on the RNMC for emergency response purposes on a large scale  
▪ connectivity assessment of critical assets (interdependency analysis is essential). 
Nevertheless, few participants (3 out of 14) replied that drive-time delays are not needed or are 
impossible to integrate into emergency response route planning. In regards to the level of 
interpretability of ERR hexagonal matrixes, the results showed that 100% of the participants 
understand the risk-based colouring, utilising the fuzzy set theory and assigning fuzzy classifying 
variables (qualitative), such as high (red colour), medium (orange), operational (yellow), green (no 
impacts). The results verify that such resilience informative matrixes are the best fit for the 
visualisation of complex information.  
Additionally, this colour scheme is recognisable in Europe, and it might differ in other continents 
(comment of a participant familiar with the subject). This comment of the participant raises awareness 
about the applicability of such methodologies in other continents, but on the other hand, the risk-
based colour classification is easily configurable. In the end, the level of intent for potential 
integration to different planning for civil protection and emergency response activities, but also to 
different platforms bringing science to the end-users, is high. It is mentioned that impact assessment 
of floods to the road network is “…affecting the accessibility of the different areas”, and “…could 
be useful for real case studies”, emphasizing the need for locational knowledge background for 
improved assessments and prioritisation processes. Another critical insight given was in regards to 
suggestions for further usability of such methodologies “… in countries that do not face flood risk, 
for practical training of the responders regarding emergency preparedness and planning”. Overall, 
99% of the participants identified the usefulness of implementing such methodologies (impact 
assessments towards risk-based ERR assessments). Specifically, it is mentioned that “the study on 
the resilience of an emergency response system can be a step forward for better emergency planning 
activities”. Additionally, the traffic density is identified as an additional factor for further 
consideration (as also suggested throughout the thesis), and it is emphasized that such maps can be 





General observations also indicate that for civil protection and emergency response purposes, there 
is a need for: 
▪ assessment of the emergency response resilience of systems 
▪ for simplification of information, on a national and accurately on a regional scale, regarding 
disseminating risk information.  
▪ for tools assessing the impact of EWE-induced events (riverine floods and flash floods, of 
snow, of drought etc.) on CI using forecasting models etc. time effectively (primary CI of 
focus impact on the road network, schools and hospitals -a bit for rail network) 
▪ there is a need for the enrichment of such platforms with more tools providing information for 
a timely, effective emergency response. 
In this thesis, the ERR conceptual framework and the operationalisation methodology suggested, 
applied with GIS workflows and tools, aim to fulfil these needs by providing different large-scale 
maps (exposure, redundancy, resourcefulness and ERR matrixes) for ER purposes. These maps 
enhance the geospatial preparedness to such events, with high-resolution products, regarding in-depth 
impact (risk) analyses assessments considering both present and future extreme flood events. The 
analyses in the thesis regard flood impacts to the components of the road network and their traffic 
characteristics (RNMC and TTR) and the ER delivery (urban ER system efficiency). The aim is the 
quantification of the ERR considering safety and security aspects on a city-scale, based on risk-based 
and time-dependent accessibility assessments, in case of riverine floods and flash floods of different 
intensities, and the concept can be utilised further as mentioned in the discussion sections 7.1.1, 7.2.1, 
7.3.1, 7.4.1, 7.5.1. 
 
 
8.  Conclusions 
Since disasters continue mounting, with climate change playing a vital role in this increase, the 
international frameworks, such as the SFDRR, call for strengthened preparedness for response with 
adaptive management, which explicitly addresses the risk and a deepened understanding of hazard 
related impacts on societies and their environment, in a range of scales. Strengthening the 
preparedness and response to EWE-induced disasters, such as riverine floods and flash floods and the 
cascading impact they trigger, is a challenge for the scientific community, practitioners and decision-
makers. Therefore, EWE-induced riverine floods and flash floods have been under the magnifying 
glass of the scientific community, either for the production of high-accuracy probabilistic models, for 
methodologies that assess their impacts, in efforts to enhance the resilience of communities and the 
interfaced CI, to their occurrence. Through the literature review conducted in the thesis, the need for 
inclusion of aspects, such as the safety of the population, safety of the emergency responders 
operating under sub-optimal flooded conditions and security of rescue assets (fire brigade buildings, 
rescue equipment storages, rescue vehicles), lack scientific attention is demonstrated. Additionally, 
there is an identified lack of connection to application fields such as the fire brigades, civil protection 
and critical infrastructure protection, which need to be made. Therefore, this thesis contributes to the 
overall goals of saving lives, a strategic goal of civil protection and emergency management, by 
reducing losses in CI functioning that is a strategic goal of CIP. This is achieved by providing more 
detailed risk analyses on large scales (intraurban), boosting community resilience by enabling 
emergency responders, civil protection officials, and critical infrastructure planners to utilise the 




Many scientists argue that it seems impossible to develop a single theory, model, or tool for solving 
EWE-related issues of increasing frequency and intensity due to their unpredictable nature. Such 
issues become even more complicated when they occur in the operation and management, in complex 
adaptive urban settings, with high densities of CI and population, specifically in emergencies.  
Therefore, this thesis argues that it is feasible to strengthen the preparedness for operations in sub-
optimal conditions by analysing the present (frequent flood events) and the “improbable” future 
extremes. Furthermore, it is argued that a deepened understanding of a range of flood events in 
complex urban environments is enabled with a further breakdown of the complex systems into simple 
components with further compartmentalisation to identical segments or units. With this 
compartmentalisation, this thesis suggests that the issues can be solved independently, on different 
levels, concerning traditional boundaries and conditions, after configuration according to the 
capacities and needs of the respective ERS systems, urban CI networks and urban areas. In the end, 
they can be combined to solve the issues of a single SoS and can be utilised for macro-level solutions 
in regards to enhancing their resilience to external disruptions. Moreover, for this isolation of issues, 
this thesis proposes the utilisation of applied geoinformatics, which intersect digital technologies and 
spatial sciences, enabling spatial analyses, handling, extracting and manipulating several forms of 
data (quantitative and qualitative). Therefore, issues occurring from flood-induced disruptions in 
urban complex adaptive systems enable the digitisation and compartmentalisation of an urban SoS, a 
deepened understanding of the flood impacts on large and small scales, as called from the 
international DRR frameworks (i.e. SFDRR). GIS, offer a high quantity of tools, which are most 
commonly used for applying geoinformatics, offering the possibility to develop new tools for 
complex problem-solving.  
Regarding the resilience concept towards mitigation of flood impacts in complex urban environments, 
this thesis proposes an urban ER system conceptualised with graph theory, CAS thinking, and 
network science, enabling resilience thinking for advanced and integrative resilience approaches. In 
this way, the thesis suggests combining the flood, transport, urban and spatial resilience concepts 
applied to urban ER systems. Respectively, resilience and the indicator approach followed enable 
further compartmentalisation of the SoS (urban ER system) for in-depth operationalisation 
assessments and provision of solutions for every system, network level and agent of the urban ER 
system. Therefore, it is also suggested that CAS thinking enables the identification of operational 
properties of a SoS with CAS properties (urban ER system) through the identification of the hierarchy 
of the interconnected systems and paves the ground for further magnification, enabling the isolation 
mentioned above of the issues and large-scale operationalisation assessments. As it has been argued 
throughout the text, such operationalisation assessments are enriching the so far silo-thinking DRM 
approaches, which still lack spatial assessment tools that are combining cascading impacts (risks) of 
various intensities, enabling fast decision-making through strengthened preparedness. Therefore, 
through the conceptualisation of an urban ER system and its resilience framework, it is proposed that 
resilience, for an overall system of an urban area related to its ER, is a composition of interdependent 
resilient components of the systems they compose it. That is, the interdependency of resiliencies of 
the systems of a SoS is suggested as a core component of an ERR concept and is consisted of: 
▪ the resilience of the ER in urban environments - named urban ERR, 
▪ the resilience of the under research urban ER system (i.e. fire brigade system), 
▪ the resilience of the critical infrastructures used (i.e. road network and ERS buildings),  
▪ the interrelation of the urban ERR with risk when it comes to a disruptive event (flood) that 




urban ER system under the stressor of various flood intensities, providing opportunities for 
enhancement of the resilience capacities of the systems. 
 
The flood events reveal how the urban ER system can cope with the flood due to these 4R features 
(robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity of response). In the thesis, and with the 
utilisation of the CAS theory, the road network is identified as higher in the system's hierarchy. 
Therefore, following the conceptualisation of the suggested ERR framework, its resilience, i.e. TTR, 
for timely ER under the stressor of floods, is of focus and is considered the primary resilience 
identifier for the overall urban ER system resilience. In general, the revelation of the coping capacity 
of the timely urban ER under flooded conditions is in the ERR concept, the TTR of the ER road 
network. TTR is proposed as a resilience identifier on a network level, which serves as a combinatory 
node between the concept of risk and resilience. TTR’s operationalisation reveals the complex 
behaviour of the ER road network regarding its ER efficiency provision and, consequently, the urban 
ER system. Specifically, TTR is assessed after exposure and vulnerability assessments, which are 
identifiers of the absorption capacity of the system and the adaptation and transformation capacity of 
the urban ER system under the stressor of floods. 
Furthermore, for an application of the suggested ERR operationalization methodology to several case 
study areas and several urban ER systems (fire brigade systems, EMS) and CI networks, a multi-
criteria indicator is suggested. The risk-based time-dependent accessibility indicator, the RITAI, is 
designed to spatially analyse the aforementioned interdependent resilience components of an urban 
ER system with applied geoinformatics, which include: 
▪ a GIS-based methodological framework and a developed GIS-Toolkit for large-scale spatial 
assessments of the robustness, the redundancy of the road network, transferring information 
from raster to line vector data and automatically calculating the flood-impacted road-type 
dependent FFS, on a road segment level,  
▪ risk-informed updated road network databases resulting from the developed GIS-Toolkit and 
GIS calculations of the flood-impacted travel times on a road segment level,  
▪ spatial assessments of the robustness, redundancy and the resourcefulness of the ER road 
network for timely ER, with exposure and vulnerability assessments associated with FFS and 
TTR changes, on the scale of analysis,  
▪ flood impact curves (statistical analyses) of the robustness, redundancy and resourcefulness, 
for detailed, in-depth analyses of the flood risk to the ER, v) network analyses for connectivity 
and risk-based time-dependent accessibility assessments revealing the impact of the flood risk 
to the performance of an urban ER system (i.e. fire brigade system) under ER,  
▪ the aggregation of information with GIS-based calculations and geovisualisation techniques 
after simplifying information with fuzzy variables and classification.  
 
Therefore, this thesis contributes to the overall goals of saving lives, as mentioned previously, which 
is a strategic goal of civil protection and emergency management by cutting down losses on CI 
functioning - a strategic goal of CIP -, with the provision of more detailed risk analyses in large-scales 
(intraurban). The aim is to enhance community resilience by enabling emergency responders, civil 
protection officials and critical infrastructure planners to utilise: 
▪ an operationalisation adaptive resilience framework for SoS with CAS properties, which are 
furthermore fostering collaboration between end-users (agents of the urban ER system), 




▪ adaptive and transformative pre-routing plans, according to rescue equipment capacities, 
strengthening the preparedness for rapid response through enhancement of the redundancy 
and resourcefulness of the urban ER system, in case of blackouts, enhancing their geospatial 
preparedness for such events, but also providing the possibility for operations under sub-
optimal conditions,  
▪ service area analyses, considering the status of the ER road network in regards to the 
resourcefulness levels for timely ER provision, revealing the risk to each fire brigade station,  
▪ flood-impact curves for flexibility testing and identification of “no-recovery” thresholds of 
the urban ER system in case of floods,  
▪ geovisualisation techniques for aggregation of information from large-scales to smaller and 
vice versa, fostering the exchange of information between the ERS system and CI operators, 
providing the means and tools for enhanced collaboration towards the safety of the population, 
the safety of the emergency responders and security of the interconnected CI in an urban ER 
system. 
 
Categorically, the adaptive operationalisation spatial upscaling methodology suggesting the multi-
criteria RITAI applied to the Cologne fire brigade system, after application of the GIS-Toolkit for the 
four selected flood scenarios of the city of Cologne, returned four updated ER road network databases 
with information per one-meter road segment in regards to the FD and the recalculated flood-
impacted FFS. The benchmarking of the calculation process to four FD classes, including the zero 
FD, allows for the configuration of the operationalisation process according to the rescue vehicle 
capacity of Cologne’s fire brigades. The classification of the FD levels per road segment of an urban 
ER system is easily configurable, especially with the developed GIS-Toolkit. It is suggested that they 
should be classified to consider the safety of the population (timely ER provision with a potential 
extension of connectivity) and the safe driving mobility by the emergency responders under flooded 
waters, which, according to the rescue vehicle capacity, integrates the decision-making and the ERR 
assessments the safety lens perspective. Accordingly, the detailed geolocated identification of 
critically flooded ER road network areas, specifically in urban areas, is vital for the operation and 
management, specifically in emergencies, may be possible.  
The large-scale GIS-based upscaling suggested methodology and the toolkit developed aim to 
advance the traditional urban management, and emergency response approaches, providing the 
theories, methods and tools for a strengthened preparedness for response to riverine floods and flash 
floods, which in intraurban systems, are under-researched [179, 233, 254]. The large-scale 
methodological workflow suggested in the thesis can be utilised and enriched further in combination 
with various theories, apart from those combined in the thesis, graph and fuzzy set theories, for further 
information before or during emergencies. Such theories are indicatively: i) the ‘decision tree’, which 
handles non-linear relationships in complex systems [443], ii) the ‘systems dynamics’, which can be 
used in CI protection tools as suggested from [426], and provide feedback loops [112, 444], indicating 
connections and consequences between various CI, and iii) the ’ high-level architecture’, used for the 
modelling and simulation of complex distributed systems [445] and multi-agent systems for resource 
optimisation after strong earthquakes [446].  
Additionally, as previously stated, it can also be utilised for agent-based modelling, producing 
dynamic interactions between real-world systems [447]. Specifically, is utilised for i) agent-based 
validation techniques for geospatial simulations [228], ii) risk-based flood incident management 




risk management frameworks [448] and v) synergetic mechanism simulations in emergency response 
[106].  
Throughout this thesis, it is also discussed that it is essential to understand the dynamics of the urban 
ER systems to enhance the urban safety of the dense population and the densely interfaced CI, 
considering safety aspects, including safe driving through flooded waters. 
End-users, such as emergency managers, together with city managers, urban planners, traffic 
planners, CI planners and various decision-makers in urban settings, need to start cooperating and 
enhance their resilience, towards EWE-induced perturbations, through collaborative training 
activities that can be fostered or initiated with the concepts and methodologies that this thesis brings 
together. As mentioned throughout the thesis, exchange of information, i.e. cyber interdependency of 
the participating agents in an urban SoS, such as the urban ER system proposed, must be an iterative 
process (adaptive and transformative management) and overcome issues of sensitivity of data, which 
often degrades the efficiency of timely-response. Scientists have underlined the lack of information, 
even though it plays a significant role in the effectiveness of ER [449, 450]. Therefore, this thesis 
also provides the means to overcome the exchange of sensitive data, which most disaster managers 
and CI operators cannot or refuse to exchange. The thesis further suggests that with the provision of 
detailed quality time-critical aggregated information, as outlined throughout the application of the 
methodology and has been under the scientific focus too for years [449-451], the exchange of 
information is enabled towards faster resilience-based decision-making and enhanced response 
capacity. 
Moreover, the spatial resilience-informative matrixes can be further enriched with ways presented 
throughout the discussion sections, fostering easier collaboration and exchange of sensitivity on the 
one hand but aggregated information on the other hand. Through the weighting processes suggested 
in the methodology for many scales and levels of an urban ER system applying geoinformatics, 
aggregation of information is asserted that it is not jeopardising data sensitivity issues that mostly 
come with geolocated information. Furthermore, the ERR concept as applied to the fire brigade 
system and outlined in the sections of the thesis propounds the further utilisation of the:  
▪ location theory [264, 452] solving its main issues, such as the “service area covering” and the 
“location-allocation” [242, 269, 338, 417, 453], combined with the tool of the Analytic 
Hierarchy Processes [454] introduced by [455, 456] for the support of decision-making and 
has been so far used in accessibility indexes [344],  
▪ prioritisation of restoration concept of individual systems and CI towards self-organisation 
and improvement of the urban ER system following the restoration interdependency 
mentioned in [457] and the reconstruction as a factor for redundancy analyses [301],  
▪ optimisation of the resources through the handling of the uncertainties occurring in risk 
management strategies for urban SoS with adaptive, transformative and collaborative 
management [22] of the participating agents fostering,  
▪ optimal coordination of the agents (organisations) through iterative communication and 
synchronisation of their operations towards time-effective management and response, as also 
suggested in [80]. 
 
Emergency management must shift the focus from simple risk-based decision-making to hazard-
related resilience-based decision-making, considering its resilience for response to various hazards as 
a priority of focus for further advancement, strengthening and enhancement of safety, both of the 




in urban complex areas, stressing the decision-makers for quick responses must be part of further 
investigations towards a deepened understanding of the occurring and emerging risks for further 
enhancing the urban community resilience.  
The conceptualisation of the resilience framework of a SoS in an operational way and specifically of 
the ERR as applied in a complex urban area and its fire brigade system is the first step towards 
enhancing the resilience of emergency rescue services to hazardous events e.g. floods. Flood impact 
assessment in urban areas on complex SoS, for a strengthened preparedness for response, as called 
from the SFDRR, needs high-resolution operationalisation methodologies and resilient architectural 
design to capture risks in all scales and levels, enhancing the interdependent resilience of its systems 
through constant adaptation and transformation. Furthermore, in this era of the increase in frequency 
and intensity of EWE, the management of the cities must consider and proceed with collaborative, 
adaptive and transformative management strategies. Such strategies, towards enhancing urban 
resilience, community resilience, and CI resilience, should have a mitigation focus rather than a focus 
on enhancing the preparedness for response to the extremes and known, until the capacity of 
prediction, futures. Therefore, it is argued that extreme, escalating, and compound events’ scenarios 
must be the future of hazard-related resilience assessments, considering not only the safety of the 
population but also the operational safety of the emergency responders and the security of the 
interrelated critical infrastructures (CI), bringing the resilience thinking to the forefront as a priority. 
Exchange of information between the different disaster, emergency and urban management agents in 
urban areas can be supported with aggregating methods and applied geoinformatics, fostering future 
collaborations for enhanced preparedness to respond to escalating and compound events. Finally, the 
suggested conceptualised framework of ERR to floods as applied to emergency rescue services and 
its operationalisation methodology, utilising applied geoinformatics, offers an exchange of multi-
scale, multi-level and multi-network information, can be either used compartmentalised or as a whole. 
This flexible and interdisciplinary character of the concept can be valuable for further applications to 
various emergency rescue services with various hazard scenarios in different urban districts, counties, 
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Rasters of the flood scenarios selected for the case study area of 
Cologne for simulation and “stress-test” purposes 
 











Frequent riverine flood scenario H10 with 10-years of flood occurrence 






Extreme riverine flood scenario HQ500 with >500-years of flood 






Tessellation and geometric representation of the city units of 
Cologne 
Hexagonal spatial matrix of Cologne (hexagonal city units in the form  














Operationalisation methodology of ERR to floods with a GIS-based upscaling spatial assessment workflow resulting in  




























Exposure of the road network to floods 



























Classified FFSchange of Cologne’s ER road network in case of the 
extreme flash flood of floods 
 
Classified FFSchange of Cologne’s ER road network in case  





Classified FFSchange of Cologne’s ER road network in case of the extreme 






Classified FFSchange of Cologne’s ER road network in case of the regular 






Classified FFSchange of Cologne’s ER road network in case of the extreme 






Classified Urban Flood Travel Time Reliability per segment 
(UFTTRj) of Cologne’s ER road network in case of floods 
Classified UFTTRj of Cologne’s ER road network after the regular 





Classified UFTTRj of Cologne’s ER road network after the extreme 







Classified UFTTRj of Cologne’s ER road network after the regular flash 





Classified UFTTRj of Cologne’s ER road network after the extreme flash 






Risk-based time-dependent fastest accessibility routes for Cologne’s 
fire brigades to the nearest city units in case of floods 
Risk-based time-dependent fastest accessibility routes of Cologne’s fire brigades to 





Risk-based time-dependent fastest accessibility routes of Cologne’s fire brigades to 






Risk-based time-dependent fastest accessibility routes for Cologne’s fire brigades to 






Risk-based time-dependent fastest accessibility routes for Cologne’s fire brigades to 






Connectivity-informative hexagonal spatial matrixes - 
Encoded accessible sub-locations of Cologne from the fire 
brigade stations in case of floods 






























Hexagonal Spatial ERR-informative matrixes  
per city unit of Cologne in case of floods 






ERR levels of Cologne’s fire brigade system in case of an extreme 













ERR levels of Cologne’s fire brigade system in case of an extreme flash 






























GIS-TOOLKIT - Detailed Methodology and Model 
 
The first part of the GIS-Toolkit is presented in the figure below and is mainly built because the 
ArcMap toolkit library collection lacks a tool for the extraction of information from a raster file (flood 
scenarios) to a line vector. Therefore, detailed information of the FD cannot be extracted into the road 
network directly. Nevertheless, in the GIS Toolkit library, the tool “Extract values to points” can 




Zooming to the first part of the GIS-Toolkit. Tools stringed together in the ModelBuilder of ArcMap 10.6.1 to 
create road segments (unit scale of the methodology) and extraction of information of the FD to the unit of the 
scale used. 
 
For applying the methodology suggested in section 4.2, it is used the scale of one meter (normalised) 
since it is applied on a city scale, and detailed information is necessary for high resolution results 
regarding resilience assessments. Furthermore, the normalisation provided from this segmentation 
allows for purely flood impact-based focused assessments, necessary for further detailed comparison 
analyses. Therefore, the creation of road segments of 1 m starts with a generation of points throughout 
the updated ER road network with official ERPS, with the tool named “Generate points”. The tool's 
output is a shapefile named “PointsAtLines”, with 4,382,013 points extracted along the road network 
of Cologne. This shapefile is one of the two inputs to the tool “Extract values to points”. The second 
input is the raster file of the flood scenarios through which the information of the FD is extracted and 
inserted in the road network database.  
This information is then provided in the shapefile named “PointsWithRasterValues”. This shapefile 
is, later on, one of the inputs to the tool “Split Line at Point”, which is splitting the road network of 
Cologne (first input) into segments, having as a start and endpoint the extracted points with FD 




is used to search for the maximum FD (in the flood raster models) around the segments and assigns 
the values.  
Finally, the shapefiles of “PointsWithRasterValues” and “road_networksplit2” are spatially joined 
with the tool “Spatial Join”, resulting in an integrated line vector road network with information on 
FD per road segment, gathered in the database field named “RasterValue”. Information on the FD 
per road segment (FDj) is a direct exposure assessment (physical flood damage), and therefore 
robustness assessments to the four selected flood scenarios of the road network are enabled (see 
section 3.1). 
In the second part of the model (see figure below) takes place the assignment of FFS per road segment 
and the updated FFS after each flood scenario, per road segment, based on the FD. Cologne's road 
network downloaded from OSM provides information on the FFS per road link and type, but not for 
all the road links. This lack of information is overcome with the manual update of the road network 
database with the official FFS used for ER purposes provided from the Cologne fire brigade per road. 
According to the road type, recalculations of the FFS per 1 m of the road on a later stage and per road 
segment occur. Furthermore, the travel time of each road segment before a flood scenario is calculated 
and saved in a new field, “DriveTimeBF”. 
 
 
Zooming to the second part of the GIS-Toolkit: Tools stringed together in the ModelBuilder of ArcMap 10.6.1 
to create an updated risk-informed road network database with information on FD, FFS and travel time before 
and after each input flood scenario for the scale unit (road segment). 
 
 
For the quantification of the impact of the selected flood scenarios to the road network with 
vulnerability assessments (see section 3.2) and therefore of the redundancy of the ERS (the ability 
of ERS to absorb the impact of the stressor to the system and transform so to function towards timely 
ER), new values of FFS per road segment are assigned using function 8. The road network database 
is updated with information on the FFS/ERPS, used for ER purposes from the Cologne fire brigade 
in a new field on a road segment scale. The next step is the assignment of the flood-impacted FFSAF 
calculated in case of each selected flood scenario in a new field. In this way, the road network 
database contains information on the FFS before and after each flood scenario (FFS change - 
an indicator of vulnerability), further enabling detailed large scale vulnerability assessments. After 




assignment. The following VB script is indicative of the process. The PR function (function 5) is 
based on FD calculated in millimetres, but the rasters of each flood probability used in this thesis are 
in meters. Therefore, so to achieve the extraction of FD information on a large scale with a decimal 
definition, for each raster (flood scenario), the “RasterValue” field (FD in meters) is multiplied by 















The three hypotheses (see section 4) are considered for automated benchmarking, calculation and 
assignment of new FFS for the case of each flood scenario, applied with the PR function (function 
5) and Kj function (function 6), which are taking into consideration the safe driving behaviour of 
a vehicle through flooded road segments according to FDj.  
Safe driving is achieved by driving a specific vehicle within a range of FFS. Furthermore, flooded 
road segments with FDj > 0.5 m are transformed to impassable, and for FD [0.3, 0.5) m, the road 
segments are transformed to walking paths, assigned with the FFS corresponding to a walking 
speed (see section 4.1). For the road segments not impacted from floods (not exposed to floods) 
with intact FFS, it is assigned to each of these road segments the FFS assigned before the flood; 
aforementioned first update of the road network with official ERRPS from the fire brigade of 
Cologne. The results of the calculation are saved in a new field, “SpeedwithFlood”. With flood-
impacted FFS per road segment, this field is used for the accessibility assessments (see section 6), 
taking place at a later stage of applying the upscaling spatial assessment methodology towards 
operationalising the ERR to floods.  
The new field on the database “SpeedwithFlood” is used for calculations, using function 8, on the 
travel time needed to pass each of the road segments, and the information is saved in a new field 
“DriveTimeAF”. The result is the TTR, which is calculated before and after each flood scenario per 
road segment, named in this thesis UFTTR, indicating the potential risk of each flood scenario to 
the driving behaviour of the emergency vehicles for timely ER provision. This information can 
be useful for the ERS, given the opportunity to include or exclude specific road segments from their 
emergency route planning. 
Code block → Script written in Visual Basics (VB) 
 
RasterValuemm = [RasterValue] * 1000 
PR= 0.0009*( RasterValuemm* RasterValuemm)-0.5529*RasterValuemm+86.9448 
If [RasterValue] > 0.5 Then 
SpeedwithFlood = 0 
ElseIF [RasterValue] > 0.3 Then 
SpeedwithFlood = 2.0748 
ElseIf SpeedPregnolato < [DriveTimeBF] Then 
SpeedwithFlood =PR 
Else 







Finally, the GIS-Toolkit is applied to the four selected flood scenarios providing four different 
road network databases with detailed risk information per 1 m road segment for ER purposes. 
These ER road network databases will serve as inputs for further risk and resilience assessments of 




































Python script of the GIS-Toolkit 
 
# Python script MODEL.py 
# Created on: 2019-01-7 12:29:34.00000 
# (generated by ArcGIS/ModelBuilder) 
# Usage: Python script MODEL <Distance> <PointsAtLines> <Strecken_shp> <Flood_raster> 
<PointsWithRasterValues>  
# Description:  
# Set the necessary product code 
# import arcinfo 
# Import arcpy module 
import arcpy 
# Script arguments 
Distance = arcpy.GetParameterAsText(0) 
if Distance == '#' or not Distance: 
    Distance = "1 Meters" # provide a default value if unspecified 
PointsAtLines = arcpy.GetParameterAsText(1) 
if PointsAtLines == '#' or not PointsAtLines: 
    PointsAtLines = "\... Flooddatabase.gdb\\PointsAtLines" # provide a default value if unspecified 
ER_road Network.shp = arcpy.GetParameterAsText(2) 
if ER_road Network.shp == '#' or not ER_road Network.shp: 
    ER_road Network.shp = "….\\...\\ ER_road Network.shp" # provide a default value if unspecified 
Flood_raster = arcpy.GetParameterAsText(3) 
if Flood_raster == '#' or not Flood_raster: 
    Flood_raster = "…..\\....l\\Flooddepths\\Flooddatabase.gdb\\T100_maxD_GESAMT" # provide a default 
value if unspecified 
PointsWithRasterValues = arcpy.GetParameterAsText(4) 
if PointsWithRasterValues == '#' or not PointsWithRasterValues: 
    PointsWithRasterValues = "… …\\...l\\... \\Flooddatabase.gdb\\PointsWithRasterValues" # provide a 
default value if unspecified 
# Local variables: 
Search_Radius = "0,1 Meters" 
StreckenSplit2 = "…\\... Flooddatabase.gdb\\road network_Split2" 
ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin = "… ….\\Flooddatabase.gdb\\ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin" 
ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin__2_ = ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin 
ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin__3_ = ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin__2_ 
Expression = "Speedvari" 
ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin__6_ = ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin__3_ 
ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin__7_ = ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin__6_ 
ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin__5_ = ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin__7_ 
ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin__4_ = ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin__5_ 
Code_Block  
# Process: Generate Points Along Lines 
arcpy.GeneratePointsAlongLines_management(ER_road_network_shp, PointsAtLines, "DISTANCE", 
Distance, "","") 
# Process: Extract Values to Points 
arcpy.gp.ExtractValuesToPoints_sa(PointsAtLines, Flood_raster, PointsWithRasterValues, "NONE", 
"VALUE_ONLY") 
# Process: Split Line at Point 





# Process: Spatial Join 
arcpy.SpatialJoin_analysis(ER_road_networkSplit2, PointsWithRasterValues, 
ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin, "JOIN_ONE_TO_ONE", "KEEP_ALL", "Id \"Id\" true false 6 Long 0 6 
,First,#,….\\Flooddatabase.gdb\\ER_road_networkSplit2,Id,-1,-1;DriveTimeBF \"DriveTimeBF\" true false 
19 Double 0 0 ,First,#,….\\Flooddatabase.gdb\\ER_road_networkSplit2,DriveTimetBF,-1,-1;Shape_length 
\"Shape_length\" true false 0 Double 0 0 
,First,#,….\\Flooddatabase.gdb\\ER_road_networkSplit2,Shape_length,-1,-1", "INTERSECT", "", "") 
# Process: Add Field 
arcpy.AddField_management(ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin, "SpeedwithFlood", "FLOAT", "", "", "", 
"", "NULLABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "") 
# Process: Calculate Field 
arcpy.CalculateField_management(ER_road_networkSpatialJoin__2_, Code block_expression 
# Process: Add Field (2) 
arcpy.AddField_management(ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin__3_, "ShapeLengthCalc", "FLOAT", "", 
"", "", "", "NULLABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "") 
# Process: Calculate Field (2) 
arcpy.CalculateField_management(ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin__6_, "ShapeLengthCalc", 
"!shape.length@kilometers!", "PYTHON", "") 
# Process: Add Field (3) 
arcpy.AddField_management(ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin__7_, "FloodImpactedTime", "FLOAT", 
"", "", "", "", "NULLABLE", "NON_REQUIRED", "") 
# Process: Calculate Field (3) 
arcpy.CalculateField_management(ER_road_networkSplitSpatialJoin__5_, " FloodImpactedTime ", 






































































 ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 
Interviewees Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 
Senior Specialist  
 






Yes, some sort of 
knowledge. There 
are so many 
different 
definitions for the 
term resilience. 
An emergency 
response resilience is 
one that works 
together to understand 
and manage the risks 
that it confronts, to 
reducing future risk by 
enhancing protection 
and building for 
recovery. 
Yes, it is very 
important. The 
roadblocks has to be 
known in advance, 
otherwise the response 
time will grow and in 
a worst case-scenario, 
people will lose their 
lives. 
Yes, but in a normal 
interventions you do 
not really use the 
emergency response 
plan. In Finland you 
can add road blocks 
etc. as a layer to our 
emergency 
management support 
tool (alarm list, maps 
and navigation) which 
every emergency 
vehicle has, but this 
information has to 
known and layers 
added before the 
intervention. 
Yes, if the depth 
is measured 
constantly and the 
plan updated. 
▪ Red (extreme) 
▪ Orange (high) 
▪ Yellow (substantial) 
▪ Light green 
(moderate) 
▪ Green (low or 
normal)) 
From this map, I can see which areas are 




        
Interviewees Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 ▪ Q7 




I think I am  A response leading to 




damages specially in 
case of massive 
evacuation 
Essential for the action 
of first responders, the 
reducing of risk of 
fatality (in 
Mediterranean areas 
50% of the deaths are 
due to the use of the 
cars), and for the 
evacuation plans  
Yes, for the reasons 
above 
Yes, essential to 
evaluate predicted 




▪ The risk for users 
from dark green to 
red (most 
dangerous) 
▪ The availability 
e.g.: 
red = forbidden, 
orange = first 
responders only, 
yellow = allowed 
but with cautious 
▪ To identify alternative safe paths 
▪ To close the dangerous roads 
▪ To preposition law enforcers in strategic 
place in order to regulate traffic 
▪ To preposition rescuers near the most 






Yes, but focused 
on industrial sites 
It is a way to relaunch 
traffic and activities in 
the short time possible 
and with less damage 
to people and goods 
Yes it is important in 
order to afford a better 




For time delays yes 
and they should be 
integrated on plans. As 
for the flood depth I 
am not sure because 
even small flood 
depths may hide 
damages on road that 
could impact cars and 
people 
Yes Road and traffic 
condition impacts due to 
runoff and floods from 
green (less impacted) to 
red (the most impacted) 
The information provided could help decisors to 



















Yes Fast response to 
mitigate the impact 
and help in a fast 
recovery 
Yes - To be sure 
emergency vehicles 
can pass, the people 
can go to a safe place 
in safety 
Yes - with evacuating 
routes 
Yes ▪ Red- extreme river 
is the flood 
▪ Orange - high “ “ 
▪ Yellow - medium “ 
“ 
Green - low “ “ 
 
▪ Create population awareness of the critical 
areas 
▪ Anticipate for evacuation with critical areas 
Cut the population access of red areas 
Chief of Civil 






Is the capability to 
maintain flexibility 
actions despite the 
emergency (or in the 
middle) 
Yes, the road status is 
a very important 
function in emergency 
response, if not one of 
the most important 
Yes I need this data to 
give access routes for 
the vehicles and to 
decide other needs to 
help the population 
Yes - after all we 
need a rapid 
reaction and 
response 
▪ In the context we 
are talking about 
it’s the accessibility 
for the emergency 
teams to different 
areas of a city 
▪ We need this info to planify the routes and 





Yes - Yes   Yes, emergency routes 
(safe ones) 
- Red ones have high 
water, are the flooded 
ones 
Helps us to set the escape routes and distribute 
routes 




        







Yes ERR= To maintain the 
electricity for working  
To have 
comprehensive plans 
so we can cope with 
the flood 
Yes, because our 
teams depend on the 
roads to arrive to 
affected assets 
Yes – it will enable to 
preposition teams and 
to reconnect some 
assets 
No Red zones are the 
affected areas 






Yes Crisis management / 
intervention in a 
critical situation in 
order to guarantee and 
sustain basic societal 
functions 
Obviously. Among 
other informetrics in 
order to support 
common operational in 





Is for other ones Yes Classical risk colour 
coding 
If it has the form of recommendations / 
guidelines 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        




        
        










Yes For me the Emergency 
Response Resilience is 
the way of thinking or 
prioritize how to 
deploy the emergency 
resource in the most 
efficient way knowing 
in advance the impact 
of the hazard. I would 
also understand the 
ERR as the manage of 
focusing the resource 
where the risk is 
higher no bothering 
where the hazard is in 
a non-risk area. 
Totally agree. If we 
want to deploy the 
emergency response in 
an efficient way is 
totally necessary to 
know which roads are 
operative or will be 
close in next hours 
(fire, snow, flood…) 
Roads for evacuation, 
roads for emergency 
services… it’s a must in 
an emergency response 
plan to avoid a one path 
to arrive to a place, trying 
always to have a network 
of roads to arrive 
everywhere. And if a 
unique road is the only 
way to arrive to one place 
and this road is highly 
potential of be under a 
hazard, the place has to be 
ready to be confined 
against that hazard. 
In few years all 
the cars will be 
driverless, so its 
ESTRICTLY 
necessary to add 




Areas with high potential 
of road problems 
Information in real time of density of cars and 
probability of impact of hazards next hours 
Forecast of the people’s movements for the 
hazard. Ex: a city is in fire, so all the people will 
exit the city in all directions (but are the roads 












Yes, I am familiar 
with the concept 
of resilience. 
Resilience is the 
ability of a 
system, a 
community or an 





   
ERR is the ability of 
the emergency 
response system to 
deal with all the 
disturbances that can 
occur in case of an 
event, both extreme or 
not. Dealing with 
disturbance may not 
affect the 
performances of the 
emergency system and 
that’s the ERR, it is of 
the emergency system 
the ability to deal with 
the unexpected 
without modify its 
performance. 
Yes, in case of an 
extreme event the road 
situation is a crucial 
point especially if the 
area to reach are in the 
countryside or remote 
area. The emergency 
response system has to 
be ready to face and 
organize its emergency 
plan in order to help 
people in need; that 
means that without a 
good communication 
all the system might be 
affected by a wrong 
use of the resources. 
Maybe yes and I 
would like that could 
be a good benefit in 
the emergency 
response plan. 
- There are different way to 
read the map above. 
Below my idea that could 
represent a mix of the 
different information I 
read: 
▪ Red area: is the most 
affected area by the event 
and high difficulties to 
reach people in need. The 
emergency response team 
has to be there as soon as 
possible to proceed to the 
evacuation, if needed, 
and to secure the area; 
▪ Orange area: effected by 
the event and difficulties 
to reach people in need. 
The emergency response 
team has to be there as 
soon as possible and 
secure the area and use it 
in case of evacuation of 
the red area; 
▪ Yellow area: slightly 
affected by the event and 
the difficulties are fewer 
compared to the orange 
and the red area to reach 
people in need. The 
emergency response team 
can use the area to reach 
the orange and red area in 
order to provide help to 
the people affected; 
Green area: the area is not 
affected by the event and the 
emergency response team 
can fully use the area to 
reach the most affected area. 
According to me, this kind of study is of crucial 
importance for the good of the population that 
can be affected by an extreme event. I think that 
the study of the resilience in the Emergency 
response system can be a step forward for better 






        
Interviewees Q1 Q2 Q3  Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 
Fire Officer/  







In this context I 




ability to respond 
to a changing 
situation 
As a field officer 
almost all accidents 
are more or less 
responding to 
changing 
surroundings. It can 
also be more than just 
single accident case. It 
can be e.g problems 
with communication 
network when you 
need to find out other 
ways to communicate 
between rescue units. 
Yes it is very 
important to know 
which roads are 
available to use and 
which are not. It is 
also important to know 
other route options 
especially for those 
areas where leads only 
one or two roads. 
Sometimes if primary 
route is not able to use 
it may cause tens of 
minutes delay in 
reaching the accident 
site because rescue 
units may drive even 
“wrong way” at first 
and then forced to go 
back to find other 
route. 
If the depth of the 
flood gives 
information, that is the 
road accessible or not 
it is very important. If 
roads are still able to 
use but there are many 
flood areas (especially 
in the urban area) then 
it is important to know 
how much all those 
floods delay driving 
time taken together 
because there might be 
dozens of smaller 
floods on the way. 
Unfortunately, I 
do not quite 
understand the 
question.  
Maybe due to lack 
of my language 
skills  
In this context I 
understand it that red 
areas are either high 
flood risk areas or there 
are already worst 
situation. Orange areas 
same but moderate risk 
or situation and so on. 
Green areas are fine. 
In other context it might 
mean population density 
or also it might mean 
risk areas based on 
actual accidents in each 
hexagon. 
Specially in those areas where floods are rare 
must have plans how to react when situation 
strikes because there might not be chance to 
practice. And when situation strikes you have to 
count on good plans. 





No, I am not - In Finland, it is not so 
important. In here we 
think that the road is in 
running condition or 
not. The weather can 
change fast so we have 
to estimate the vehicle 
we take on the scene. 
The condition of the 
roads can also change 
over the years so it is 
very hard to maintain 
data of it. 
The flash flood risk is 
so low that the 
information is not 
needed. There is only 
a little risk in spring 
- Red = high risk 
Green = low risk 
In some places it could be useful. In here we 
have so much other (more important) things to 
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